HUBUNGAN ANTARA SUARA BATIN (INNER VOICE) NEGATIF DAN PENERIMAAN DIRI PADA WARIA DI KOTA MAKASSAR by Desius, Vitha Melzy
78 The Open Neuroimaging Journal, 2012, 6, 78-89  
 
 1874-4400/12 2012 Bentham Open 
Open Access 
Self-Reflection and the Inner Voice: Activation of the Left Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus During Perceptual and Conceptual Self-Referential Thinking 
Alain Morin* and Breanne Hamper 
Department of Psychology, Mount Royal University, 4825 Richard Road S.W., Calgary, Alberta, Canada T3E 6K6 
Abstract: Inner speech involvement in self-reflection was examined by reviewing 130 studies assessing brain activation 
during self-referential processing in key self-domains: agency, self-recognition, emotions, personality traits, 
autobiographical memory, and miscellaneous (e.g., prospection, judgments). The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) has 
been shown to be reliably recruited during inner speech production. The percentage of studies reporting LIFG activity for 
each self-dimension was calculated. Fifty five percent of all studies reviewed indicated LIFG (and presumably inner 
speech) activity during self-reflection tasks; on average LIFG activation is observed 16% of the time during completion of 
non-self tasks (e.g., attention, perception). The highest LIFG activation rate was observed during retrieval of 
autobiographical information. The LIFG was significantly more recruited during conceptual tasks (e.g., prospection, 
traits) than during perceptual tasks (agency and self-recognition). This constitutes additional evidence supporting the idea 
of a participation of inner speech in self-related thinking.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Self-referential activity is currently the target of numerous 
brain-imaging studies aimed at determining what brain areas 
get reliably activated during self-reflection tasks. The 
consensus is that the following regions underlie self-related 
processing: cortical medial structures, which include 
ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, lateral 
prefrontal cortex, precuneus, insula, temporoparietal junction, 
and anterior/posterior cingulate cortex [for reviews, see 1-6].  
 Ruby and Legrand [7] recently proposed that memory 
recall and inferential reasoning constitute particular 
computational ingredients recruited when one is engaged in 
self-referential processing. That is, most self-reflection tasks 
employed in brain-imaging studies require one form or 
another of memory and evaluation involving a certain degree 
of uncertainty (e.g., does this personality trait apply to me?). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, most aforementioned brain 
areas recruited during self-reflection are also activated 
during memory recall and inferential reasoning.  
 Another elementary process potentially recruited during 
self-reflection is the inner voice [8-12]. Verbalizing one’s 
characteristics to oneself or engaging in a complex silent 
verbal self-analysis is postulated to facilitate the 
identification, storage, and retrieval of self-information [for 
details see 13]. Inner speech is known to serve various 
important cognitive functions [for reviews see 14-16], 
among which are planning [17], self-regulation [18], self- 
control [19], and memory [20], including working memory 
[21]. The idea that one often “thinks” (including about 
oneself) in words is certainly not new (Plato, cited in [22]); 
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what is novel is empirical evidence establishing connections 
between self-reflection and the inner voice. To illustrate, 
people report talking to themselves mostly about themselves 
[23]. Various validated frequency measures of self-focus and 
self-talk significantly correlate [e.g., 24, 25]. Deterioration of 
inner speech following a left lateralized stroke is associated 
with self-awareness deficits [10].  
 Morin and Michaud [26] noted that inner speech 
production consistently recruits the left inferior frontal gyrus 
(LIFG) and reported a relatively high incidence of LIFG 
activation during self-reflection tasks, suggesting inner 
speech activity during at least some self-information 
processing. More specifically, this team reviewed 59 brain-
imaging studies of self-awareness in the following self-
domains: agency, self-recognition, emotions, personality 
traits, autobiographical memory, and preference judgments. 
Resting state (REST) studies were also included because of 
the introspective quality of that state [20]. Fifty-six percent 
of all studies reviewed identified LIFG and presumably inner 
speech activity during self-reflection tasks. In addition, the 
LIFG was more frequently recruited during conceptual self-
tasks (e.g., emotions, traits) than during perceptual self-tasks 
(agency and self-recognition). This possibly suggests that 
more abstract self-aspects need to be verbalized in order to 
be fully brought to consciousness. 
 The main goal of the present meta-analysis was to 
expand Morin and Michaud’s original results [26] by 
combining them with a new set of brain-imaging studies of 
self-reflection published since 2006. The overall principle 
here [reverse inference; see 27] is that researchers can infer 
what particular thought processes are solicited during a given 
social cognitive task by concentrating on peripheral 
structures instead of on a core network. For example, 
retrieval of autobiographical information often activates 
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occipital regions [28]; control tasks typically do not lead to 
such an activation. Since these areas are known to support 
visuospatial imagery [29], one may suggest that retrieval of 
autobiographical memories is at least partially mediated by 
mental images of the self in the past [30]. Similarly, 
activation of the LIFG observed in Morin and Michaud’s 
review [26] has been taken as an indication that participants 
engaged in inner speech during various self-tasks. 
 The LIFG represents the neurological foundation of both 
overt and covert speech generation. The LIFG is also 
referred to as the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex or left 
frontal operculum; it includes Broadmann’s areas 44, 45, and 
47. There is little doubt that the LIFG is implicated in inner 
speech production. Numerous studies show LIFG activation 
when participants are asked to silently read single words or 
sentences, or when undertaking working memory tasks 
involving covert repetition of verbal material [e.g., 31-33]. 
Moreover, accidental destruction or temporary disruption 
(using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation) of the 
LIFG interferes with inner speech [34-36]. Note that other 
brain areas are associated with inner voice use, among which 
Wernicke’s area, the supplementary motor area, insula, and 
superior parietal lobe on the left side, as well as right 
posterior cerebellar cortex [for a review see 37].  
 It has been proposed that the LIFG serves additional 
functions besides covert speech per se, including cognitive 
control [38], working memory [39], language unification 
[40], selection among competing alternatives [41, 42], 
response inhibition [43], and action understanding [44]. It is 
conceivable that most, if not all, listed functions above 
actually require subvocal articulation. For instance, 
articulatory suppression (i.e., blocking inner speech) 
negatively affects performance on cognitive control and 
verbal working memory tasks [45, 46]. Hence the 
observation of an activation of the LIFG during both inner 
speech production and tasks designed to test the 
aforementioned functions. In other words, one could argue 
that LIFG activation most often signifies inner speech use, 
be it for cognitive control or working memory purposes, or 
for any other possible reasons, including self-reflection. 
Given this, and considering the fact that self-tasks presented 
in the next section most unlikely involve cognitive control, 
working memory, language unification, selection among 
competing alternatives, response inhibition, and action 
understanding, LIFG activity in this review was interpreted 
as indirect evidence of inner speech use by participants.  
 The first objective of the present meta-analysis was to 
determine if LIFG activation is observed in a significant 
number of brain-imaging studies of self-reflection. Different 
ways of classifying self-dimensions exist [see 2, 3]. In this 
paper self-tasks were put into the following self-domains: 
agency, self-recognition, emotions, personality traits, 
autobiographical memory, and miscellaneous. This latter 
category included experiments imaging participants thinking 
about their intentions, hopes, aspirations, mental states, 
preferences, as well as self-evaluation and prospection tasks 
(i.e., thoughts about one's future).  
 A second aim was to compare LIFG activation in 
perceptual (agency and self-recognition) and conceptual 
(e.g., autobiography, traits) self-domains, where inner speech 
use is hypothesized to be more important in the latter. 
Perceptual (sensory) self-information refers to products of 
one’s direct experience with oneself (e.g., the body) or 
environmental stimuli (e.g., other persons, mirrors) that 
identify the self. Conceptual self-information constitutes data 
about the self that is not available to immediate perceptual 
experience and that presumably requires mental 
representation to be accessible to consciousness. This 
division between perceptual and conceptual self-domains 
echoes the distinction between physical and psychological 
selves proposed by Gillihan and Farah [2, 47]. Perceptual 
self-information such as one’s face during self-recognition, 
because of its visual and concrete nature, most probably does 
not need to be verbally labeled (e.g., “this is my face”) to 
successfully complete the task. Agency tasks typically 
involve evaluating the degree of one's participation in a 
given action and thus mostly rely on kinesthetic information. 
Reflection on more abstract self-dimensions such as past 
memories and intentions however, possibly entail subvocal 
speech (e.g., “I spent last summer at my brother’s place”; “I 
want to go swimming”) to be fully brought to one’s 
attention. 
2. METHOD 
 English-language papers published between September 
2006 and August 2010 were identified from searches using 
Medline, Psycarticle, and Psycinfo, as well as the 
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection. 1The 
reference section of each article was scrutinized for 
additional studies. Review articles were also carefully 
examined. Inclusion criteria for selection of articles were all 
studies measuring brain activity using hemodynamic 
methods (Positron Emission Tomography [PET] and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) during self-
related tasks pertaining to the aforementioned self-domains. 
Exclusion criteria were: (a) articles using Theory-of-Mind 
(ToM) tasks, as opposed to purely self-referential tasks [e.g., 
48]; (b) electrophysiological studies using event-related 
potentials, as well as those employing EEG and Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation [e.g., 49]; (c) studies imaging clinical 
populations exclusively [e.g. 50]; and (d) studies not 
reporting all areas of activation and uniquely focusing on 
regions of interest [e.g., 51]. ToM and self-reflection abilities 
are linked in complex ways [see 52] and common brain areas 
are recruited when one both introspects and thinks about 
others' mental states [53]. Nonetheless, ToM abilities 
fundamentally differ from self-reflection abilities in that the 
former focuses on other social agents whereas the latter 
exclusively pertains to the self [54]. This is why we excluded 
ToM studies from the present meta-analysis. 
 The application of this selection process led to the 
identification of 68 articles; we added to these articles 59 
previously identified by Morin and Michaud [26] in the same 
self-domains. These authors used the same search and 
selection processes describe above for articles published 
                                                
1 Keywords were searched in the title of articles. Keywords used were: agency, 
autobiographical, autobiography, autonetic, brain, cortical, emotion awareness, 
emotion recognition, fMRI, future thoughts, intentions, introspection, judgments, 
mental time travel, neural correlates, neural substrates, neuroanatomy, personality 
traits, PET, preferences, self, self-awareness, self-face, self-processing, self-projection, 
self-recognition, self-referential, and self-reflection. 
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prior to September 2006. In all, we thus examined 127 
articles containing 130 individual studies (some papers 
contained more than one study). Frequency of LIFG 
activation reported in these articles is presented in the 
Results section. Note that we uniquely concentrated on LIFG 
recruitment during self-conditions and deliberately ignored 
control conditions because inner speech participation during 
these control conditions is likely. To illustrate, inner speech 
use most likely will be recruited during a control task 
consisting in judging how socially desirable personality traits 
are, as in Craig et al. [55]. As mentioned earlier, inner 
speech serves various purposes in addition to the processing 
of self-information; control tasks such as encoding semantic 
information or making decisions about statements of factual 
knowledge often recruit subvocal speech. Thus we are not 
making the claim that inner speech use is special to the self; 
indeed, recent reviews rather suggest that there is actually 
little special about or unique to the self [2, 7]. However, we 
hypothesize that the inner voice represents a privileged 
cognitive tool the self uses when assessing itself. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Overview 
 Fig. (1) depicts the percentage of studies in which LIFG 
activity was observed in all selected self-domains. Seventy 
two of all 130 studies (55.3%) indicated activation of the 
LIFG during self-awareness tasks. Percentages for each self-
domain were: 76.9 for autobiography, 56.7 for traits, 53.3 for 
emotions, 27.3 for agency, and 23.5 for self-recognition. The 
“miscellaneous” self-domain (66.7%) included studies using 
evaluative judgment tasks involving the assessment of one’s 
own preferences in order to produce a judgment, REST 
studies, as well as future-oriented thinking studies.  
 We submit that 55% represents a significant percentage, 
especially when compared to LIFG activation percentages 
that have been observed during various non-self tasks. 
Cabeza and Nyberg [29] reviewed studies of brain 
activations in various non-self cognitive domains such as 
attention and procedural memory. We excluded language 
Fig. (1). Percentage of studies in which LIFG activity was observed as a function of self-domains. 
Table 1. LIFG Activation Observed in Various Non-Self Domains (Based on 26). Language and Working Memory Domains are not 
Reported 
Domain N of Studies Reviewed 
N of Studies Reporting 
LIFG Activation (BA 44/45/47) 
Percentage of LIFG 
Activation 
Attention 39 3 7.7 
Perception 42 8 19 
Imagery 18 3 16.7 
Non-verbal episodic memory encoding 17 5 29.4 
Non-verbal episodic memory retrieval 70 10 14.3 
Priming 16 6 37.5 
Procedural memory 27 1 3.7 
ALL 229 36 15.7 
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and working memory studies, and observed that only 16% of 
213 studies report LIFG activity (see Table 1). Again, in this 
perspective an activation of the LIFG in 55% of all self-
referential thinking studies reviewed appears significant. 
 Given the nature of self-tasks reviewed here (see below 
for descriptions), this LIFG activity most probably reflects 
inner speech use instead of other possible LIFG functions 
such as response inhibition or action understanding. These 
results thus tentatively support the view that the inner voice 
substantially participates in at least some forms of self-
referential processing. 
 Consistent with the idea of a greater inner speech 
involvement in conceptual self-domains, we found that 63.7% 
of all conceptual studies (n = 102; autobiography, 
miscellaneous, emotions, and traits) reported activation of the 
LIFG, as opposed to 25% of all perceptual studies (n = 28) of 
agency and face/voice self-recognition. This difference is 
statistically significant, 2(1) = -3.770, p =.005. This supports 
the view of a differential involvement of inner speech across 
self-domains, where perceptual self-dimensions (e.g., one’s 
face) can be consciously perceived without words, whereas 
conceptual self-aspects (e.g., autobiography; prospection) 
most probably demand verbalization. 
3.2. Agency and Self-Recognition 
 All Tables included below detail (1) the authors of 
individual articles, (2) self-tasks used, and (3) the presence 
or absence of LIFG activation. Note that unless otherwise 
indicated all studies used fMRI imaging technology. Table 2 
presents 11 reviewed articles in the agency self-domain. A 
typical agency study [e.g., 56] invites participants to decide 
if they are responsible for the movement of their hand [for a 
review see 57]. Three of the agency studies out of 11 
(27.3%) reported LIFG activation.  
 Table 3 shows 17 reviewed articles in the self-
recognition domain. Most self-face recognition studies [e.g., 
68] involve participants judging if a face seen on a screen is 
their own or that of another person [for reviews see 69, 70]. 
Four self-recognition studies out of 17 (23.5%) reported 
LIFG activation. Sugiura et al.’s observation [71] that “(…) 
covert naming often accompanies recognition of a familiar 
face, but rarely occurs during visual self-recognition” (p. 
147) is consistent with the notion that self-face recognition 
unlikely necessitates verbal labeling. Indeed, multiple brain 
networks for visual self-recognition have been identified [see 
72], none of which include the LIFG). 
3.3. Personality Traits 
 Most early self-reflection studies consisted in asking 
participants to determine if adjective traits were self-
descriptive [e.g., 55, 88]. This represents a simple, 
straightforward, and yet effective way of inducing self-focus, 
as one’s personality certainly constitutes a central aspect of 
the self. Twenty one out of 37 personality trait studies 
(56.7%) reported LIFG activation (see Table 4). Current 
neuropsychological and brain-imaging evidence suggests 
that once personality traits have been inferred by reflecting 
on specific and repeated behavioral instances, their retrieval 
becomes rather automatic and does not require 
autobiographical recollection [89]. This could explain why 
16 of the reviewed studies did not find brain activity 
suggestive of verbal processing. It remains unclear why 
some studies did report the target activation while others did 
not despite using identical experimental tasks. 
3.4. Autobiographical Memory 
 Remembering past personal events represents a 
fundamental human mental activity connected in complex 
ways to autonoetic consciousness and the self [123-125]. 
Thinking about one’s past and imagining one’s future 
(prospection; see next section) seem to depend on common 
underlying regions, notably the medial prefrontal cortex and 
lateral temporal corticles [126]. In a representative study of 
autobiographical memory [e.g., 127], some of the 
participants’ past personal events are collected prior to 
scanning and each event gets associated with a verbal or 
visual cue; cues are then presented during scanning and 
volunteers are asked to recall the associated events in details. 
Table 5 shows that 20 of the 26 studies analyzed (76.9%) 
reported LIFG activation. This constitutes the highest 
activation rate of all self-domains. Although introspection 
suggests that we often replay past personal episodes in 
“pictures”, some studies indicate that we also use inner 
speech when developing self-narratives [128-130]. Indeed, a 
left ventrolateral activation which includes the LIFG is often 
observed in autobiographical remembering [28, 131]. 
Table 2. Agency studies. (P) = Employed PET 
Paper Self-task LIFG Activation 
Farrer & Frith [58] (P) Driving circle along T-shaped path either by oneself or experimenter  NO 
Farrer et al. [59] (P) Providing accurate/inaccurate visual feedback while performing hand movements NO 
Knoblich et al. [60] Deciding temporal delay between hand movements & visual feedback  NO 
Leube et al. [61] See [59] NO 
McGuire et al. [62] (P) Providing accurate/inaccurate auditory feedback while reading aloud NO 
Powell et al. [63] Choosing one of 4 deck cards presented on a screen NO 
Ruby & Decety [64] (P) Imagining self vs other movements NO 
Salomon et al. [56] Deciding if hand movements are self- or other- generated NO 
Vinogradov et al. [65] Judging if words were preselected by self or experimenter YES 
Wraga et al. [66] Imagining rotating one’s body  YES 
Yomogida et al. [67] Controlling character’s movements/actions with joystick YES 
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Table 3. Self-recognition Studies. (P) = Employed PET 
Paper Self-task LIFG Activation 
Devue et al. [73] Judging if face is self or other YES 
Kaplan et al. [74] See [73] NO 
Kircher et al. [75] See [75] YES 
Kircher et al. [76] See [73] YES 
Morita et al. [77] See [73] NO 
Perrin et al. [78] (P) Listening to one’s, unfamiliar, & common names NO 
Platek et al. [79] See [73] NO 
Platek et al. [80] See [73] NO 
Platek & Kemp [81] See [73] NO 
Sachdev et al. [82] Judging if face & body shape  are self or other  NO 
Sugiura et al. [83] (P) See [73] NO 
Sugiura et al. [71] See [73] NO 
Sugiura et al. [84] Judging if face & voice are self or other YES 
Sugiura et al. [68] See [73] NO 
Sui & Han [85] See [73] NO 
Uddin et al. [86] Deciding if faces are composites of oneself or other NO 
Uddin et al. [87] Viewing full body images of self NO 
Table 4. Personality Trait Studies. (P) = Employed PET 
Paper Self-task LIFG Activation 
Blackwood et al. [90] Judging if various traits, activities & emotions are self-descriptive NO 
Chiao et al. [91] Judging self-descriptiveness of sentences NO 
Craik et al. [55] (P) Judging if adjective traits are self-descriptive YES 
D'Argembeau et al. [92] See [55] YES  
D'Argembeau et al. [93] See [55] NO 
Farb et al. [94] See [55] YES 
Fossati et al. [95] See [55] NO 
Gutchess et al. [96] See [55] YES 
Han et al. [97] See [55] YES 
Heatherton et al. [98] See [55] YES 
Jenkins & Mitchell [99] See [55] NO 
Kelley et al. [100] See [55] YES 
Kircher et al. [75] Judging if adjective traits & physical characteristics are self-descriptive YES 
Kjaer et al. [101] (P) Silently thinking about one’s traits & physical appearance YES 
(physical appearance only) 
Lemogne, le Bastard, Mayberg, et al. [102] See [55] NO 
Lemogne, Mayberg, Bergouignan, et al. [103] See [55] YES 
Lieberman et al. [104] See [55] YES  
Lou et al. [105] (P) See [55] YES 
Macrae et al. [106] See [55] YES 
Modinos et al. [107] Judging self-descriptiveness of sentences about personal qualities NO 
Moran et al. [108] See [55] NO 
Moran et al. [109] See [55] YES 
Ng et al. [110] See [55] YES 
Ochsner et al. [111] See [55] YES 
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Table 4. contd…. 
Pfeifer et al. [112] See [91] YES 
Powell et al. [63] See [55] YES 
Rameson et al. [113] See [55] NO 
Ries et al. [114] (P) See [55] NO 
Schmitz et al. [115] See [55] NO 
Schmitz et al. [116] See [55] NO 
Vanderwal et al. [117] See [55] YES 
Wu et al. [118] See [55] NO 
Yaoi et al. [119] See [55] YES 
Yoshimura et al. [120] See [55] NO 
Zhang et al. [121] See [55] NO 
Zhu et al. [122] See [55] YES 
Table 5. Autobiographical Memory Studies. (P) = Employed PET 
Paper Self-task LIFG Activation 
Botzung, Denkova, Ciuciu, et al. [132]  Recalling autobiographical memories (AM) in response to visual cues  YES 
Botzung, Denkova & Manning [133] Assessing self-descriptiveness of past personality traits NO 
Burianova et al. [134] Recalling last time one experienced event depicted on photograph YES 
Cabeza et al. [135] Remembering if pictures where taken by self or others YES 
Campitelli et al. [136] Recalling if chess moves were made by self or other YES  
Conway et al. [137] (P) Generating AM following presentation of cue words YES 
Daselaar et al. [127] Recalling AM in response to visual cues  YES 
Fink et al. [138] (P) Listening to & visualizing personal & non-personal AM  NO 
Gilboa et al. [28] Remembering context of recent/remote episodes shown on photographs YES 
Harrison et al. [139] Recalling sad past personal events  YES 
Kelly et al. [140] Recalling AM of painful & non-painful episodes in response to visual cues  YES 
Kross et al. [141] Recalling AM of negative episodes in response to visual cues  YES 
Levine et al. [142] Listening to verbal descriptions of AM  YES 
Loughead et al. [143] Recalling interpersonal life events  YES 
Maguire & Mummery  [144] (P) Indicating if read statements of past personal episodes were participants’ NO 
Maguire et al. [50] See [144] NO 
Maguire & Frith [145] See [144] YES 
Moran et al. [108] Viewing words depicting personal semantic information  YES 
Oddo et al. [146] Recalling AM in response to visual cues  NO 
Piefke et al. [147] Remembering positive / negative & old / recent past personal events  YES 
Piolino et al. [148] (P) Recalling unique personal events  YES 
Rabin et al. [149] Recalling personal events in response to visual cues  NO 
St-Jacques et al. [150] Recalling which picture was taken first after picture taking sessions YES 
Spreng & Grady [151] Recalling personal events in response to visual cues  YES 
Summerfield et al. [152] See [127] YES 
Svoboda & Levine [153] Recalling personal events in response to auditory cues YES 
 
3.5. Emotions 
 The notion that verbal labeling of emotions enhances 
emotion awareness is not new [see 154]. It seems plausible 
to suggest that verbally identifying one’s feelings through 
inner speech (e.g., “I feel tired and irritated… actually, I feel 
angry and disappointed…”) helps distinguishing between 
subtle emotional experiences [13]. Reappraisal represents a 
cognitive emotion regulation strategy which consists in 
rethinking the meaning of affectively charged stimuli or 
events to decrease their emotional impact. Interestingly, 
brain-imaging studies of reappraisal consistently show 
recruitment of ventral portions of the PFC involved in 
language functions [155]. As shown in Table 6, 8 out of 15 
emotion studies (53.3%) reported LIFG activity.  
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Table 6. Emotion Studies. (P) = Employed PET 
Paper Self-task LIFG activation 
Critchley et al. [156] Perceiving (or not) feedback delay of one’s heartbeat (interoception) YES 
Goldberg et al. [157] Evaluating emotional experiences produced by images & music YES 
Gusnard et al. [158] Evaluating one's emotional responses to visual cues  YES 
Herwig et al. [159] See [158] YES 
Jackson et al. [160] Imagining levels of pain by viewing normal & distorted limbs  YES 
Lane et al. [161] (P) See [158] YES 
Northoff et al. [5] Evaluating degree of self-relatedness to visual cues NO 
Ochsner et al. [162] See [158] YES 
Phan et al. [163] Indicating emotional association with pictures  NO 
Schneider et al. [164] See [5] NO 
Sheline et al. [165] Reflecting on current emotional experiences NO  
Silani et al. [166] See [158] NO 
Takahashi et al. [167] Judging if guilt & embarrassment are present in short sentences  YES 
(embarrassment 
only) 
Takahashi et al. [168] Imagining joyful or proud  scenarios in response to visual cues NO 
Taylor et al. [169] (P)  Rating aversive & nonaversive pictures NO 
Table 7. Various self-referential Studies. (P) = Employed PET 
Paper Self-task LIFG Activation 
Addis et al. [175] Pre-experiencing future personal events in response to visual cues  YES 
Arzy et al. [176] Indicating if personal events occurred before/after currently imagined self-location in time  YES 
Binder et al. [177] Resting still with eyes closed YES 
Blackemore et al. [170] Thinking about intentions & consequential actions in response to presentation of fictive scenarios  NO 
Botzung et al. [133] See [175] NO 
Christoff et al. [178] See [177] YES 
D'Argembeau et al. [93] Pre-experiencing future personal events in response to visual cues  NO 
D'Argembeau et al. [179] See [93] YES 
Fransson [180] See [177] YES 
Jenkins & Mitchell [99] Judging one’s current mental state in response to visual cues YES 
Johnson et al. [181] Choosing which color one prefers  YES 
Johnson et al. [182]  Thinking about hopes & aspirations in response to visual cues YES 
Longe et al. [183] Imagining being self-reassuring/self-critical after negative fictive scenarios YES 
Mazoyer et al. [184](P)  See [177] YES 
Pan et al. [185] Presenting positive, negative & neutral evaluative feedback through visual cues  NO 
Paulus & Frank [186] Determine which one of two items one prefers  NO 
Pfeifer et al. [187] Making direct/reflected self-appraisals in response to visual cues  YES 
Piech et al. [188] Judging if one likes or dislikes food  NO 
Seger et al. [189] See [188] NO 
Spreng & Grady [155] See [93] YES 
Szpunar et al. [190] See [175] NO 
Weiler et al. [191] See [175] YES 
Zysset et al. [192] Making evaluative judgments of people YES 
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3.6. Miscellaneous 
 Table 7 shows that 16 out of 24 miscellaneous studies 
(66.7%) reported LIFG activation. Studies in this general 
category included various forms of self-focus such as 
intentions, hopes, aspirations, mental states, preferences, 
self-evaluation, and self-location in time. To illustrate, one 
study invited volunteers to reflect on their intentions in 
response to the presentation of fictive scenarios [170]. Also 
included were studies of mental projections of the self into 
the future (“mental time travel”, “episodic future thinking”, 
“future-oriented cognition”, “foresight”) [for reviews see 
126, 171, 172]. People report producing both mental images 
and inner speech when engaging in prospection [173]. The 
role of language in prospection is increasingly being 
discussed in the literature [e.g., 124, 174]. Our review of 
brain-imaging studies of prospection is consistent with these 
ideas. A typical prospection study invites participants to 
imagine a future personal event in response to the 
presentation of a visual cue, e.g., a word (“camping”) or a 
photograph of a tent to stimulate thoughts about a possible 
future camping trip [see 151]. Phenomenologically speaking, 
one can propose that such tasks may trigger an internal 
dialogue such as “I can smell the odor of the tent… It will be 
fun to wake up early with the sun… Fishing in the creek 
nearby too will be fun…” 
4. CONCLUSION 
 One major difference between human and non-human 
animals is that the former possess language and the ability to 
engage in self-talk [193]. This ability to verbally 
communicate with the self in turn is assumed to lead to 
increased cognitive complexity which includes deeper self-
referential processing [194]. This paper presented evidence 
suggesting that inner speech is often used by participants 
working on various self-reflection tasks. The data show that 
speech-for-self when thinking about the self is significant, as 
55% as all studies reviewed reported LIFG activation, as 
opposed to 16% in non-self tasks [29]. This conclusion is 
acceptable only if one embraces the underlying assumption 
that LIFG activation indicates inner speech use; this 
assumption is currently supported by neuropsychological and 
brain-imaging research. Our results also imply a differential 
involvement of inner speech across self-domains, where 
reflection on conceptual self-dimensions seems to rely more 
on verbalization than reflection on perceptual self-aspects. 
Sixty four percent of studies pertaining to abstract self-
domains such as autobiographical memory and personality 
traits reported LIFG activation, as opposed to 25% of studies 
of a more perceptual nature.  
 One limitation of the approach used here is that it 
remains possible that the activation of the LIFG observed in 
some studies may reflect other cognitive mechanisms in 
addition to, or instead of, inner speech use. Although it is 
possible that LIFG activation underlies semantic processing 
during some tasks (e.g., personality traits), it is unlikely that 
the self-tasks described in the Tables require cognitive 
control, working memory, language unification, selection 
among competing alternatives, response inhibition, and 
action understanding.  
 One hotly debated issue in the literature is the importance 
of language (and by extension, of inner speech) for ToM [see 
195]. Both ToM and most self-reflection tasks involve 
making inferences about psychological attributes of 
people—either self or others. Since inner speech seems to 
play a role in thinking about oneself, it could also constitute 
the mental activity underlying thinking about others. Indeed, 
recent work indicates that ToM development is linked to 
private speech use in preschoolers [196]; also, children with 
autism (a condition associated with ToM deficits) underuse 
inner speech [17]. A large quantity of published brain-
imaging studies of ToM exists [for a review see 197]. One 
promising strategy to further test the hypothesis of inner 
speech involvement in ToM could consist in calculating the 
percentage of reported LIFG activation across mental state 
domains e.g., false belief, deceit, intentions, empathy, 
desires, and pretence. 
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CAROL D. RYFF and BURTON H. SINGER
KNOW THYSELF AND BECOME WHAT YOU ARE:
A EUDAIMONIC APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
WELL-BEING
ABSTRACT. In an eﬀort to strengthen conceptual foundations of eudaimonic
well-being, key messages from Aristotle’s Nichomacean Ethics are revisited.
Also examined are ideas about positive human functioning from existential and
utilitarian philosophy as well as clinical, developmental, and humanistic psy-
chology. How these perspectives were integrated to create a multidimensional
model of psychological well-being [Ryﬀ, C.D.: 1989a, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 57(6), pp. 1069–1081] is described, and empirical evi-
dence supporting the factorial validity of the model is brieﬂy noted. Life course
and socioeconomic correlates of well-being are examined to underscore the
point that opportunities for eudaimonic well-being are not equally distributed.
Biological correlates (cardiovascular, neuroendocrine, immune) of psycholog-
ical well-being are also brieﬂy noted as they suggest possible health beneﬁts
associated with living a life rich in purpose and meaning, continued growth,
and quality ties to others. We conclude with future challenges in carrying the
eudaimonic vision forward.
KEY WORDS: autonomy, environmental mastery, eudaimonia, personal
growth, positive relations with others, purpose in life, self-acceptance
INTRODUCTION
Eudaimonia, a term that is simultaneously difﬁcult to spell,
pronounce, and understand, is the new buzzword in studies of
happiness and well-being. I (C. Ryff) encountered eudiamonia
nearly two decades ago and ﬁrst used the term to challenge
prevailing conceptions of subjective well-being focused on
assessments of feeling good, contentment, and life satisfaction
(Andrews and Withey, 1976; Bradburn, 1969; Bryant and
Veroﬀ, 1982; Diener, 1984). Drawing on the work of Waterman
(1984), I argued that Bradburn’s (1969) seminal research on The
Structure of Psychological Well-Being rested on a mistaken
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translation of ancient texts, speciﬁcally Aristotle’s Nichomachean
Ethics, written in 350 B.C. In these essays, Aristotle stated that
the highest of all goods achievable by human action was ‘‘eudai-
monia.’’ Bradburn, along with others (e.g., utilitarian philoso-
phers from the 19th century) translated the term to mean
happiness. Accompanying empirical assessments, as noted
above, measured the extent to which people feel good, con-
tented, or satisﬁed with their lives. The problem with this for-
mulation, however, was that it suggested equivalence between
hedonia and eudaimonia, something that was deeply contrary to
Aristotle’s distinction between the satisfaction of right and
wrong desires. Even more troubling was that the essence of
eudaimonia – the idea of striving toward excellence based on
one’s unique potential – was left out. This observation was cen-
tral to my eﬀorts to articulate a conception of psychological
well-being (PWB) that was explicitly concerned with the devel-
opment and self-realization of the individual (Ryﬀ, 1989a).
Given current interest in the juxtaposition of hedonism and
eudaimonism (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2001), it seems wise to revisit
the ancients and their descendants in hopes of bringing core
meanings of eudaimonia into sharper focus. Thus, in the ﬁrst
section below, we re-examine the writings of Aristotle on the to-
pic of what constitutes the highest of all human goods, and also
draw on the work of others who have tried to distill his key mes-
sages. In the second section, we discuss ‘‘theoretical intermediar-
ies’’ – namely, other philosophers (existential, utilitarian) or
psychologists (developmental, clinical, humanistic) whose work
helps to elaborate meanings of positive human functioning. The
objective in so doing is to show the various forms that well-
being can take, while simultaneously to make clear the full scope
of prior thinking that informed the Ryﬀ (1989a) model of PWB.
Following the conceptual recapitulation, we brieﬂy highlight
select empirical ﬁndings that have emerged from this model of
psychological of well-being, with emphasis given to two primary
points. The ﬁrst is that well-being, construed as growth and
human fulﬁllment, is profoundly inﬂuenced by the surrounding
contexts of people’s lives, and as such, that the opportunities
for self-realization are not equally distributed. The second point
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is that eudaimonic well-being may be consequential for health
by promoting effective regulation of multiple physiological sys-
tems. Finally, we conclude with observations about intellectual
tensions in the study of eudaimonic well-being and suggest that
ﬁnding that which is ‘‘intermediate,’’ as advised by Aristotle,
may offer a constructive way forward.
ARISTOTLE AND EUDAIMONIA: WHATEVER WAS HE SAYING?
The Nichomachean Ethics (translated by Ross, 1925) are replete
with strange terms (e.g., ‘‘moral incontinence’’), grammatical
obscurities, digressions and winding argumentative sequences,
all of which led Johnston (1997) to wonder whether we are
dealing with notes retrieved from the waste basket. Nonetheless,
sprinkled along the way sparkling insights and exquisitely dis-
tilled thoughts. Many readers may also be sustained by a deep
appreciation for how hard Aristotle was thinking in his eﬀort to
answer the fundamental question of human existence: how
should we live? He refused to rely on cant or religious dogma,
and instead, sought to build a reasoned argument with well-
articulated propositions and carefully deﬁned terms. This was
demanding work, such that even Aristotle occasionally ran out
of steam, ending some chapters with phrases like ‘‘so much for
these questions.’’
In evaluating the substance of Aristotle’s text, it is important
to remember that his objective was not to discern the nature of
human well-being; rather, it was to formulate an ethical
doctrine that would provide guidelines for how to live. As such,
some observations are pertinent to the task at hand, while
others are not. Clearly, his opening question: ‘‘What is the
highest of all goods achievable by human action?’’ is spot-on
for any examination of what constitutes a well-lived life. And,
his opening answer, issued over 2000 years ago, is remarkably
cogent for current inquiries about human well-being:
‘‘Both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that
it [the highest of all goods achievable by action] is happiness, and identify
living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what hap-
piness is they diﬀer, and the many do not give the same account as the
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wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like plea-
sure, wealth, or honor’’ (Aristotle/Ross, 1925, p. 5).
Much of the Ethics is then devoted to disabusing the reader of
the idea that happiness consists of satisfying appetites, some-
thing he likened to a ‘‘life suitable to beasts’’ (p. 6), or of money-
making, or political power, or even amusement and relaxation,
reminding us that ‘‘serious things are better than laughable
things’’ (p. 263). In challenging the mass of mankind which is
‘‘quite slavish in their tastes’’ (p. 6), he spoke of a dramatically
diﬀerent alternative in which the highest human good was
‘‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there be
more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most
complete.’’ (p. 11).
This assertion then brought Aristotle to the next point in the
argument: what is the nature of virtue? It is here that his an-
swers are particularly trenchant for contemporary scholars of
well-being. A ﬁrst key meaning of virtue in his view is that it is
a kind of mean, aiming at what is intermediate:
‘‘Both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general
pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both
cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the
right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the
right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic
of virtue.’’ (p. 38).
He then elaborates many other examples of the appropriate
middle ground in Book II, Chapter 7 – with regard to money,
we are to avoid excess and tasteless vulgarity at one extreme,
but also deﬁciency and niggardliness at the other; with regard
to honor, too much leads to vanity, while too little results in
undue humility; with regard to ‘‘giving amusement,’’ excess is
buﬀoonery, and the man who falls short is a boor; and with
regard to pleasantness toward others, the obsequious ﬂatterer is
at one extreme and the quarrelsome, surly person at the other.
Thus, virtue for Aristotle was a state of character concerned
with choice in which deliberate actions are taken to avoid
excess or deﬁciency.
However, the good life for him was not just about achieving
the mean in all modes of conduct. It clearly involved more, and
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this is where his writings convey the essential message of eudai-
monia: ‘‘If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is
reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest vir-
tue; and this will be that of the best thing in us.’’ (p. 263). These
words bring into high relief Aristotle’s strongly teleological per-
spective – namely, the highest human good involves activities
that are goal-directed and have purpose. Most importantly, the
essential end point (telos) is to achieve the best that is within us.
As paraphrased by Johnston (1997): ‘‘The excellence of the
human being is thus going to be associated with growth towards
some ﬁnal realization of his or her true and best nature.’’ (p. 6).
To summarize, Aristotle was clearly not concerned with
the subjective states of feeling happy. Rather, his conception of
the highest good towards which we all should be reaching
was the task of self-realization, played out individually, each
according to his or her own disposition and talent. He was also
explicitly concerned with action, not just abstract ideas: ‘‘we
must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing
temperate acts’’ (p. 34). A further point is that Aristotle recog-
nized that other needs must be met as well if we are to achieve
the best that is within us: ‘‘one will also need external prosper-
ity; for our nature is not self-sufﬁcient for the purpose of
contemplation, but our body also must be healthy and must
have food and other attention’’ (p. 268). At the same time, he
reminded that ‘‘we can do noble acts without ruling earth and
sea; for even with moderate advantages one can act virtuously’’
(p. 268). Finally, it should be noted that Aristotle’s essays
covered many more topics (e.g., justice, intellectual virtues,
friendship) than are summarized here.
The most thoroughgoing distillation of Hellenic eudaimonism
in contemporary scholarship is David Norton’s Personal Desti-
nies: A Philosophy of Ethical Individualism (1976). Norton
begins by paying tribute to the Athenians, speciﬁcally the
‘‘coherent sensibility of that astonishing culture’’ (p. 31), and
then describes eudaimonism as an ethical doctrine wherein each
person is obliged to know and live in truth to his daimon (a
kind of spirit given to all persons at birth), thereby progres-
sively actualizing an excellence (from the Greek word ‘‘areˆte’’)
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consistent with innate potentialities. In his words, eudaimonia
translates to ‘‘meaningful living conditioned upon self-truth and
self-responsibility’’ (p. xi). It is thus the essence of the two great
Greek imperatives: ﬁrst, to ‘‘know thyself’’ (a phrase inscribed
on the temple of Apollo at Delphi), and second, to ‘‘choose
yourself’’ or ‘‘become what you are’’ (p. 16).
Adopting a critical perspective, Norton also reminds us that
the Hellenic scholars did not believe all human beings were
invested with potential excellences in the form of daimons.
Instead, they exempted several major classes such as slaves, pos-
sible women [he notes Aristotle’s approving citation of the line
by Sophocles ‘‘A modest silence is a woman’s crown’’ (p. 32)],
and perhaps artisans and tradesmen. Further, the Hellenic con-
ception did not give all daimons equivalent worth; rather, they
were arranged hierarchically, such that in their ﬁnal perfection,
some individuals would be superior to others. Norton’s
thoughtful book also provides links between eudaimonism,
‘‘from its wellspring in ancient Greece’’ (p. 42) and other philo-
sophical views (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre) as well as
psychological accounts of self-actualization (Maslow), some of
which are elaborated below.
THEORETICAL INTERMEDIARIES: ELABORATING MEANINGS
OF HUMAN FULFILLMENT
Aristotle’s central point, namely that the ultimate aim in life is
to strive to realize one’s true potential, was accompanied by
considerably more detail about virtue, deﬁned as ﬁnding the
middle ground between excess and deﬁciency, than about virtue,
deﬁned as making the most of one’s talents and capacities. For
the task of articulating substantive speciﬁcs of self-realization, I
(C. Ryff) thus drew on my training as a life-span developmental
psychologist, wherein numerous accounts of human growth and
development were available (Bu¨hler, 1935; Bu¨hler and Massar-
ik, 1968; Erikson, 1959; Neugarten, 1968, 1973). These were
valuable for describing the developmental tasks and challenges
that confront individuals at diﬀerent life stages. Ideas from exis-
tential and humanistic psychology (Allport, 1961; Frankl and
Lasch, 1959/1992; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1962) were also useful
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for their reminders that ﬁnding meaning and purpose in life is
sometimes diﬃcult in a world that is seems meaningless, or
horriﬁc (e.g., times of war, Nazi concentration camps). Stated
otherwise, existential views brought eudaimonia face-to-face
with adversity, something on which the Nichomacean Ethics was
surprisingly silent. Finally, formulations from clinical psychol-
ogy were incorporated, particularly those few accounts that
attempted to deﬁne mental health in positive terms rather than
focus on dysfunction (Jahoda, 1958; Jung, 1933).
Other input came from the writings of two utilitarian philos-
ophers, namely, John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell, both of
whom agreed wholeheartedly with Aristotle that subjective feel-
ings of happiness are not the ultimate target. Mill’s (1893/1989,
p. 117) message, in fact, was that happiness would never be
achieved if made an end in itself:
‘‘Those only are happy, I thought, who have their minds fixed on some
object other than their own happiness, on the happiness of others, on the
improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a
means, but as itself and ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they
find happiness by the way.’’
Russell (1930/1958), in turn, emphasized that happiness is not
something that just happens to us, like having ripened fruit fall
eﬀortlessly into the mouth, but rather is something for which
we must strive and work hard, hence his title The Conquest of
Happiness. For Russell, happiness depended most importantly
on ‘‘zest,’’ by which he meant having active interest and engage-
ment in life, and by ‘‘aﬀection,’’ by which he meant having
meaningful bonds of love with signiﬁcant others.
The central challenge in working with all of the above per-
spectives was the task of integrating them into some coherent
whole. This was a progressive process (see Ryff, 1982, 1985,
1989b), wherein the objective was to identify recurrent themes
or points of convergence in these many formulations of positive
functioning. Figure 1 oﬀers a visualization of what resulted
from this distillation. In the center of the ﬁgure are the six
key dimensions of PWB, each of which represent frequently
endorsed aspects of what it means to be healthy, well, and
fully functioning. Surrounding the six dimensions are their
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conceptual underpinnings, noted brieﬂy above. How each of the
six dimensions grew out of the integration of these prior per-
spectives is detailed below.
Self-Acceptance
The Greeks admonished that we should know ourselves; that is,
strive to accurately perceive our own actions, motivations, and
feelings. But many of the above formulations emphasized some-
thing more, namely, the need to have positive self-regard. This
is deﬁned as a central feature of mental health (Jahoda) as well
as a characteristic of self-actualization (Maslow), optimal func-
tioning (Rogers), and maturity (Allport). Life-span theories also
emphasized the importance of acceptance of self, including
one’s past life (Erikson, Neugarten). The process of individua-
tion (Jung) further underscored the need to come to terms with
the dark side of one’s self (the shadow). Thus, both Erikson’s
formulation of ego integrity and the Jungian individuation
emphasized a kind of self-acceptance that is notably richer than
standard views of self-esteem. It is a kind of self-evaluation that
Figure 1. Core dimensions of pwb and their theoretical foundations.
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is long-term and involves awareness, and acceptance of, both
personal strengths and weaknesses.
Positive Relations with Others
All of the above perspectives describe the interpersonal realm as
a central feature of a positive, well-lived life. Aristotle’s Ethics,
for example, included lengthy sections on friendship and love,
Mill’s autobiography oﬀered much detail about the great love
of his life, and Russell saw aﬀection as one of the two great
sources of happiness. Jahoda, in turn, considered the ability to
love to be a central component of mental health, while Maslow
described self-actualizers has having strong feelings of empathy
and aﬀection for all human beings and the capacity for great
love, deep friendship, and close identiﬁcation with others.
Warm relating to others was also posed as a criterion of matu-
rity (Allport). Adult developmental stage theories (Erikson)
emphasized the achievement of close unions with others (inti-
macy) as well as the guidance and direction of others (gener-
ativity). Beyond all of these perspectives, philosophical accounts
of the ‘‘criterial goods’’ of a well-lived life (Becker, 1992) under-
scored the primacy of love, empathy, and aﬀection. From a cul-
tural perspective, there is near universal endorsement of the
relational realm as a key feature of how to live (see Ryﬀ and
Singer, 1998).
Personal Growth
Of all the aspects of well-being, it is personal growth that comes
closest in meaning to Aristotle’s eudiamonia, as it is explicitly
concerned with the self-realization of the individual. This part
of positive functioning is thus dynamic, involving a continual
process of developing one’s potential. Self-actualization, as for-
mulated by Maslow, and elaborated by Norton, is centrally
concerned with realization of personal potential, as is Jahoda’s
positive conception of mental health. Rogers also described the
fully functioning person as having openness to experience in
which s/he is continually developing and becoming, rather
than achieving a ﬁxed state wherein all problems are solved.
Life-span theories (Buhler, Erikson, Neugarten, Jung) also give
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explicit emphasis to continued growth and the confronting of
new challenges at different periods of life.
Purpose in Life
This dimension of well-being draws heavily on existential
perspectives, especially Frankl’s search for meaning vis-a`-vis
adversity. His logotherapy concerned itself directly with helping
people ﬁnd meaning and purpose in their life travails and
suﬀering. Creating meaning and direction in life is also the
fundamental challenge of living authentically according to
Sartre. While these views tend to emphasize the will to meaning
in the face of what is awful, or absurd in life, themes of pur-
pose are also evident in other literatures less focused on dark-
ness. Russell’s emphasis on zest, for example, is fundamentally
about actively engaging in and having a reﬂective stance toward
life. Jahoda’s deﬁnition of mental health gave explicit emphasis
to the importance of beliefs that give one a sense of purpose
and meaning in life. Allport’s deﬁnition of maturity included
having a clear comprehension of life’s purpose, which included
a sense of directedness and intentionality. Finally, life-span
developmental theories refer to the changing purposes or goals
that characterize diﬀerent life stages, such as being creative or
productive in midlife, and turning toward emotional integration
in later life.
Environmental Mastery
Jahoda deﬁned the individual’s ability to choose or create
environments suitable to his/her psychic conditions as a key
characteristic of mental health. Life-span developmental theories
also emphasize the importance of being able to manipulate and
control complex environments, particularly in midlife, as well as
the capacity to act on and change surrounding world through
mental and physical activities. Allport’s criteria of maturity in-
cluded the capacity to ‘‘extend the self,’’ by which he meant
being able to participate in signiﬁcant spheres of endeavor that
go beyond the self. Together, these perspectives suggest that ac-
tive participation in and mastery of the environment are impor-
tant ingredients of an integrated framework on positive
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psychological functioning. Although this area of well-being ap-
pears to have parallels with other psychological constructs, such
as sense of control and self-efﬁcacy, the emphasis on ﬁnding or
creating a surrounding context that suits one’s personal needs
and capacities is unique to environmental mastery.
Autonomy
Many of the conceptual frameworks underlying this multidi-
mensional model of well-being emphasize qualities such as
self-determination, independence, and the regulation of behav-
ior from within. Self-actualizers, for example, are described as
showing autonomous functioning and a ‘‘resistance to encultur-
ation’’ (Maslow). The fully functioning person described by
Rogers has an internal locus of evaluation, whereby one does
not look to others for approval, but evaluates oneself by per-
sonal standards. Individuation is also described as involving a
‘‘deliverance from convention’’ (Jung), in which one no longer
belongs to the collective beliefs, fears, and laws of the masses.
The existential idea of living in ‘‘bad faith’’ (Sartre, 1956) simi-
larly conveys the importance of self-determination and living
authentically, rather than following the dogma or dictates of
others. Finally, life-span developmentalists (Erikson, Neugarten,
Jung) wrote about the importance of turning inward in the later
years of life, and relatedly, gaining a sense of freedom of the
norms governing everyday life. This aspect of well-being is
undoubtedly the most western of all of the above dimensions.
The preceding conceptual distillation required the develop-
ment of empirical tools to operationalize the aspects of PWB
described above. The process therein is brieﬂy described below,
followed by a select summary of research ﬁndings using the
PWB assessment scales.
EMPIRICAL TRANSLATION: ASSESSMENT TOOLS
AND SELECT FINDINGS
Measuring PWB and Evaluating its Validity
The development and evaluation of self-report scales to measure
the above six dimensions of well-being was guided by the
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construct-oriented approach to personality assessment (Wiggins,
1980). Of key importance in the empirical translation is the
presence of psychological theory that speciﬁes the constructs of
interest. Based on such theory, as summarized in the previous
section, the ﬁrst step in the scale construction process is to
deﬁne high and low scorers on each of the six dimensions. Such
deﬁnitions are provided in Table I. Multiple independent writers
then composed self-descriptive items that ﬁt with these deﬁni-
tions and that could be applicable to both sexes as well as
adults of any age. Initial item pools were large (e.g., approxi-
mately 80 items for each scale). These were then culled using
criteria of face validity (i.e., ambiguity or redundancy of item,
lack of ﬁt with scale deﬁnition, lack of distinctiveness with
items from other scales, inability to produce a variable
response, and whether all aspects of the guiding deﬁnitions had
been covered).
The reduced item pools (32 items per scale, divided between
16 positively and negatively scored items) were then adminis-
tered to the initial research sample of young, middle, and
old-aged adults (Ryff, 1989a). Item-to-scale correlations were
then computed to reﬁne the item pools. The construct-oriented
approach requires that each item correlate more highly with its
own scale than another scale. Items failing to meet this crite-
rion, or that had low correlations with their own scale, were
deleted. This evaluation process was iterative – i.e., items from
each scale were eliminated one at a time and then the entire
process was repeated, given that each item deletion meant the
overall scale had been empirically reconﬁgured. The process was
terminated, when each scale had been reduced to 20 items,
divided equally between positively and negatively scored items.
Additional psychometric evaluations (e.g., test–retest reliability,
internal consistency) were also provided for scales of this
length.
Since that original publication, multiple investigations have
examined the factorial validity of the theory-based model of
PWB. Five such studies (Cheng and Chan, 2005; Clarke et al.,
2001; Ryﬀ and Keyes, 1995; Springer and Hauser, in press; van
Dierendonck, 2004), all using conﬁrmatory factor analyses, have
CAROL D. RYFF AND BURTON H. SINGER24
TABLE I
Deﬁnitions of theory-guided dimensions of well-being
Self-acceptance
High scorer: Possesses a positive attitude toward the self; acknowledges and
accepts multiple aspects of self including good and bad qualities; feels
positive about past life
Low Scorer: Feels dissatisﬁed with self; is disappointed with what has
occurred in past life; is troubled about certain personal qualities; wishes to
be diﬀerent than what he or she is
Positive relations with others
High scorer: Has warm, satisfying, trusting relationships with others; is
concerned about the welfare of other others; capable of strong empathy,
aﬀection, and intimacy; understands give and take of human relationships
Low scorer: Has few close, trusting relationships with others; ﬁnds it diﬃcult
to be warm, open, and concerned about others; is isolated and frustrated
in interpersonal relationships; not willing to make compromises to
sustain important ties with others
Personal growth
High scorer: Has a feeling of continued development; sees self as growing
and expending; is open to new experiences; has sense of realizing his or
her potential; sees improvement in self and behavior over time; is changing
in ways that reﬂect more self-knowledge and eﬀectiveness
Low scorer: Has a sense of personal stagnation; lacks sense of improvement
or expansion overtime; feels bored and uninterested with life; feels unable
to develop new attitudes or behaviors
Purpose in life
High scorer: Has goals in life and a sense of directedness; feels there is
meaning to present and past life; holds beliefs that give life purpose; has
aims and objectives for living
Low scorer: Lacks a sense of meaning in life; has few goals or aims; lacks
sense of direction; does not see purpose of past life; has no outlook or beliefs
that give life meaning
Environmental mastery
High scorer: Has a sense of mastery and competence in managing the
environment; controls complex array of external activities; makes eﬀective
use of surrounding opportunities; able to choose or create contexts suitable
to personal needs and values
Low scorer: Has diﬃculty managing everyday aﬀairs; feels unable to change
or improve surrounding context; is unaware of surrounding opportunities;
lacks sense of control overexternal world
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shown that the best-ﬁtting model is, in fact, the theory-guided
six factor model. Included in this mix are three nationally repre-
sentative samples, two from the U.S. (MIDUS, Midlife in the
U.S.; NSFH, National Survey of Families and Households),
and one from Canada (CSHA, Canadian Study of Health
and Aging). Other sources of evidence are also relevant for
evaluating the validity of the well-being scales, such as how they
correlate with other psychological constructs as well as sociode-
mographic and biological factors, and how they vary over time
(longitudinal analyses). Summaries of these ﬁndings are avail-
able elsewhere (Ryﬀ and Singer, in press). Select ﬁndings from
this research are brieﬂy discussed below.
Psychosocial and Sociodemographic Correlates of PWB
Social scientists have linked the above aspects of well-being to
many psychological constructs, such as identity status (Helson
and Srivastava, 2001), self-enhancing cognitions (Taylor et al.,
2003a, b), emotion regulation (Gross and John, 2003), personal-
ity traits (Lopes et al., 2003; Schmutte and Ryﬀ, 1997), personal
goals (Carr, 1997; Riediger and Freund, 2004), values (Sheldon,
2005), coping strategies (Kling et al., 1997), social comparison
processes (Heidrich and Ryﬀ, 1993; Kwan et al., 2003), and
spirituality (Kirby et al., 2004; Wink and Dillon, 2003). Others
have examined associations between well-being and life experi-
ences, such as early parental loss or parental divorce (Maier
and Lachman, 2000), growing up with an alcoholic parent
(Tweed and Ryﬀ, 1991), trauma disclosure (Hemenover, 2003),
community relocation (Smider et al., 1996), caregiving (Marks,
TABLE I
(Continued)
Autonomy
High scorer: Is self-determining and independent; able to resist social
pressures to think and act in certain ways; regulates social pressures to think
and act in certain ways; regulates behavior from within; evaluates self by
personal standards
Low scorer: Is concerned about the expectations and evaluations of others;
relies on judgments of others to make important decisions; conforms to
social pressures to think and act in certain ways
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1998), and change in marital status (Marks and Lambert, 1998).
Collectively, these investigations speak to the diverse interests
researchers bring to the topic of well-being, and thereby, to the
many factors that may inﬂuence positive functioning conceptu-
alized under the eudaimonic umbrella, broadly deﬁned.
We will focus on sociodemographic correlates of well-being,
namely, how PWB varies by age and socioeconomic status of
respondents. The reasons are to underscore the life course
dynamics of well-being as well as the opportunity structures, or
lack thereof, surrounding the challenge of ‘‘becoming what you
are.’’ Both receive insufﬁcient attention in current psychological
inquiries. With regard to age, Figure 2 shows cross-sectional
age diﬀerences in well-being among young, middle, and older
aged adults from the MIDUS (Midlife in the U.S.) national sur-
vey. The age diversity of well-being for both men and women is
immediately apparent. Some aspects show incremental proﬁles
with age (e.g., autonomy, environmental mastery), while others
show sharply decremental proﬁles from young adulthood to old
age (e.g., purpose in life, personal growth), and still others
show little age variation (e.g., positive relations with others,
self-acceptance – only for women). These patterns have been
replicated across multiple studies, including those with commu-
nity samples and nationally representative samples (Ryﬀ, 1989a,
1991; Ryﬀ and Keyes, 1995) as well as with instruments of
dramatically diﬀerent length (e.g., 3-item scales, 20-item scales).
What is as yet unknown is whether the patterns represent
aging changes, or cohort differences, although other longitudi-
nal analyses (over shorter age periods) have documented
that PWB does, indeed, change with aging, particularly as indi-
viduals negotiate life challenges and life transitions, such as
caregiving or community relocation (Kling et al., 1997a, b;
Kwan et al., 2003). With regard to the sharply downward tra-
jectories for purpose in life and personal growth, the two most
eudiamonic aspects of well-being, we have emphasized current
societal challenges in providing older persons with meaningful
roles and opportunities for continued growth. Sociologists have
termed this the ‘‘structural lag’’ problem, in which contempo-
rary social institutions lag behind the added years of life that
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many now experience (Riley et al., 1994). Related to such ideas,
Greenﬁeld and Marks (2004), using MIDUS data, focused on
older persons who occupied few major roles and found
that those who engaged in formal volunteering had higher levels
of purpose in life than those lacking both major roles and
volunteer experiences.
Whether or not the surrounding context nurtures self-realization
is partly illuminated by examining how reported well-being varies
depending on individuals’ socioeconomic status, such as their
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Figure 2. Age diﬀerences in PWB. (Source: MIDUS National Survey).
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levels of education, income, or occupational status. Figure 3
arrays scores on the six dimensions of well-being among females
and males in MIDUS as a function of their educational attain-
ment. The story is clear: PWB and educational standing are
strongly positively linked, with the association being especially
pronounced for personal growth and purpose in life, the two pillars
of eudaimonia. These ﬁndings bring into high relief Dowd’s
(1990) observation that the opportunities for self-realization are
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Figure 3. Educational diﬀerences in PWB. (Source: MIDUS National
Survey).
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not equally distributed, but occur via the allocation of resources,
which enable only some to make the most of their talents and
capacities.
Aristotle missed this point, although the Greeks did differen-
tiate society into subgroups of people, some of whom were
thought to possess the essential daimon, and others not. In the
present era, there is greater awareness of problems of social
inequality and their implications for health (Adler et al., 1999).
Our research on educational disparities in PWB (Marmot et al.,
1997, 1998) adds to this literature, by showing that those at the
low end of the SES hierarchy are not only more likely to suc-
cumb to disease and disability, they also suﬀer from diminished
opportunities to make the most of their lives. As detailed in
the biological section below, we see the two as linked – i.e.,
thwarted self-realization may be a critical part of the complex
biopsychosocial processes that contribute to early morbidity
and mortality.
Nonetheless, it is important to note deviations from these
patterns, which on average, link higher PWB to higher standing
in the social hierarchy. Our work has shown remarkable resil-
ience among some who lack socioeconomic advantage and/or
have been confronted with signiﬁcant life challenges (Markus et
al., 2004; Ryﬀ et al., 2004b; Singer and Ryﬀ, 1997, 1999; Singer
et al., 1998). We have also found such resilience among racial/
ethnic minorities (Ryﬀ et al., 2003). These studies are valuable
for documenting the meaning-making and growth-producing
eﬀects of adversity, thus bringing empirical substance to
Frankl’s (1959/1992) vision. Regarding Hellenic eudaimonia,
such ﬁndings challenge the view that realizing the highest human
good is the exclusive terrain of privileged segments of society.
Biological Correlates of PWB: The Positive Health Agenda
Within moral philosophy, deontological theories rest on princi-
ples of obligation (from the Greek word deon, meaning duty).
Consequentialist theories, in contrast, focus on the outcome
or consequences to deﬁne right moral action. Aristotle’s
formulation of the highest human good as eudaimonia may well
be primarily deontological; that is, it is a purely conceptual
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argument.1 We are, however, intrigued with the idea of bringing
empirical defense to the argument that some kinds of human
goods are perhaps better than others. One such realm of conse-
quentialist evidence pertains to biology and human health
(Singer and Ryﬀ, 2001). That is, if eudaimonic well-being truly
is the to right way to live, presumably it will beneﬁt their
health, both in terms of health behaviors (e.g., those experienc-
ing self-realization may take better care of themselves), but also
with regard to neurobiological processes that underlie their phe-
nomenological experiences of growth and development. This
perspective also provides a useful antidote to medical models of
health, focused exclusively on illness and disease (Ryﬀ and
Singer, 1998). Our alternative approach suggests that progress
toward understanding positive human health follows from ﬁrst
assessing human ﬂourishing (i.e., PWB, as formulated within
the eudaimonic tradition) and then probing its neurobiological
substrates. The key hypothesis in such inquiry is that having
high levels of purpose, growth, and quality ties to others, etc. is
part of what keeps people healthy, even in the face of challenge.
A ﬁrst step in testing the hypothesized protective features of
PWB is thus to examine its neurobiological correlates.
Our work therein has just begun, but preliminary ﬁndings are
promising. In a sample of aging women (Ryff et al., 2004a) we
correlated the six dimensions of PWB with diverse biomarkers
(cardiovascular, neuroendocrine, immune) and found evidence
of numerous links supporting our guiding predictions. Older
women with higher levels of personal growth and purpose in
life had, for example, better neuroendocrine regulation – i.e.,
they started the day with lower levels of salivary cortisol and
stayed lower throughout the day, compared to older women
with lower levels of growth and purpose. We found that those
with higher levels of life purpose had lower inﬂammatory mark-
ers (i.e., sIL-6r, the soluble receptor for interluekin-6). Those
with higher levels of environmental mastery, positive relations
with others, and self-acceptance, in turn, showed lower levels of
glycosylated hemoglobin (a marker for insulin resistance).
Personal growth and purpose in life were also signiﬁcantly posi-
tively correlated with HDL cholesterol, the ‘‘good ‘‘ cholesterol.
A EUDAIMONIC APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 31
Finally, we included objectively measured sleep assessments and
found that those with higher levels of environmental mastery
experienced longer periods of REM sleep and faster entry into
REM sleep. Longer periods of REM sleep were also evident for
those with higher levels of positive relations with others, which
along with high purpose in life was also signiﬁcantly correlated
with less body movement during sleep.
Extending these ﬁndings, Friedman et al. (2005) has docu-
mented the interplay between well-being and sleep in predicting
inﬂammatory factors in older women. Those with both low
levels of interpersonal well-being and poor sleep efﬁciency had
the highest levels of interleukin-6, in contrast to those with po-
sitive proﬁles on one or both of these factors. In a sample of
midlife adults, Urry et al. (2004) examined the neural correlates
of well-being, and found that those with higher levels of PWB
(all scales except autonomy) had greater left than right superior
frontal activation (referred to EEG asymmetry), compared to
those with lower well-being. This pattern of cerebral activa-
tion asymmetry has been previously linked to more positive
dispositional styles and reduced likelihood of depression. Thus,
eudaimonic well-being appears to be tied to more adaptive pat-
terns of brain circuitry. Although limited by small samples and
cross-sectional data, the above ﬁndings oﬀer promising evidence
that eudaimonic well-being is linked with better neuroendocrine
regulation, better immune function, lower cardiovascular risk,
better sleep, and more adaptive neural circuitry.
SUMMARY: CONSTRUCTIVE TENSIONS AND FINDING
THAT WHICH IS INTERMEDIATE
Our primary objective in this paper has been to revisit the
philosophical and theoretical roots of eudaimonia so as to clar-
ify how its central ideas infuse the study of human well-being.
Whether we have done justice to these ideas, or fully utilized
them to advance theoretical and empirical understanding of
self-realization and human fulﬁllment is for others to evaluate.
Also needed is thoughtful evaluation of how our perspective
overlaps with, or is distinctive from, other ﬂowers blooming in
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psychology’s eudaimonic garden (see Ryan and Deci, 2001 and
other contributors to this special issue).
We conclude with observations about ‘‘constructive tensions’’
that come with the territory of studying human well-being. A
central one pertains to the competing pulls of self versus other in
formulating what it means to function optimally. In some cir-
cles, the human potential movement itself was seen as little more
than an arena of narcissistic self-spelunking and ego-diving (see
Ryff, 1985). Preoccupations with personal growth were depicted
as crippling basic social institutions (e.g., the family), and thus
ensued countervailing calls to elevate social responsibility and
concern for others as the highest good. A further tension inher-
ent in any eﬀort to formulate ultimate ideals for human conduct
is the pull between universalism versus relativism (see Ryﬀ and
Singer, 1998). Are there multiple forms of eudaimonic well-being
– distinct varieties of self-realization nurtured by diﬀerent socie-
tal contexts and culturally distinct ways of being (Diener and
Suh, 2000; Kitayama and Markus, 2000). Or, is there a single
formulation that applies to our species as a whole?
These challenging questions draw on the values and moral
philosophies (implicit or explicit) of those who choose to study,
if not, promote, human well-being. In reﬂecting on these ten-
sions, we were struck anew by Aristotle’s admonishment to
seek ‘‘that which is intermediate.’’ Following such guidance, we
should avoid excess and extremes, whether it be a kind of well-
being that is so solipsistic and individualist as to leave no room
for human connection and the social good, or a version that is
so focused on responsibilities and duties outside the self that
inherent talents and capacities are neither recognized nor devel-
oped. Similarly, we are not well-served by rigid, tightly con-
strained formulations of how selves are realized any more than
we beneﬁt from a relativistic buffet in which any type of well-
being goes. Moreover, even with regard to the dimensions of
eudaimonic well-being we put forth (e.g., personal growth, self-
knowledge, purposeful living), there are possible extremes in
which self-realization spins out of control at great cost to oth-
ers, or where responding to the expectations of others elimi-
nates the capacity for autonomy.
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Thus, we close with renewed appreciation for the idea of
balance, both as a conceptual guide and as an empirical reality
that scholars of well-being need to better understand. This will re-
quire that we peer deeply into what levels of well-being contribute
to ﬂourishing individual lives as well as optimally functioning so-
cial institutions. We will thus be required to address issues, such
as what constitutes too little, or too much, life purpose? Or, what
is too little, or not enough, self-knowledge? Questions such as
these could not be more timely for the scientiﬁc study of human
well-being where current inquiry is now poised to predict impor-
tant empirical outcomes (e.g., the health of individuals, their fam-
ilies, and their communities) based on reported levels of
eudaimonic well-being.
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ABSTRACT 
The inner voice- we all know what it is because we all have it and use it when we are thinking 
or reading, for example. Little work has been done on it in our field, with the notable 
exception of Brian Tomlinson, but presumably it must be a cognitive phenomenon which is of 
great importance in thinking, language learning, and reading in a foreign language.  
The inner voice will be discussed as a cognitive psychological phenomenon associated with 
short-term memory, and distinguished from the inner ear. The process of speech recoding will 
be examined (the process of converting written language into the inner voice) and the 
importance of developing the inner voice,  as a means of both facilitating the production of a 
new language and enhancing the comprehension of a text in a foreign language, will be 
emphasized. 
Finally, ways of developing the inner voice in beginning and intermediate readers of a foreign 
language will be explored and recommended. 
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I. THE INNER VOICE IN OUR NATIVE LANGUAGE 
 We are all familiar with the inner voice, as it accompanies our thinking, but although it 
is perhaps our most familiar companion, it is very difficult to specify exactly what it is. It is 
perhaps most often identified with the voice of the spirit or the conscience (the ‘still small 
voice’ of the Bible), or in a related sense, the voice of the ‘real you’; indeed, Vygotsky (1986 
[1934]) argues that inner speech (we will be using the terms ‘inner voice’ and ‘inner speech’ 
interchangeably here, although the latter may imply a Vygotskian point of view) helps the 
individual to constitute his or her very inner life. In this sense, the inner voice is often the 
voice of integrity that reminds us of our principles.  
 The inner voice is also what we think with, this language-productive module in our 
heads that works so unceasingly that we sometimes may wonder whether it is possible to shut 
it up! This irrepressibility makes us ask ourselves sometimes whether it is possible to think 
without language. At times the inner voice seems to be faint, as language impinges only 
slightly on our thoughts, while other modularities such as the visual take over. At other times 
it echoes in our heads as we perform complex operations such as mental arithmetic. We can 
even see it at work in other people as their speech organs form the shapes of words that we do 
not hear. But it rarely, if ever, seems to go away completely. From the time that it develops in 
tandem with our faltering efforts to express ourselves in early childhood, it remains with us 
for the rest of our lives. Some types of meditation are techniques to stop, even if only 
temporarily, the continual twitter of the inner voice,  so that we may contemplate our 
existence without its constant interpolation. In psychotic interludes the inner voice may 
appear to take on an external reality of its own, and to take on a number of different identities, 
so that people possessed may speak of their ‘voices’. Indeed, we all may have different voices 
or perspectives on our inner voice. We may, for example, address ourselves as ‘I’, ‘you’, or 
‘we’, depending on the situation (willingly imposed or unwillingly imposed obligation, for 
example). While we are reading, we may also hear different voices from different characters, 
particularly where the language and orthography indicate a particular dialect. It is hard to 
imagine hearing the voice of Huckleberry Finn in an English accent while reading the book. 
 
 I.1.Working Memory and the Phonological Loop 
Working memory, which may in general be identified with short-term memory (simply a 
more general term), is described by Baddeley (2003a: 6) as “a temporary storage system 
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which underpins our capacity for thinking”. The most widely accepted model (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 2001) consists of four components, as illustrated in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Working Memory, from Baddeley 2003b 
 
  The central executive is akin to attention, the visuo-spatial scratchpad deals in the 
short term with visual images, the phonological loop with auditory information, and the 
episodic buffer temporarily combines the information from the senses to create a multisensory 
impression of what is happening. The timescale of working memory is in the region of 1-2 
seconds, as long as it takes, say, to put a proposition together as a thought, and in this sense it 
is useful to think of it as the cognitive ‘present’, constantly changing with our thoughts and 
impressions. Indeed, since William James (1890) there have been thinkers who identify close-
knit relationships between short-term memory and consciousness (e.g. Baars, 1997, Crick & 
Koch, 1998).  
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I.2. Inner Ear and Inner Voice 
 The phonological loop can be divided into two parts- a short-term phonological store 
(inner ear), which retains the traces of speech attended to, and an articulatory rehearsal 
mechanism (inner voice), which assembles speech in preparation for its delivery. It is not 
clear to what extent these two elements are separate or aspects of the same thing, but there is 
evidence that they are associated with different areas of the brain- Brodmann’s area 44 and 
Broca’s area respectively (Baddeley 2003a: 1.1). It can also be demonstrated that the inner ear 
can still operate while articulation is repressed.  Rayner and Pollatsek (1989), cited in 
Eysenck & Keane (1995, p. 312) point out: “…it is possible to have phonological coding 
without the appropriate subvocal articulation- if you read a text while saying ‘the the the’ over 
and over again, it is still possible to hear your own voice.”  This points to the existence of 
both an inner voice and an inner ear as separate, if related, phenomena. 
 
II.3 Sociocultural theory 
 In sociocultural theory (Vygotsky 1978), developing learners move from an 
‘intermental’ (social) to an ‘intramental’ (psychological) state. Learners acquire language 
through co-operative activity (as in task-based learning), directed interactive behavior (as in 
‘scaffolding’), and internalisation of speech patterns (‘inner speech’) (Mitchell & Myles 
1998). Children playing, for example, will talk to themselves (private speech), but later this 
becomes internalised as inner speech. An important element of Vygotsky’s theory is 
mediation, where language is seen as a tool mediating between us and the outside world in the 
same way as a pencil and paper help us to do an arithmetic problem. Once speech has been 
internalised, it may return into the public domain under the pressure of an unexpected event, 
or a particularly knotty problem. Mental arithmetic is an example of a situation where the 
inner voice may become externalised. Vygotsky (1986: 249, cited in McCafferty & Ahmed, 
2000: 201) characterises inner speech thus: 
 
In inner speech words die as they bring forth thought. Inner speech is to a large extent 
thinking in pure meanings. It is a dynamic, shifting, unstable thing, fluttering between 
word and thought, the two more or less stable, more or less firmly delineated 
components of verbal thought. 
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 Vygotsky also differentiated inner speech from interactive speech in two ways. Firstly, 
the syntax is reduced. The example he gives is of someone waiting for a bus. When the bus 
arrives, the inner speech mechanism would not say something like “The bus for which I was 
waiting has arrived.”, but something more like “Coming”. Secondly, inner speech is different 
semantically, words having private meanings which amount to the sum total of one’s 
experience with them, rather than their public currency (McCafferty & Ahmed, 2000, 201). 
 
II. INNER VOICE AND EAR IN FIRST-LANGUAGE READING 
 Huey (1908), in the first classic study of reading, expresses the viewpoint (primary 
memory being James’s (1890) precursor of short-term memory): 
 
The carrying range of inner speech is considerably larger than that of vision… The 
inner subvocalisation seems to hold the word in consciousness until enough others are 
given to combine with it in touching off the unitary utterance of the sentence which 
they form… It is of the greatest service to the reader or listener that at each moment a 
considerable amount of what is being read should hang suspended in the primary 
memory of the inner speech. 
Huey, 1908, cited in Eysenck & Keane, 1995: 312 
 
 
 
 It appears that both inner ear and inner voice may be used in reading, though not 
necessarily so (in speed reading, for example, it may be actively discouraged, as it may slow 
down the pace). The evidence reviewed in Eysenck & Keane (1995: 312-4) indicates that 
“inner speech plays a useful role in comprehension unless the text is very easy.” (314). The 
most obvious function of inner speech in reading comprehension in probably “…that of 
holding information about words and about word order in working memory so as to reduce 
the memory load in comprehension.” (315). Another possible function is “…that it may 
provide the prosodic structure (e.g. rhythm, intonation, stress) that is lacking in written text 
but present in spoken language.” (315).  
 
II.1 Phonological recoding 
 In the previous section we discussed inner speech as a spontaneously occurring 
cognitive phenomenon- a vehicle for thought. In reading there are two significant differences. 
In thought, the elements of inner speech are instantly available; in reading, access to the inner 
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voice or ear is indirect- signals enter the brain by the visual route, and then may be encoded 
into phonological form. Secondly, thought is a productive activity, generally accompanied by 
subvocalisation. Reading, whilst it is not passive, is receptive, and therefore the inner ear, as 
well as the inner voice, is involved. We have already seen that articulatory suppression does 
not suppress the auditory store, so it is likely in reading that when the articulatory component 
of the phonological loop is engaged, the auditory component is working too.  
 The short-term phonological store (inner ear) receives inputs from the phonological 
modality of the reading process, and is used perhaps to monitor more affective and 
interpersonal aspects of language, especially where the text has resemblances to speech. It 
would therefore be of more importance in reading poetry and drama. It also appears to direct 
us to meaning by endowing the (hitherto) written word with the prosody of speech. The 
articulatory rehearsal mechanism is used by the fluent reader only when reading difficult 
texts, in a quest for meaning. The probable reason for this is that the working memory as a 
whole is overloaded, and needs the extra capacity as back-up (Eysenck, 1986: 84). There is 
evidence that when subjects are trained to suppress the laryngeal muscle activity which is 
associated with subvocalisation during reading, there is no effect on comprehension while 
reading easy passages, but comprehension of complex prose suffers (Hardyck & Petrinovich, 
1970). 
 It is well known that the progression from beginning to fluent reading is accompanied 
by a process of automatisation (Laberge & Samuels 1974; McLeod & McLaughlin, 1986; 
Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977). Thus early efforts to ‘sound out’ words from orthographic cues 
by means of phonological recoding gradually become automatised with repetition- the sight of 
a word becomes automatically associated with its sound via the phonological route.  
 
III. THE INNER VOICE IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
 There is evidence that a good short-term memory (measured by span, for example, 
how long a telephone number can you repeat back to me?) is a significant predictor of foreign 
language learning proficiency: 
 
…Service (1992) … studied the acquisition of English as a second language by young 
Finnish children, finding that children with good immediate verbal memory proved to 
be better at language learning than those with short spans, not only when measured by 
vocabulary, but also by acquisition of syntax. Similar results have been found for adult 
learners of a second language, in the case of both vocabulary and syntax by both 
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adults (Atkins & Baddeley, 1998; Gathercole, Service, Hitch, Adams, & Martin, 1999) 
and children ( Service, 1992). 
(Baddeley, 2003a: 1.2) 
 
 
 In addition, Baddeley, Pappagno & Vallar (1988) found that a patient with short-term 
memory deficit failed to learn anything whatever in a foreign language but performed equally 
with others in learning word-pair associations in her native language. Pappagno, Valentine & 
Baddeley (1991) found that articulatory suppression (for example repeating “the the the” 
continually) inhibited learning in a foreign language, but not in the native language (cited in 
Baddeley 2003a: 1.2). 
 Vocal, or internally subvocalised, rehearsal seems, then, to be a significant factor in 
learning a new language, and a good short-term memory lends its possessor an advantage in 
foreign language acquisition. 
 At this point the research seems to run out and one is thrown back onto introspection 
and hearsay. Whenever I have learnt a new language,  there comes a stage where an inner 
voice in the new language begins to come into its own. I regard this as something of a 
breakthrough- a breakthrough period, not a breakthrough point. There are some features of 
this worth remarking on: 
1. There is definitely a motivational factor. If one does not like the target language, then 
there is no reason to think in it. For this reason among others many people do not progress 
very far in a language they are learning for reasons that do not include their own 
enthusiasm for the process. 
2. Thinking in a language provides practice which is arguably as good as speaking it. 
Processes as important as automatisation continue to operate and one’s proficiency 
continues to develop. 
3. When one is out of the environment in which the language is spoken, thinking in it keeps 
the language alive and prevents one from going ‘rusty’. 
4. When one is thinking in a different language, one takes on a slightly different personality. 
This may be partly because, in a Vygotskian sense, we associate the language with a 
different series of gestures and actions, and partly because a language in itself carries 
different assumptions and connotations with it and prevents us from expressing ourselves 
in exactly the same way as we would in our native language. 
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 Also, there seems to be a folk belief that once you think in a language you can really 
speak it. People when asking one how well one can speak a language may well ask if one 
thinks in it, or is able to think in it, as if this provides confirmation of proficiency. This takes 
us right back to the idea of the inner voice being the voice of the true self or the spirit- 
Vygotsky’s ‘inner life’, and it is not uncommon for people to feel threatened by the 
encroachment on their identity of a foreign voice, as I have found from informal discussions 
with students. 
 
IV. INNER VOICE AND EAR IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE READING 
 A significant difference between learning to read in a foreign language and learning to 
read in one’s native language is that in a foreign language one will generally have little 
familiarity with the phonology or prosody of the target language which one is learning to 
read. Setting aside the case of ideographic writing systems, which would need a study of their 
own, one generally proceeds along a scale from an interlanguage based on one’s sounding-out 
of the new language according to one’s preconceptions (likely to be based on L1) through 
progressively more accurate forms of interlanguage until one reaches the limit of one’s 
proficiency or inclination to learn. In first-language reading the reader already has a 
phonological store with which to associate written words. The development of inner voice and 
ear while reading in a foreign language, however, depends on the development of an 
automatised phonological store in the target language, which comes about through a process 
resembling that described above. 
 We have seen that inner ear and voice come into play increasingly as the text becomes 
more challenging to the reader. Subjectively I am aware of a far more intense and laborious 
sounding of the words taking place in the mind’s ear when reading in a foreign language than 
in my native language- even when, as in the case of Latin, it is a language I have never heard. 
The difficulty of the task places a heavy load on working memory, which marshals to its aid 
all the capacity it can find. Inner ear and inner voice are much more likely to be present in 
foreign language reading because of the cognitive load entailed. 
 Harris and Coltheart (1986) identify four phases in the process of learning to read for 
native speakers. The third and fourth of these are: 
 
(c) The phonological recoding phase, where children are able to successfully identify 
nonsensical pseudo-sentences (for example “Tell me blue he went”) as nonsense, but 
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unable to do so where they contain homophones (for example “Tell me wear he 
went”) (Doctor & Coltheart, 1980). 
 
(d) The orthographic phase, by which time children are able to identify sentences 
containing homophones, such as “Tell me wear he went” as nonsensical. (Doctor & 
Coltheart, 1980). 
 
 
 The orthographic phase is necessary in English because of spelling irregularities and 
homophones, and in any language with regular phoneme-grapheme correspondence, such as 
Turkish or Spanish, this problem will not exist, there will be no homophones, and the 
orthographic phase will be unnecessary, except in as far as the reader’s dialect differs from 
the standard. 
 
 
V. PEDAGOGIC IMPLICATIONS 
 Not only in reading, but in language learning as a whole, the development of inner 
voice and ear in that language is of importance. In reading in a foreign language, inner 
voice and ear are most likely to be brought into service to deal with the cognitive load the 
activity demands in a quest for meaning. So how can we develop inner voice and ear in 
language learners? 
 Speech is primary, and in native language acquisition of course we are all very 
familiar with the spoken language before we start to read. In a foreign language we need to 
avoid introducing difficult reading texts too early. In general the approaches used in English 
language textbooks for children are good: at an early stage do plenty of oral work with 
contextualised language, and only place upon the learner a light reading load.  
 At lower levels, always introduce the written form of the word after the spoken form, 
and don’t introduce unfamiliar language in reading texts. 
 To develop the inner ear, do lots of work at lower levels that emphasises the prosody 
of the language. Rhymes, chants (e.g. jazz chants) and games like “Who stole the cookie?” 
are good for this. 
 Rehearsal for the use of the public voice should be good training for the inner voice, 
and as long as it is not done prematurely, and is based on language that has been carefully 
listened to as well as read, so learning poems or parts in plays should be useful. At lower 
levels, reading aloud by learners is not a good idea unless it has been prepared, and a 
spoken version of the text can be referred to. There is one exception to this: unprepared 
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reading aloud by students can be used as a powerful diagnostic tool by teachers (Goodman, 
1982a, b; Wallace, 1989). The level of a reader’s comprehension, for example, can often be 
surmised by listening to their stress, intonation, and the way they divide the text into 
chunks.  
 Not only do we need to develop the inner voice and ear, but we also want to make sure 
that they are as close to the target language as possible. Because of irregularities of spelling 
in English, we need to make sure that learners go through the equivalent of Harris and 
Coltheart’s “orthographic phase” (1986). In order to do this, the following are useful: 
 Again at lower levels, have learners see the written form and hear the spoken form at 
the same time. The teacher can read the text aloud while students follow silently. Dhaif 
(1990) found that reading aloud to a class of FL learners while they followed the ext 
enhanced comprehension when compared to silent reading. This confirms L1 research 
(Elley, 1989, Hillman, 1975; McCormick, 1981) and was favoured by the students 
themselves. Listening to the rhythm and intonation of a teacher or recording gives the 
listener/reader valuable information about the way a skilled reader chunks text into telling 
information units.  The importance that intonation may have is emphasised by Goodman: 
“The ability to read with natural information is related to comprehension” (1964: 1). 
Training in phoneme-grapheme correspondences is an important area and more work on 
homophones needs to be included in the syllabus. 
 The exercise of dictation, with the demands it makes on the phonological loop and the 
chunking mechanism, may be useful in the development of working memory capacity in the 
foreign language, as well as raising awareness of phoneme-grapheme correspondences. 
Another useful exercise which, unlike dictation, actually involves the skill of reading, 
would be ‘reading dictation’, where the chunks of a text for dictation are presented on 
flashcards for a very short period of time, say one second, and the learners have to read, 
encode (probably phonologically) in short-term memory, and write down what they have 
read.  
 Tomlinson (2001) makes a number of useful suggestions in this area. He begins by 
noting: 
In L1 the inner voice develops naturally at the same time as (or possibly even 
before) the external voice. In L2 the external voice is given primacy from the 
very beginning, and it is imposed on and inhibits the inner voice, thus slowing 
down thought and retarding creativity. Instead of demanding public 
performance in the L2 from the very beginning, we should encourage learners 
to talk to themselves in private, egocentric speech. But even before that we 
should allow them the privacy and silence to develop an inner voice by 
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providing them with opportunities to listen to the L2. They can respond 
mentally, physically or even in the L1; but they must be given time to think, 
and they must not be forced to perform in a public voice without having an 
inner voice available to help them to prepare.  
 
 
 
 This is an argument for a silent period, and indeed, the first stage in developing inner 
voice and ear is necessarily through listening. There is also a psychological argument that 
students should not be forced to use public speech before they are ready.  
 His suggestions for the development of the inner voice come under the following 
headings (in italics with my comments following): 
 Listen and don’t repeat. This again is an argument for a silent period. But there is 
repeating and repeating. When one observes children using songs and rhymes in their L1 
development it seems clear that they enjoy repeating and this rote-learning of aspects of the 
sound system of their language is beneficial to them and develops their phonological 
awareness. 
 Expose students to colloquial unplanned speech. It has already been pointed out that 
the inner voice uses a reduced syntax. Much formal writing uses an artificially complex 
register in accordance with socially (that is public voice rather than inner voice) accepted 
norms. Some written language, for example legal language, is not really designed to be 
rehearsed by the inner voice at all. Initially, then, exposure to colloquial, unplanned speech 
will be beneficial, but one should also bear in mind the role of the inner voice as an aide-
memoire in reading difficult, complex texts. At a more advanced level, then, one reads 
whatever one has to read and uses inner ear and voice to help out with the cognitive load. 
 Limit the use of drills. Again, there are drills and drills. Many of the songs and rhymes 
which children love are drill-like, whether they be of the “One man went to mow…” or the 
“Partridge in a pear tree” variety. There are also meaningful activities which are drill-like in 
the sense that they intensively repeat the same language. Many guessing games are like this, 
and can be meaningful and fun. 
 Avoid premature reading activities. Yes, in particular avoid introducing texts which 
are too difficult or, at lower levels, which introduce language which has not yet been met in 
the spoken form.  
 Avoid bland and neutral ESL readers. Yes, but there are plenty of good readers out 
there to help the learners develop their reading skills. Once a learner can read for pleasure, the 
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battle to develop inner ear and voice has already been half won. Reading for pleasure in a 
foreign language almost inevitably involves the participation of the inner ear, and most 
probably the inner voice as well. If learners are in an environment where they can find texts 
they are motivated to read at a level which is suitable for them, then this will greatly help the 
development of inner voice and ear as long as the voice/ear resembles the target language 
sufficiently closely. 
 Encourage L1 in L2 classes. ‘Encourage’ is perhaps too strong a word. In my 
experience students don’ need any encouragement! However this may not be as true in the Far 
East, where Tomlinson was teaching. In an ideal situation L1 is used optimally where 
appropriate to assist with scaffolding, strategic translations, and so on. Then it can certainly be 
a help. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The inner voice and the inner ear (the phonological loop) are familiar constant 
companions, and vital components of short-term memory, which is itself what underpins our 
thinking, and therefore much of our learning. Although they have been relatively neglected in 
the literature until recently, there is now evidence that they play an important part in foreign 
language learning and comprehension. They appear to do this by: 
• aiding the memory as the reader progresses through a text 
• Providing extra cognitive space for the processing of difficult texts 
• Possibly facilitating semantic access by providing prosodic clues 
• Possibly monitoring affective and interpersonal aspects of language 
  
 At a certain stage of language proficiency, around intermediate level, the inner voice 
emerges gradually as a spontaneous and autonomous phenomenon- thinking in the language, 
which is popularly regarded as a sign of proficiency in it. Before this stage inner ear and inner 
voice may be developed in the following ways: 
• Introducing the spoken form of words before the written form at lower levels. 
• Using rhymes, chants and games which emphasise the prosody of the language. 
• Learning poems and parts in plays. 
• Reading texts aloud by the teacher while learners follow the written text. 
• Training learners in phoneme-grapheme correspondences. 
• Dictation. 
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• Avoiding texts whose level of difficulty is beyond the learners. 
• Exposing learners to colloquial unplanned speech. 
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Inner and outer voices in the present moment of
family and network therapy
Jaakko Seikkulaa
Dialogue in the polyphony of inner and outer voices in the present
moment of family therapy is analysed. In Western Lapland a focus on
social networks and dialogues in the meeting with families has proved to
be effective in psychotic crises.
Introduction
In this paper three main themes are considered. First, I analyse the
importance of the present moment in family therapy. Second, I
explore the polyphony of voices as the main aspect of human
psychology and its meaning for family therapy dialogue. Third, the
effectiveness of dialogism in the treatment of psychotic problems will
be illustrated in the province of Western Lapland in Finland.
The present moment
Open dialogue describes both organizing the psychiatric practice for
severe crises and dialogues in meetings with the family and the rest of
the client’s social network. For therapists the main challenge becomes
being present and responding to every utterance. We are living in the
‘once occurring participation in being’ (Bakhtin, 1993).
Tom Andersen (2007) was preoccupied by three different realities
of our practices as clinicians. In the ‘either–or’ reality we handle issues
that are visible but dead in the sense that they are exactly defined and
the definitions remain the same in spite of the context. In the ‘both–
and’ reality we deal with issues for which many simultaneous descrip-
tions are possible. These issues are living and visible. This is the case,
for instance, in the family therapy discussion when we make space for
different voices to become heard without considering one point of
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view to be right and another wrong. The most interesting may be the
‘neither–nor’ reality, in which things are invisible but living. We
experience something as taking place, but we do not have an exact
linguistic description for it. We may say that it is neither this nor that,
but I know that something is taking place. As an example, Andersen
gives handshaking. It is something that happens in our embodied
participation in the session, yet it is not commented on by words but
remains as our embodied experience of the present moment.
Daniel Stern (2004) in emphasizing the importance of the present
moment is critical of descriptions of psychotherapy and psychoana-
lysis that focus on clients’ narratives. The therapist is seen as the one
giving meanings to patients’ stories, in different schools in different
ways. Therapy deals with explicit knowledge in linguistic descriptions.
Stern proposes moving from explicit knowledge to the implicit
knowing that happens in the present moment as embodied experi-
ence, and mainly without words. We live in it. The present moment is
a short one, varying between one and ten seconds, lasting on average
three seconds.
Stern is describing individual psychotherapy. In the type of family
therapy that focuses on generating dialogues this means shifting the
focus from the content of narratives to the present moment when
narratives are told. Therapists and clients live in a joint embodied
experience that happens before the client’s experiences are formulated
in words. As in dialogue on the whole an intersubjective consciousness
emerges. Our social identity is constructed by adapting our actions to
those of others. For Bakhtin, knowing myself is only possible by seeing
ourselves through the eyes of the other. I see myself through others’
eyes (Bakhtin, 1990). In Bakhtin’s view if we want to see ourselves as
living persons while looking at our reflection in the mirror, we adapt
others’ eyes to do that. Living persons emerge in real contact with each
other and adapt to each other as in a continuous dance in automatic
movements without controlling their behaviour in words.
Intersubjectivity
The intersubjective quality of our consciousness is shown in
the mother–baby communication studies conducted by Colwyn
Trevarthen (1990). Trevarthen’s careful observations of parents and
infants demonstrate that the original human experience of dialogue
emerges in the first few weeks of life, as parent and child engage in an
exquisite dance of mutual emotional attunement by means of facial
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expressions, hand gestures and tones of vocalization. This is truly a
dialogue: the child’s actions influence the emotional states of the
adult, and the adult, by engaging, stimulating and soothing, influ-
ences the emotional states of the child. Bra˚ten (1992, 2007) describes
the Virtual Other as an innate part of the baby’s mind that in a way
waits for a dialogue with the Actual Other. If the Actual Other is not
present, the dialogue emerges with the Virtual Other. Near relations
take place in the mode of felt immediacy, in feelings that are felt in a
pre-linguistic form. David Trimble has been analysing the importance
of Trevarthen’s and Bra˚ten’s studies for family and network interven-
tions (Seikkula and Trimble, 2005).
In every meeting two histories happen. The first is the history
generated by our presence as embodied living persons. We adapt
ourselves to each other and create a multi-voiced polyphonic experi-
ence of the shared incident. Salgado and Hermans (2005) point out
that we cannot call this ‘experience’, because experience already
presumes psychological meaning that is included by the Other or
Otherness in the situation. It is our embodied experience for which
manifold meanings emerge based on the number of participants in
the situation. Family sessions as such already include several family
members and often two or three therapists. Most of this history takes
place without words, but not all. The words that refer to our presence
in this conversation often include the most important emotions
connected to those voices of our lives that deal with difficult experi-
ences. We may, for example, describe and reflect on our feelings about
the specific situation we are talking about.
The second history in the same situation occurs in the stories
that living persons tell of their life. Stories always refer to the
past, they never can reach the very present moment, since when the
word is formulated, and when it becomes heard, the situation in
which it was formulated has already passed. Integrating the two
aspects of the same moment it becomes evident what focus on
dialogue can add into narrative orientation. While comparing
narrative and dialogical approaches in family therapy, Roger Lowe
(2005, p.70) stated that:
The conversational style . . . simply follows the conversation, while the
narrative and solution-focused styles often attempt to lead it. The
conversational style strives to remain dialogical, while the solution-
focused and narrative styles may become monological (e.g., when
therapists attempt to ‘story’ clients’ lives according to a planned agenda).
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Compared to narrative and solution-focused therapies, in dialogical
approaches the therapists’ position becomes different. Therapists are
no longer interventionists with some preplanned map for the stories
that clients are telling. Instead, their main focuses on how to respond
to clients’ utterances as answers are the generators for mobilizing
one’s own psychological resources, since ‘for the word (and conse-
quently for a human being) there is nothing more terrible than a lack
of response’ (Bakhtin, 1984, p.127). Respecting the dialogical princi-
ple that every utterance calls for a response, team members strive to
answer what is said.
Answering does not mean giving an explanation or interpretation,
but, rather, demonstrating in a therapist’s response that one has
noticed what has been said and, when possible, opening up a new
point of view on what has been said. This is not a forced interruption
of every utterance to give a response, but an adaptation of one’s
answering words to the emerging natural rhythm of the conversation.
Team members respond as fully embodied persons, with genuine
interest in what each person in the room has to say, avoiding any
suggestion that someone may have said something wrong. As the
process enables network members to find their voices, they also
become respondents to themselves. For a speaker, hearing her own
words after receiving the comments that answer them enables her to
understand more of what she has said. Using the everyday language
with which clients are familiar, team members’ questions facilitate the
telling of stories that incorporate the mundane details and the difficult
emotions of the events being recounted. By asking other network
members’ comments on what has been said, team members help
create a multi-voiced picture of the event.
When the team is not present
To illustrate the importance of the once occurring event of being, a
transcript of a therapy session is given. Pekka (P) had been hospita-
lized after a home visit that the crisis intervention team had made the
previous week. In the meeting it appeared that P had been violent
towards his mother. In the following sequence, this occasion is
described. T1 and T2 stand for the two therapists.
T1: I thought that it happened during the last two weeks, not before.
T2: Was it a threat or even worse?
T1: Hitting, I thought that P hit his mother.
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T2: Was P drunk or did he have a hangover?
P: No, I was sober.
T2: Sober.
T1: I understood that P had tried to ask his mother something?
P: Well, it was last weekend; the police came to us. She was drunk. When
she didn’t say anything and started to make coffee in the middle of the
night, and I asked . . . I went out and came into the kitchen, and she
turned round and said that I wasn’t allowed to speak of it. Then I
slapped her. She ran out into the corridor and started screaming. I
said that there is no need to scream, why can’t she tell . . . . And then I
calmed down. At that point I got the feeling . . . . And the police came
and the ambulance. But in some way I have a feeling, that it is, of
course, it is not allowed to hit anyone. But there are, however,
situations . . .
T1: Was that the point when you went into primary care?
P: Yes it happened just before that.
T2: Why didn’t she say that the police came round?
P: What?
T2: Why didn’t she say that police had been at your place the previous
night?
P: It wasn’t the previous night, it was last weekend. I was thinking, all
the time I am thinking these strange things and I knew that they were
not true. But when you think about them for a while, after that you
have the feeling that things like that can really happen. It is too much
. . . .All you can think about are all kind of trifling matters.
T2: And it all started last weekend, this situation?
T1:Yes.
When the patient was describing the situation in confused lan-
guage, unable to use unambiguous description, he ended by saying, ‘it
is not allowed to hit anyone’. He had an origin of an inner dialogue to
deal with what he had done. But the team did not respond to this,
instead continuing to question him about how he contacted the
healthcare system. Team members actually focused in on the content
of his story of what had happened instead of being present in the very
moment and answering Pekka’s reflections of his own behaviour. This
was not an isolated example, given that in the next utterance,
when the patient continued his self-reflection on his ‘strange things’
(meaning hallucinations), the team did not help him to construct
more words for this specific experience he was speaking about. In this
short sequence there were two utterances, which were not answered,
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and in which the team members focused more on the story than
on the presences and consequently no dialogue emerged. The case is
described in a study (Seikkula, 2002), in which it was found that
not responding and thus helping to generate dialogue in severe
psychotic crises can actually be related to generally poor outcome in
the treatment.
Polyphonic self – voices
Seeing our consciousnesses as intersubjective abandons the frames of
looking at individuals as subjects of their lives in the way that the
coordinating centre of our actions would exist within the individual.
Instead, a description of the polyphonic self is generated. This is the
core content of Bakhtin’s work, but he was not the first one to speak of
the polyphonic self. In fact, Plato in his early works saw self as a social
construction. He said:
When the mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself, asking questions
and answering them, and saying yes or no. When it reaches a decision –
which may come slowly or in sudden rush – when doubt is over and the
two voices affirm the same thing, then we call that ‘its judgement’.
(Plato, Theatetus, 189e–190a)
The mind is voices speaking to each other; it is an ongoing process of
dialogues instead of looking at one core self. What we name as
personality and psychological being takes place in this inner conversa-
tion between voices. Voices are the speaking personality, the speaking
consciousness (Bakhtin, 1984; Wertsch, 1991). Personality is not a
psychological structure inside us, but actions that happen in speaking,
and in this way the human consciousness is generated. Stiles (2002)
has tried to operationalize the idea of voices by noting that ‘Voices are
traces and they are activated by new events that are similar or related
to the original event’ (p. 92). All our experiences leave a sign in our
body, but only a minimal part of these ever become formulated into
spoken narratives. In formulating these into words they become
voices of our lives. Instead of speaking of unconsciousness into which
those experiences and emotions that we cannot deal with are
repressed, it is more accurate to speak of non-conscious experiences
(Stern, 2004). When experiences are formulated into words, they are
no longer unconscious (Bakhtin, 1984).
There is not only one form of polyphony, but words that are spoken
openly and in inner dialogue mean different things for our therapy
Voices in the present moment 483
r 2008 The Author. Journal compilationr 2008 The Association for Family Therapy and Systemic Practice
session. Psychologist Kauko Haarakangas (1997) described horizontal
and vertical polyphony (Figure 1).
The horizontal level of the polyphony includes all those present in
the conversation. A kind of conversation community is generated.
Everyone has its own voice and if we want to mobilize the psycholo-
gical resources of each one present, everyone should have the right to
utter them in their own way. Figure 1 illustrates a case. Father Pekka
was referred to psychotherapy owing to his deep depression that had
led to a severe suicide attempt. His wife and two adult sons were
present. The richness of the family therapy conversation becomes
evident if we focus on those voices that are not seen but are present in
each one’s inner dialogues. These voices of the vertical polyphony
become ‘switched on’ depending on themes of dialogues. In this case
Pekka was occupied by his job as a doctor, because he had difficulties
taking care of his duties. He was also occupied by his marital
problems, by being a father to his two sons and especially by his
own father and his memory. The memory of his father was actualized
even though his father had died when he was only 10 years old, forty-
five years ago. In Figure 1, an illustration is given of the voices of
Pekka and his wife Liisa.
Important aspects of the polyphony are the voices of each therapist.
Therapists participate in the dialogue in the voices of their profes-
T2
T1
Mikko
Sinikka
Seppo
Jukka
male
Father’s death
spouse 
mothermother
son
female
teacher
memory of death
• ”Vertical polyphony” = inner voices
father
physician
sister
daughter
Family therapist
father
”Horizontal polyphony” = social network
Figure 1. Illustration of horizontal and vertical polyphony
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sional expertise, being a doctor, psychologist, having training as family
therapists and so on. In addition to the professional voices, the
therapists participate in the dialogue in their personal, intimate
voices. If a therapist has experienced the loss of someone near to
her, these voices of loss and sadness become a part of the polyphony,
not in the sense that therapists would speak of their own experiences
of death, but in the way they adapt themselves to the present moment.
How they sit, how they look at the other speakers, how they change
their intonation and so on. Inner voices become a part of the present
moment, not so much of the stories told. Therapists’ inner voices of
their own personal and intimate experiences become a powerful part
of the joint dance of dialogue.
Main elements of open dialogue meeting
The activity of constructing new shared language, incorporating the
words that network members bring to the meetings and the new words
that emerge in the dialogue among team and network members affords
a healing alternative to the language of symptoms or of difficult
behaviour. It is the task of the team to cultivate a conversational culture,
which respects each voice and strives to hear all of them.
The meetings are organized with as little preplanning as possible.
One or more team members act as host for the meeting. With everyone
sitting together in the same room, in the beginning, the professional
helpers share the information they may have about the problem. The
one in charge then offers an open-ended question, asking who would
like to talk and what would be best to talk about. The form of the
questions is not preplanned; on the contrary, through careful attune-
ment to each speaker, therapists generate each next question from the
previous answer (e.g. by repeating the answer word for word before
asking the question or by incorporating into the language of the next
question the language of the previous answer). It is critically important
for the process to proceed slowly in order to provide for the rhythm
and style of each participant’s speech and to ensure that each person
has a place created in which he or she is invited and supported to have
his or her say. As many voices as possible are incorporated into the
discussion of each theme as it emerges. Professionals may propose
reflective conversation within the team whenever they deem it ade-
quate. After each reflective sequence, network members are invited to
comment on what they heard. When closing the meeting, the partici-
pants are encouraged to say if there is something they want to add.
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Each meeting concludes with a summary of what has been discussed
and what decisions have been or should be made.
After team members have entered the conversation by adapting
their utterances to those of the patient and her nearest relations, the
network members may in time come to adapt their own words to
those of the team. If one discovers that one is heard, it may become
possible to begin to hear and become curious about others’ experi-
ences and opinions. Together, team and network members build up
an area of joint language, in which they reach agreement about the
particular use of words in the situation.
Effectiveness of open dialogues in the treatment of psychosis
Dialogism is the basic quality of the psychiatric system in the Finnish
Western Lapland. To make it possible, some basic principles of the
treatment may be defined. The treatment should (1) start immedi-
ately after contact with the psychiatric unit in the province. The first
meeting should be organized within twenty-four hours after the
contact. (2) The social network should be included in every
case from the very beginning for the entire treatment period. (3)
Treatment response should be adapted in a flexible way to the varying
and unique needs of each family. (4) Psychiatric units should guaran-
tee the responsibility and psychological continuity by mobilizing a
case-specific team for each process. This team takes charge of
the entire process for as long as necessary, both in inpatient and
outpatient settings. (5) By increasing safety during the first days of the
crisis it is aimed at increasing resources for tolerating uncertainty in
the situation, in which no ready-made rapid solutions exist. This is
done by primarily focusing on (6) dialogicity in the meetings. The
main aim is to generate a new joint language for experiences that do
not yet have words and live in symptoms.
Open Dialogue is one of the most studied approaches to severe
psychiatric crisis in Finland. Since 1988, there have been several
studies of treatment outcome and qualitative studies analysing the
development of the dialogue itself in the meeting (Haarakangas,
1997; Kera¨nen, 1992; Seikkula, 1994; 2002; Seikkula et al., 2003,
2006). Since this approach was institutionalized, the incidence of new
cases of schizophrenia in Western Lapland has declined (Aaltonen et
al., 1997).
In a quasi-experimental study of first-episode psychotic patients,
Western Lapland was part of a Finnish national API (Integrated
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Treatment of Acute Psychosis) multicentre project conducted by the
Universities of Jyva¨skyla¨ and Turku together with STAKES (State
Center for Development and Research in Social and Health Care)
(Lehtinen et al., 2000). The inclusion period for all non-affective
psychotic patients (DSM-III-R) in the province was April 1992
through March 1997. As one of three research centres, Western
Lapland had the task of starting treatment without beginning neuro-
leptic drugs. This was compared to three other research centres which
used drugs in a standard way, most often at the very beginning of the
treatment. In Western Lapland, 58 per cent of the patients were
diagnosed with schizophrenia.
In the comparison of the patients with schizophrenia who partici-
pated in Open Dialogue versus those who had treatment as usual in
another psychiatric unit in another province of Finland, the process of
the treatment and the outcomes differed significantly. The Open
Dialogue patients were hospitalized less frequently, and three of these
patients required neuroleptic drugs, in contrast to 100 per cent of the
patients in the comparison group. At the two-year follow-up, 82 per
cent had no, or only mild non-visible psychotic symptoms compared
to 50 per cent in the comparison group. Patients in the Western
Lapland site had better employment status, with 23 per cent living on
disability allowance compared to 57 per cent in the comparison
group. Relapses occurred in 24 per cent of the Open Dialogue cases
compared to 71 per cent in the comparison group (Seikkula et al.,
2003). A possible reason for these relatively good prognoses was the
shortening of the duration of untreated psychosis (DUP) to 3.6
months in Western Lapland, where the network-centred system has
emphasized immediate attention to acute disturbances before they
become hardened into chronic conditions. DUP has been reported to
vary between one to three years in a treatment-as-usual setting
(Larsen et al., 1998; Kalla et al., 2002).
In a five-year follow-up with all psychotic patients the results had
remained the same. In Table 1 the outcomes of open dialogues in
Western Lapland are compared to a study revealing information of a
treatment as usual in Stockholm, Sweden. What is surprising is that
there actually exist few five-year follow-up studies on the whole.
Comparing Western Lapland to a big city such as Stockholm includes
problems of demographic differences between these two sites.
In the Svedberg et al. (2001) study in Stockholm, 54 per cent of
participants were diagnosed with schizophrenia, which was about the
same as in the ODAP group. In Stockholm, the mean age seemed to
Voices in the present moment 487
r 2008 The Author. Journal compilationr 2008 The Association for Family Therapy and Systemic Practice
be higher (30 years compared to 27 years in the ODAP group). This
may indicate that in Stockholm the duration of untreated psychosis
(DUP) was longer. The mean of hospitalization was 110 days with the
Stockholm patients compared to thirty-one days with the ODAP
group patients. Neuroleptic drugs were used in 93 per cent of cases
in the Stockholm group compared to 33 per cent in the ODAP group.
As an outcome, 62 per cent of the patients treated in Stockholm were
living on a disability allowance compared to 14 per cent in the ODAP
group.
Conclusions of the comparison need to be drawn with caution
because we did not have any control of the differences of population
in these two areas. The Stockholm results, however, are similar to
other five-year follow-up studies conducted in a treatment-as-usual
setting. For example, in a study in the Netherlands, Linszen et al.
(2001) found that following an active psychosocial programme when
patients had returned to treatment as usual, only 25 per cent
managed without at least one relapse and their social functioning
level was poor. Taking this into account, a suggestion may be made
that Open Dialogue has given new promising aspects in the treatment
of acute psychosis.
Concluding remarks
In this presentation I have aimed at describing the importance of
focusing on the present moment in meeting with family and the social
TABLE 1 Comparison of five-year follow-up studies of first-episode psychotic patients in
Western Lapland and Stockholm
ODAP Western Lapland
1992–1997
Stockholmn
1991–1992
N5 76 N5 71
Diagnosis: Schizophrenia 59% 54%
Other non-affective psychosis 41% 46%
Mean age (years)
female 26.5 30
male 27.5 29
Mean length of hospitalization (days) 31 110
Neuroleptics used 33% 93%
- ongoing 17% 75%
GAF at f-u 66 55
Disability allowance or sick leave 19% 62%
Note: nSvedberg et al. (2001).
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network. Every conversational situation is lived in two simultaneous
histories, namely in the one lived and in the one storied. Especially if
we want to focus on generating dialogue as the primary form of
psychotherapy, the importance of the polyphony of the voices
becomes evident compared, for instance, to systemic family therapy
that focuses on elements of family structure or family rules. In every
form of psychotherapy dialogue is important, but often dialogue is
regarded as a form of communication. That is one aspect of dialogue,
but in this paper it is seen as the basic way of engaging with others
actually and virtually in the way that forms the mind. Mind is not seen
as an independent element of human psychological structure, but an
ongoing process from one second to another between living persons.
Dialogue is communication, but it is also the relation and process of
forming oneself.
It is not a simple task to connect basic ideas of human life into a
description of family therapy. What is common is the fact that in family
therapy dialogue a multi-voice reality is constructed by the presence
of more than one client and often more than one therapist. Polyphony
of the voices becomes relevant in focusing on the dialogue itself, how
to answer utterances in every present moment. Giving the example of
the psychiatric system developed in the Finnish Western Lapland,
the polyphony of voices and dialogism has become the basis of
the practice. In systematic follow-ups the effectiveness of treatment
of first-episode psychotic patients has been proved. This illustrates
perhaps the fact that in dialogue own psychological resources of
families are mobilized more than compared to systems that rely on
the guidance of professional experts. In the studies this was seen
when comparing open dialogues to treatment as usual.
Being involved in many projects for developing social network
orientation, what is surprising is the often difficult process of learning
to be in dialogue with our clients and our colleagues in the meetings.
Perhaps as therapists we are so used to thinking so much about being
skilful in methods and interventions that it is difficult to see the
simplicity. All that is needed is to be present and to guarantee that
each voice becomes heard.
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INNER VOICE EXPERIENCES:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF
THIRTY CASES
Myrtle W. Heery
Petaluma, California
Throughout human history, the "voice within" has been
described in religion, history, psychology, fiction, and myth.
The psychological literature on these experiences has largely
focused on individuals often seen as pathological, while the
religious literature focuses on individuals considered inspired
or possessed. Surprisingly little attention has been directed to
the inner voice experiences of adults not in either of these
groups. This study of selected reports of inner voice experi-
ences describes an exploratory investigation, and suggests a
foundation for further research into the experience.
The term "inner voice" refers to a significant subjective experi-
ence-the actual perception of a voice speaking internally and I
or a vaguer "felt sense" of some inner communication. Just as
the external voice communicates between one human beingand
another, the inner voice may communicate intra-psychically
between one levelof the psyche and another (Van Dusen, 1981).
PERSPECTIVES ON "INNER VOICES"
Traditional psychology and medicine have long viewed "hear-
ing voices" as equivalent to auditory hallucinations and thus as
psychopathologic. This judgment has relegated the inner voice
experience to the realms of pathology and abnormal stimuli.
Similarly, in ordinary usage, the tone of an expression such as,
"You must be hearing things," illustrates how a negative
connotation creates reluctance to report inner voice experi-
ences. Unless an individual is careful to translate a subjective
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experience of the inner voice into more acceptable terms,
he/she may risk being labeled a misguided visionary, or a
psychotic (Heery, 1988).
Children have an easier time with an inner voice. They move
more easily between different levels of perception, creating
imaginary companions, for example. Selective permeability
has not yet been impressed on them and the cognitive grids they
acquire in the process of socialization have not yet narrowed
their range of perceptions (Heinze, 1985). Adults generally
place no negative value on such childhood experiences,
although the child is expected to "outgrow" such experiences
after a while.
There is currently an increasing interest in the transpersonal
dimension of human experience (Grof, 1985). Terms such as
superconscious (Assagioli) are being used to suggest different
levels of being within the individual. According to Assagioli
(1965, p. 113), "Transpersonal Will is an expression of the
Transpersonal Self and operates from the superconscious
levels of the psyche. It is its action which is felt by the personal
self, or 'I; as a 'pun' or 'call'."
The interplay of these intrapsychic levels may express itself as
the experience of an inner voice. This experience should not be
classified as pathological, but rather be considered as a striving
toward fulfillment of various aspects of the individual.
Many individuals who report a sense of the inner voice describe
it as a strong, positive directive force in their lives (Raphael-
Staude, 1977). It gives them the inner certainty to withstand
the conformity demands of the external world. Carl Jung
speaks of it as the "call" of a higher principle:
What, in the last analysis, induces a man to choose his own way and
so climb out of unconscious identity with the mass as out of a fog
bank .... It is what is called "vocation." ... Who has vocation
hears the voice of the inner man. . . . To have vocation means in
the original sense to be addressed by a voice. We find the clearest
examples of this in the Confessions ofthe Old Testament Prophets.
Nor is this merely an ancient manner of speech, as is shown by the
confessions of historic personalities such as Goethe and Napoleon,
to mention two familiar examples, who made no secret of their
feeling of vocation. Now, vocation, or the feeling of vocation, is not
perchance the prerogative of great personalities, but also belongs
to the small ones ... (quoted in Assagioli, 1973, p. 115).
This concept of "call" or vocation as expounded by lung
appears to be closely akin to the Hindu and Buddhist concept
of dharma, righteousness. Dharma literally means the univer-
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sal law of nature, which, if violated, causes serious imbalance.
This cosmic law is manifest not only in the natural world but
also in the human world in conduct which supports the
individual's progress toward full unfoldment (Heinze, 1982).
There have been individuals who speak quite openly of the
inner voice as the source of their conviction and authority.
Mahatma Gandhi, both a spiritual and political leader, relied
on "inner voice" as his primary guidance in life. Gandhi
described the inner voice as full of power and authority. A year
before his death the voice told him. "You are on the right track,
move neither to your left, nor right. but keep to the straight and
narrow" (Chatterjee, 1984, p. 99).
In the fifth century B.C. Socrates told of a voice that had spoken
to him at crucial moments since his childhood. He referred to
this voice as his "daemon," a spirit of that intermediate world
where communication passes between the divine and the
human (O'Brien, 1967).This voice "always forbids [when there
is danger] but never commands [when there is no danger] me to
do anything [ am going to do" (Jaspers, 1964, p. 10). For
Socrates, the voice did not bring knowledge or suggest definite
action, but merely said "no" when necessary. These two
examples point to a major difference in inner voices: one with
more mystical elements, and another working through the level
of the superego.
The history of the world's major religions makes it clear that
saints, sages, prophets, and teachers (such as Moses, Moham-
med, and Teresa of Avila) have relied heavily on the inner voice
as their inspiration, their guidance, and their authority. The
inner voice experiences of these men and women have had
tremendous impact on our world. But just as psychotics and
schizophrenics have no monopoly on the inner voice, neither
do saints and sages. Ordinary men and women in that broad
continuum between these two extremes also report hearing
inner voices. This study deals with the inner voice experiences
of thirty adult men and women who are neither saints nor
psychotics.
METHOD
Thirty subjects, all reporting having had inner voice experi-
ences, participated in this study. Fifteen subjects, known to the
author to have had inner voice experiences, were selected, and
fifteen subjects were randomly selected from 50 respondents to
a questionnaire on inner voice experience mailed to two
hundred subjects on a psychological-educational mailing list in
California.
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The subjects' experiences of "inner voice" were explored in a
naturalistic manner, allowing the various aspects of their
experience to emerge with as little observer contamination as
possible. My intention was to explore their experience in
depth-especially its positive relationship to their exterior life.
I gathered demographic data from and administered the
Thematic Apperception Test to these subjects, and conducted
individual subject interviews (DeVos, 1975; Bugental, 1966).
All thirty subjects were interviewed twice, with approximately
two weeks between first and second interviews. The format
was the same for all subjects, and the interval between the
two interviews gave respondents an opportunity to reflect
on the first interview and report any additional insights.
DATA ANALYSIS
The demographic, TAT, and interview data were analyzed to
discover natural groupings of inner voice experiences.
Nine subjects (18 interviews) were selected as representative of
the thirty subjects interviewed. This selection included a variety
of inner voice experiences, occurring under varying circum-
stances, and a wide range of occupations, incomes, education
levels, and life styles. The material was analyzed by the author,
and a colleague who had extensive experience in evaluating
subjective interview data. We independently read verbatim
transcripts of the interviews, along with my notes of intonation
patterns and silences during the interviews. We met and
discussed our findings. There were some very obvious areas
of agreement, and for those areas we questioned, we went
directly back to the transcripts and tapes for clarification.
Fairly stable categories of inner voice experiences began to
emerge.
Three major categories of inner voice experiences emerged
from the first nine interviews, and these were used as guidelines
to analyze the data from the remaining interviews, refining and
redefining the categories in the process. In addition, the results
of the TAT were used to build a fuller picture of the subjects.
The author and two colleagues with two and five years of
experience in TAT evaluation reviewed the TAT results to
determine if and how the material supported the three
emerging categories of inner voice experiences.
The three categories in their final form are:
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I. Inner voice experiences as a fragmented part of the self.
2. Inner voice experiences characterized bydialogue providing
guidance for growth of the individual,
3. Inner voice experiences where channels opened toward and
beyond a higher self.
THREE CASE STUDIES
The following case studies represent each category of inner
voice experience. The identities of the respondents have been
disguised to protect their anonymity.
Inner Voice Experiences as Fragmented Parts of the Self
Eric is a thirty-three-year old liberal arts college graduate,
married, with two children. His former job involved managerial
work, but he is now unemployed and living with his wife and
children at his in-laws. He has begun to study for his teaching
credential, and is studying social work as well. His hesitation to
commit to a career and support his family suggests that he is
still fragmented in major areas of his life.
Eric reported the inner voice as having control over some
situations, including leaving his last job, as if he had abdicated
his free will to it.
I was absolutely a victim of the whole thing. I just sat back and the
thing [inner voice] did it to me and I didn't have a vote about it. It
was another takeover.
The experiences Eric reported led him in a positive direction,
but he denies that the inner voice is a part of him. He sometimes
questions its guidance but feels strongly that the inner voice has
the final say in the matter.
I had stopped some relationships that were getting real negative,
and I didn't have the courage to do that, but I got myself into the
situation and a voice-over just came out of my voice and I said
things that destroyed the relationship. I mean it [inner voice]
finished the relationship, which was the appropriate and healthy
thing to do at the time. I, in my individual personage, didn't know
how to do that, so the voice took over.
Eric's inner voice experiences strongly suggest an expression of
fragmented parts of himself, and this fragmentation seems to
be leading him toward integration.
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Inner Voice Experiences Characterized by Dialogue Providing
Guidance for Individual Growth
Ruby is a married thirty-eight-year-old former educational
consultant. Within the last year she has left consulting and is
devoting her life to painting.
My inner voice is what tells me when to paint, when it's time and
when it's not time, and when it would be futile. And my inner voice
gave me the direction about quitting my job and doing what I'm
doing with painting.
Note the emphasis here on dialogue with the inner voice, rather
than its dictates, as in Eric's case.
I checkthat [whatI'm doing with painting]out a Jot.LastspringI
was given an opportunity to apply for a state grant and become a
consultant, and it seemed on the outside to me a real exciting
possibility, but when I checked it out with my voice, my voice said
"absolutely not," that it would get in the way of my painting. . . it
wouldn't have given me time for painting, so what I see it [inner
voice] really doing a lot now is directing me more towards my
original intent, which was to paint.
Ruby's change in profession is a direct result of her inner voice
experiences. Note Ruby's phrase, "I checked it out with my
voice." Ruby engaged in dialogues with the inner voice, actively
using it for guidance in releasing creative energy; quite different
from Eric's resignation to the dictates of his inner voice.
Inner Voice Experiences Where Channels Opened Toward and
Beyond a Higher Self
Rob is a sixty-three-year-old writer and counselor, with three
grown children. He lost a fourth child twenty-four years ago in
a sudden illness. Rob resolved this loss slowly. He feels that
parenting has been the most rewarding and humbling experi-
ence of his life. His thirty-eight-year marriage has been an
enriching experience and seems to provide a secure base for
Rob's sense of being deeply rooted in life.
Rob's belief system includes the inner voice as "a deeper level of
my own being." The experience of inner voice was a significant
part of Rob's life as he finished his doctorate in divinity and
became involved in work characterized as nonviolent, selfless
action. He recounted an experience which happened when he
was thirty-three.
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It operated once, that I can remember, in the civil rights movement,
when I was in Mississippi in 1961,and I was part of a visitation to
Jackson, where the Freedom Riders were. There were a group of 40
or 50 of us in this room in a black college, and they were asking for
people to volunteer to go with seven or eight into the airport
restaurant, which meant we'd be arrested and go to jail.
They needed a white Protestant minister, and they asked two or
three times. They were about ready to leave, and the Rabbi who
was heading up the delegation said, "Well, we haven't got a white
Protestant minister yet," and then I heard this voice say, "Well
you've got one now," and that was me. I was so surprised that it was
me, that I had said that. It came from some very deep place in me. I
was hearing it and saying it at the same time. . . .
I wasn't uncomfortable about it. That's what I wanted to do, that's
what I believed in, and that's what in my deepest self I wanted to
do. I was never dissatisfied or upset or distressed by what I had
said, but it surprised me.
Rob feels that there is a spiritual dimension, which he definesas
"the I being part of a larger process," operating with his inner
voice experiences. He sees the inner voice experience as closely
related to intuition, but he made the distinction that his inner
voice experiences were consistently a part of the spiritual
dimension of being. There is an element of volition in Rob's
inner voiceexperiences. He findsprayer and meditation helpful
in contacting the inner voice when he chooses to do so
intentionally, Rob also has inner voice experiences without
deliberately seeking them, but intention is an important aspect
of his relationship with the inner voice.
INTERPRETATIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The major interests reported by these subjects were, for
example, astrology, parapsychology, and meditation. Partici-
pation in such interests suggests the possibility of a certain
psychological openness on the part of the subjects. Also,
twenty-one subjects (70%) of a sample of thirty reported
practicing some form of meditation. Twenty-three subjects
(76%) have been involved in some form of psychotherapy.
These facts suggest a group of subjects who combine both
psychological and spiritual interests.
The subjects showed a wide range of occupations, including
both professional and blue collar work; annual incomes ranged
from $10,000 to above $60,000. Twenty-eight of thirty (93%)
had a college education, or a higher degree. These are subjects
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who value education and can support themselves in a variety of
occupations. Their age is also notable, ranging from 28 to 68,
with the majority reporting that their inner voice experiences
occurred between ages 35 and 45. On this basis, inner voice
experiences may be age-specific. Midlife has been noted as a
significant time for individuation (Jung, 1965, p, 196), and
Heinze (1982, pp. 30-31) found that shamans reported first
occurrences of inner voice experiences, predominantly either
after puberty or at midlife.
All of the individuals in the third category of inner voice
experiences as channels toward a higher self practiced some
form of meditation on a regular basis, and expressed a deep
sense of spiritual connection through these inner voice
experiences. The sense of certainty expressed by these indivi-
duals was very similar to the certainty Arbman (1963-70)
reports in mystics experiencing inner voices. It is possible that
this last category of subjects attained a certain level of mystical
experience which is in part auditory and which leads to positive
selfless action, as described above in Rob's case.
Assagioli (1986, p. 25) outlines three reactions to spiritual
awakening which parallel the three categories of inner voice
experiences emerging from this study. Assagioli speaks in
terms of energies and levels of organization with regard to peak
experiences. According to Assagioli, superconscious energies
work with the individual according to the levels at which
he/she can receive and integrate these energies. He observes
that one possible outcome of a peak experience is that it fails to
bring about a higher level of organization. Such experiences
are often painful, and the individual may not recognize their
transpersonal origin.
The positive outcome of such an experience is that the
individual can be directed to the next steps necessary for fuller
integration. Such an outcome of a peak experience, in
Assagioli's schema, parallels this study's category of inner voice
experiences as fragmented parts of the self. For instance, Eric
has not yet recognized the transpersonal origin of his inner
voice experiences, but they have continually led him to piece
together various fragments of himself. He is searching for a
career that will reflect his talents as well as support his family.
He is no longer content to simply do a job, but through his
inner voice experiences has formed a commitment to find work
that reflects him.
The second outcome to peak experiences according to Assagi-
oli, is less intense and involves a temporary neutralization of
personality patterns. What remains is very important: "an ideal
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model and a sense of direction which one can use to complete
the transformation through his own purposeful methods"
(1986, p. 25). This sense of direction is precisely what emerged
with individuals in my second category of inner voice
experiences, which essentially created a dialogue furthering the
growth and development of the individual. For instance,
Ruby's inner voice experiences guided her in the direction of
changing her career to painting. This change, she reports, has
been very fulfilling for her, and she continues to change and
grow in a positive direction.
A third possible outcome of a peak experience, according to
Assagioli, is a higher integration of personality. The indivi-
dual's life is permanently transformed as a result of the
experience. This type of integration is rare and can be
compared to the third category of inner voice experiences.
Individuals in this category are integrated and open to the
higher self through inner voice experiences; they experience a
permanent shift in their lives. In this study, this permanent shift
in personality also was associated with selfless service-work
without monetary or obvious ego gratification.
These findings suggest an ongoing interior education with the
inner voice as the teacher. Alschuler (1987) proposes an inner
curriculum based on a study of religious figures who had inner
voice experiences. The experiences reported by subjects in the
third category, where channels opened toward and beyond a
higher self, showed some similarity with this inner curriculum.
First, according to Alsehuler, contact with the inner voice
brings into question the individual's prior beliefs about reality.
Then, the individual goes through a process of intensive
instruction, which may involve periods of isolation. The last
stage of the curriculum is union, characterized by a fuller
identification with the other world, a tour of heaven and hell,
and a spiritual marriage with the inner teacher. Those
individuals who have experienced this level of inner education
go on missions of unification in the exterior world. Their
knowledge of the "other side" is so clear that they want to make
this side more like the other side. Although none of the subjects
in this study reported this level of experience, the subjects in the
third and most integrated category of inner voice experiences
were consistently involved in missions of selfless service.
Sometimes selflessservice preceded, but it was always intensi-
fied after inner voice experiences. These subjects were in touch
with an experience that transcended their individuality.
These findings suggest that psychotherapists might do well to
consider a wide range of possibilities when a client reports
an
"inner
curriculum"
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hearing an inner voice. The possibilities could include such
diverse processes as a fragmented voice, psychotic or integrated
dissociation, extrasensory perception experience, intuitive
experience, "vocation," or a spiritual awakening. The three
categories emerging from this study may provide a beginning
and much needed cartography for inner voice experiences.
They may also serve as a foundation for further investigation
into a little understood, but widely reported experience.
Finally, this study may help dispel the common stereotype of
the inner voice as the prerogative of saints and psychotics, and
thereby encourage research into its liberating effect on our
human capacities.
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IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AND UNCONDITIONAL
SELF-ACCEPTANCE. II. EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE FOR A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN
TWO KEY FEATURES OF REBT
Martin F. Davies
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University of London
ABSTRACT: In a test of two key features of REBT, causal relationships be-
tween irrational beliefs and unconditional self-acceptance were experimen-
tally investigated in a sample of 106 non-clinical participants using a priming
technique. Priming participants with statements of irrational belief resulted
in a decrease in unconditional self-acceptance whereas priming participants
with statements of rational belief resulted in an increase in unconditional self-
acceptance. In contrast, priming participants with statements about uncon-
ditional self-acceptance did not result in an increase in rational thinking and
priming participants with statements about conditional self-acceptance did
not result in an increase in irrational thinking. The present study is the first
to provide evidence of a causal link between rational/irrational thinking
and unconditional/conditional self-acceptance. The findings have important
implications for the core hypothesis of REBT and underscore the advantages
of experimental over correlational studies in theory-testing.
KEY WORDS: priming; irrational beliefs; REBT; self-acceptance; self-esteem.
INTRODUCTION
According to REBT, irrational beliefs are illogical, rigid and incon-
sistent with reality whereas rational beliefs are logical, flexible and
consistent with reality. As a result of holding irrational beliefs,
people acquire unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors and
psychological disturbance. Through disputation of their irrational
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beliefs, people can develop more rational and realistic ways of think-
ing that will produce greater acceptance of the self and others. In
REBT, self-acceptance means accepting oneself unconditionally
regardless of whether one behaves competently or correctly and whe-
ther others are likely to express approval or respect (for reviews, see
Dryden & Neenan, 2004; Ellis, 1994).
A great deal of research has been carried out on irrational beliefs,
but very little work has been done on unconditional self-acceptance,
even though unconditional self-acceptance has long been a key fea-
ture of REBT. One reason for this state of affairs may be the lack of
a reliable and valid measure of unconditional self-acceptance. Re-
cently, however, Chamberlain and Haaga (2001a) devised a measure
consisting of 20 statements reflecting the various philosophical and
practical aspects of unconditional self-acceptance distilled from the
REBT literature. Chamberlain and Haaga (2001a, b) found that this
measure of unconditional self-acceptance was positively associated
with life satisfaction and happiness, and negatively associated with
anxiety, depression and depression-proneness. Unfortunately, their
measure of unconditional self-acceptance was also found to be corre-
lated with self-esteem. To overcome this problem, they partialled out
self-esteem from the other correlations. When this was done, the cor-
relations with anxiety and depression-proneness remained signifi-
cant, but the correlations with depression and life satisfaction/
happiness became non-significant.
Armed with this newly-available measure of unconditional self-
acceptance, Davies (2006) investigated its relationship with irrational
beliefs and found a highly significant negative correlation even after
self-esteem had been partialled out. Thus, irrational thinking was
associated with conditional self-acceptance, whereas rational thinking
was associated with unconditional self-acceptance. This provided the
first empirical evidence of a link between two key aspects of REBT.
However, the findings were only correlational and therefore it could
not be concluded that rational/irrational thinking is a cause of uncon-
ditional/conditional self-acceptance. Indeed, it could well be that the
reverse causal direction is the case—accepting oneself uncondition-
ally/conditionally leads to more rational/irrational beliefs. To investi-
gate the causal relations between these constructs would require the
use of true experimental designs.
In the present study, causal links between the two key features of
REBT were experimentally investigated using a priming technique.
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Although priming is commonly used in social cognition to examine
the effects of presenting different types of information on ostensibly
unrelated subsequent judgments or behavior (for a review, see
Higgins, 1996), it is not typically used in REBT. The usual technique
of manipulating beliefs in REBT is to instruct participants to assume
or hold a particular belief while imagining a problem scenario and
then to measure the variables of interest. For example, while imagin-
ing having a serious disagreement with one’s partner, participants
might be instructed to hold the belief ‘‘It may be inconvenient dis-
agreeing with my partner but it is not awful’’ and then relationship
satisfaction is measured (taken from Cramer, 2005). Although this
may be a useful technique in therapy, the problem with this tech-
nique from an experimental point of view is demand characteristics
(Orne, 1962). Being instructed to assume or hold a belief may consti-
tute a powerful demand cue such that, when it comes time to take
the measure of interest, participants will guess the purpose of the
experiment and simply respond in such a way as to please the experi-
menter and/or confirm the experimenter’s hypothesis rather than re-
spond as they naturally would. In the example above, having been
asked to hold the belief ‘‘It may be inconvenient disagreeing with my
partner but it is not awful’’ and then responding to a relationship
satisfaction measure, participants may correctly guess that the exper-
imenter wants them to respond more positively than they otherwise
would (or, in the Cramer example, as they previously did on a pre-
test). With the priming technique, there is no ostensible relationship
between the priming manipulation and the measurement of the
dependent variable, and therefore demand cues are minimised.
To test the idea that irrational/rational beliefs cause conditional/
unconditional self-acceptance, some participants were primed with
irrational beliefs and others were primed with rational beliefs.
Unconditional self-acceptance was measured before and after the
priming manipulation. It was therefore hypothesized that priming
irrational beliefs would lead to a significant decrease in unconditional
self-acceptance, whereas priming rational beliefs would lead to a sig-
nificant increase. To test the reverse causal link, some participants
were primed with unconditional self-acceptance statements and
others were primed with conditional self-acceptance. Irrational beliefs
were measured before and after the priming manipulation. It was
therefore hypothesized that priming unconditional self-acceptance
would lead to a significant decrease in irrational beliefs, whereas
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priming conditional self-acceptance would lead to a significant in-
crease.
Self-esteem was included as a control measure. It was not expected
that priming rational/irrational beliefs would affect self-esteem but it
was expected that priming conditional/unconditional self-acceptance
would affect self-esteem given the close relationship between these
measures (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001a, b). Thus, priming condi-
tional self-acceptance should lead to lower self-esteem whereas prim-
ing unconditional self-acceptance should lead to higher self-esteem.
METHOD
Participants
Undergraduate students aged 18–43 (M = 22.86) completed a num-
ber of questionnaires for course credits in mass-testing sessions. Four
months later they returned for testing in small groups. Complete
data were obtained for 82 women and 24 men.
Measures
The measure of irrational beliefs was the Irrational Beliefs Scale
(IBS; Malouff & Schutte, 1986), a questionnaire consisting of 20
statements representing the 10 irrational beliefs described by Ellis
and Harper (1961) to which participants respond on a scale from 1
(‘‘strongly disagree’’) to 5 (‘‘strongly agree’’). Malouff and Schutte
report a test–retest reliability of 0.89 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.80.
From this questionnaire, a set of 20 irrational beliefs was prepared.
A set of 20 rational beliefs was prepared by reversing the meaning of
the items. For example, scale item 5 ‘‘Some of my ways of acting are
so ingrained that I could never change them’’ was re-worded as
‘‘Some of my ways of acting are ingrained but I can still change
them.’’
Unconditional self-acceptance was measured with the USAQ
(Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001a), a questionnaire consisting of 20
statements to which participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘almost
always untrue’’) to 7 (‘‘almost always true’’). In this questionnaire,
nine items are worded such that higher scores represent greater
unconditional self-acceptance (e.g., ‘‘I avoid comparing myself to
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others to decide if I am a worthwhile person’’), while 11 items are re-
verse-scored such that higher scores represent greater conditional
self-acceptance (e.g., ‘‘I set goals for myself that I hope will prove my
worth’’). Chamberlain and Haaga report a Cronbach alpha of 0.72
which is an acceptable level of internal consistency. From this ques-
tionnaire, a set of 20 unconditional self-acceptance statements was
prepared using the nine normally-scored items plus re-wording of the
11 reverse-scored items. A set of 20 conditional self-acceptance state-
ments was prepared using the 11 reverse-scored items plus re-word-
ing of the nine normally-scored items.
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale
(RSE; Rosenberg, 1965), a questionnaire consisting of 10 statements
to which participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘strongly agree’’) to
4 (‘‘strongly disagree’’). To avoid confusion in the interpretation of
results, items were scored so that high scores represented high self-
esteem. The Rosenberg scale is the most widely-used measure of self-
esteem and has been found to have high reliability and internal
consistency. For example, Fleming and Courtney (1984) report a
Cronbach alpha of 0.88.
Procedure
In initial mass-testing sessions, participants completed a number
of questionnaires including the Unconditional Self-Acceptance Ques-
tionnaire (USAQ), the Irrational Beliefs Scale (IBS) and the Rosen-
berg Self-Esteem scale (RSE). Approximately 4 months later,
participants returned for a second testing session when they were
randomly assigned either to one of three rationality-priming condi-
tions or to one of three self-acceptance priming conditions. (The rela-
tively long delay between the initial pre-testing and the experimental
session was caused by administrative and organizational constraints
outside the control of the experimenter.)
In the irrational-priming condition, participants were presented
with a list of 10 irrational beliefs. In the rational-priming condition,
participants were presented with a list of 10 rational beliefs. In a
neutral-priming (control) condition, participants were presented with
a randomly-mixed list of five irrational and five rational beliefs. In
the unconditional-priming condition, participants were presented
with a list of 10 unconditional self-acceptance statements. In the
conditional-priming condition, participants were presented with a list
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of 10 conditional self-acceptance statements. In a neutral-priming
(control) condition, participants were presented with a randomly-
mixed list of five unconditional and five conditional self-acceptance
statements.
Participants were asked to study the statements for 2 minutes. In
order to justify the task and to concentrate participants’ attention on
the statements, the experimenter told them that they would be asked
questions about the statements later on as part of a memory test.
This memory test also served as a check on the equivalence of the
priming tasks across conditions. After 2 minutes, the list of state-
ments was removed and participants in the irrational/rational/neutral
priming conditions were given the USAQ and RSE questionnaires to
fill in, whereas those in the conditional/unconditional/neutral priming
conditions were given the IBS and RSE questionnaires. The partici-
pants were then presented with 20 statements, 10 of which had been
previously presented in the priming phase and 10 of the same type
which had not been previously presented. They were required to tick
the 10 statements they had been shown previously. After completion
of the testing, participants were thoroughly debriefed.
RESULTS
The recognition-memory scores are shown in Table 1. There were
no significant differences between the irrational/rational/neutral
priming conditions nor between the unconditional/conditional/neutral
self-acceptance priming conditions, Fs < 1. This suggests that the
statements were equally memorable across conditions and therefore
that the priming effects were equivalent across conditions.
Priming of Irrational/Rational beliefs
Scores on the USAQ and RSE were analysed using a 3 (Irrational,
Rational, Neutral priming)2 (Pretest/Posttest measurement)
ANOVA. Table 2 shows summary statistics for Unconditional Self-
Acceptance and Self-Esteem scores as a function of Priming and
Pretest/Posttest conditions.
For Unconditional Self-Acceptance scores, there was a significant
interaction of Priming and Pretest/Posttest conditions, F(2,50) = 6.89,
p < .002. As can be seen from Figure 1, unconditional self-acceptance
increased significantly as a result of priming Rational beliefs,
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t(18) = 2.38, p < .05 (a medium effect; d = 0.55), decreased signifi-
cantly as a result of priming Irrational beliefs, t(17) = 3.44, p < .01 (a
large effect; d = 0.81), and stayed the same in the neutral-priming
condition, t < 1.
For Self-Esteem scores, there were no significant effects, Fs < 1.
Further analysis was carried out on the USAQ scores. Previous
research (Davies, 2006) had shown that the items of the USAQ did
not load on a single factor but rather on two factors, self-esteem and
self-acceptance. Therefore, two scores were calculated from the USAQ
Table 1
Number of Statements Correctly Recognised
Priming condition Priming condition
Irrational Rational Neutral Conditional Unconditional Neutral
Mean 7.84 7.58 7.50 7.42 7.76 7.64
SD 1.25 1.27 1.32 1.40 1.29 1.17
N 18 19 16 19 17 17
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Unconditional Self-Acceptance and
Self-Esteem Scores as a Function of Priming and Pretest/
Posttest Conditions
Unconditional
self-acceptance
Self-esteem
Priming condition Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Neutral Mean 87.56 86.75 30.88 31.94
SD 11.72 13.49 5.20 4.92
N 16 16 16 16
Rational Mean 85.95 92.63 31.21 32.74
SD 9.80 12.87 4.16 5.16
N 19 19 19 19
Irrational Mean 85.56 77.50 32.17 32.00
SD 11.74 11.00 4.02 5.55
N 18 18 18 18
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items based on their loadings on these factors, Factor 1 representing
self-esteem and Factor 2 representing self-acceptance. Analysis of
variance showed a highly significant interaction of Irrational/Rational
priming and Pretest/Posttest for Factor 2 (self-acceptance),
F(2,50) = 10.92, p < .001, but no significant interaction for Factor 1
(self-esteem), F < 1. As can be seen from Figure 2, Factor 2 scores
increased significantly as a result of priming Rational beliefs,
t(18) = 3.36, p < .005, decreased significantly as a result of priming
Irrational beliefs, t(17) = 3.40, p < .005, and stayed the same in the
neutral-priming condition, t < 1.
Priming of Unconditional/Conditional Self-Acceptance
Scores on the IBS and RSE were analysed using a 3 (Uncondi-
tional, Conditional, Neutral Priming)2 (Pretest/Posttest measure-
ment) ANOVA. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the Irrational
Beliefs and Self-Esteem measures as a function of Priming and
Pretest/Posttest conditions.
For Irrational-Beliefs scores, there was no significant interaction of
Priming and Pretest/Posttest conditions, F < 1. However, for Self-
Esteem scores, there was a significant interaction of Priming and
Pretest/Posttest conditions, F(2,50) = 3.42, p < .05. As can be seen
from Figure 3, self-esteem increased as a result of priming uncondi-
tional self-acceptance, t(16) = 2.36, p < .05, decreased as a result of
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Figure 1. Self-acceptance as a function of priming irrational/rational
beliefs.
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priming conditional self-acceptance, t(18) = 1.82, p < .10, and stayed
the same in the neutral-priming condition, t < 1.
DISCUSSION
The findings of the present study show clearly that thinking about
rational beliefs increases unconditional self-acceptance whereas
thinking about irrational beliefs reduces unconditional self-accep-
tance. By contrast, thinking about unconditional or conditional
self-acceptance does not affect irrational versus rational thinking
(although it does influence self-esteem such that unconditional
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Figure 2. USAQ factor 1 and 2 scores as a function of irrational/
rational priming.
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self-acceptance increases self-esteem whereas conditional self-accep-
tance reduces self-esteem).
As well as supporting previous findings that irrational beliefs are
associated with low unconditional self-acceptance (Davies, 2006),
these findings extend this work by showing not simply a correlation
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Irrational-Beliefs and Self-Esteem
Scores as a Function of Priming and Pretest/Posttest
Conditions
Irrational beliefs Self-esteem
Priming condition Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Neutral Mean 58.65 58.59 31.47 32.35
SD 10.01 8.13 5.25 5.41
N 17 17 17 17
Unconditional Mean 57.88 56.41 31.06 33.88
SD 8.25 7.02 5.24 4.34
N 17 17 17 17
Conditional Mean 59.63 60.63 30.79 28.68
SD 7.28 7.80 5.19 5.20
N 19 19 19 19
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Figure 3. Self-esteem as a function of priming unconditional/condi-
tional self-acceptance.
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between the two but a causal link. In addition, the present findings
establish that the previously-observed correlation was not simply due
to content overlap between measures of irrational beliefs and uncon-
ditional self-acceptance, otherwise the priming effects of IBS and
USA would have been similar when they were clearly not.
These findings are very relevant to the issue of whether the ‘‘core’’
hypothesis of REBT—that irrational beliefs cause psychological
dysfunction and disturbance—is testable (e.g., Bond & Dryden,
1996a). Ellis (1958, 1994) proposed that cognitions, emotions and
behaviors are not separate psychological entities but that they are
intimately related to each other. This is what Bond and Dryden refer
to as the ‘‘interdependence principle’’ of REBT. If this principle holds,
then causal links between these entities, such as between irrational
beliefs and unhealthy emotions, cannot be examined because interde-
pendence logically implies that these entities are not separate and
cannot be separated from one another. Thus, the ‘‘core’’ REBT
hypothesis cannot be tested. According to Bond and Dryden ‘‘If a
system is truly interdependent, then each element of that system
cannot be isolated and its effects examined, because the effect of each
element is contingent upon the other elements of the system; in other
words, cognitions, emotions, and behavior cannot legitimately be
separated from each other; therefore, if one attempts to measure the
effects of cognition on psychological disturbance and health, one is
also measuring the effects of emotions and behavior as well.’’ (p. 31).
Although the present study found evidence that irrational beliefs
are a causal agent in self-acceptance, there was no evidence that self-
acceptance is a causal agent in irrational thinking. However, there
was no check to see whether the experimental priming of self-accep-
tance actually changed people’s self-acceptance. It is possible that the
priming method is particularly suited to changing beliefs rather than
to changing stable and central traits such as self-acceptance and this
is why no significant effects of self-acceptance on irrational beliefs
were found. Unfortunately, the priming method does not easily allow
for manipulation checks. In addition, since there is only one recog-
nized measure of unconditional self-acceptance, the findings need to
be replicated with different measures and different methods, espe-
cially since there are some doubts about the psychometric properties
of the USAQ (Davies, 2006).
It may very well be that other areas of Ellis’s REBT model are
interdependent or exhibit bi-directional causality. In an important
M. F. Davies
series of studies, Bond and Dryden (1996b, 1997, 2000) showed, using
role-playing/imaginal inductions, that people who hold irrational
beliefs endorse more dysfunctional inferences than those holding
rational beliefs. However, they did not test whether inference state-
ments may cause beliefs and therefore it remains a possibility
(admittedly unlikely) that there is also a reverse causal link, i.e.
holding functional versus dysfunctional inferences results in the dif-
ferential endorsement of rational versus irrational beliefs.
Clearly, the present findings need replicating using other samples,
methods and procedures, particularly different manipulations or
inductions of irrational/rational thinking, as well as other measures
relating to self-acceptance. Given the application in the present study
of an experimental technique (priming) new to REBT, it would be of
interest to examine the use of priming in other REBT areas to see
whether similar effects occur and whether there are qualifications or
limitations of the effects observed in the present study.
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The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading:
Review of literature and implications for future research
Tania Singer
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College of London,
17 Queen Square, WC1N 3AR London, UKAbstract
Social neuro-science has recently started to investigate the neuronal mechanisms underlying our ability to understand the mental and
emotional states of others. In this review, imaging research conducted on theory of mind (ToM or mentalizing) and empathy is selectively
reviewed. It is proposed that even though these abilities are often used as synonyms in the literature these capacities represent different
abilities that rely on different neuronal circuitry. ToM refers to our ability to understand mental states such as intentions, goals and
beliefs, and relies on structures of the temporal lobe and the pre-frontal cortex. In contrast, empathy refers to our ability to share the
feelings (emotions and sensations) of others and relies on sensorimotor cortices as well as limbic and para-limbic structures. It is further
argued that the concept of empathy as used in lay terms refers to a multi-level construct extending from simple forms of emotion
contagion to complex forms of cognitive perspective taking. Future research should investigate the relative contribution of empathizing
and mentalizing abilities in the understanding of other people’s states. Finally, it is suggested that the abilities to understand other
people’s thoughts and to share their affects display different ontogenetic trajectories reﬂecting the different developmental paths of their
underlying neural structures. In particular, empathy develops much earlier than mentalizing abilities, because the former relys on limbic
structures which develop early in ontogeny, whereas the latter rely on lateral temporal lobe and pre-frontal structures which are among
the last to fully mature.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Humans are intensely social creatures and one of the
major functions of our brains is to enable us to interact
successfully in social groups. One crucial capacity for
successful interaction is our ability to understand other
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science (Adolphs, 1999, 2003; Blakemore et al., 2004;
Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001; Frith and Wopert, 2004)
has recently started to provide insights into the neural
mechanism underlying our capacity to represent others
people’s intentions and beliefs (referred to as ‘‘theory of
mind’’ ToM or ‘‘mentalizing’’), and the capacity to share
the feelings of others (referred to as ‘‘empathy’’). In
everyday language as well as in the literature the terms
empathy, perspective taking and ToM are often used as
synonyms. Sometimes the term empathy is further differ-
entiated by dividing it into two subcomponents, emotional
and cognitive empathy. Indeed, at ﬁrst glance these
concepts are difﬁcult to differentiate because they share
similar features. Thus all these concepts refer to our ability
to put ourselves in the shoes of another person, be it in
their mental or emotional shoes. In the present paper the
suggestion is made that the capacities to mentalize and to
empathize are distinct and rely on different neuro-cognitive
circuits. More speciﬁcally, it is argued that the process of
mentalizing refers to the attribution of propositional
attitudes to another person, that is, the attribution of
desires, beliefs and intentions. For reasons of simplicity,
the term ‘‘propositional attitude’’ will be sometimes
replaced by the term ‘‘mental states’’, although the reader
has to keep in mind that mental states could in principal
also include feeling and emotional states. In the present
paper we use the term ‘‘empathizing’’ to refer to the process
which allows us to experience what it feels like for another
person to experience a certain emotion or sensation (e.g.,
qualia). The capacity to understand other people’s emo-
tions by sharing their affective states is fundamentally
different in nature from the capacity to mentalize. Thus,
sharing the grief of a close friend feels fundamentally
different than understanding what this person is having as
thoughts and intentions, the latter lacking a bodily
sensation.
First a short summary of the major ﬁndings of imaging
studies in three interrelated but separate research streams
will be provided: the neural basis of mentalizing, motor
action imitation and empathizing. Then future directions
for the study of empathizing and mentalizing will be
discussed, focusing on how these abilities can be differ-
entiated with regard to their relative contribution to the
understanding of other people’s mental and emotional
states. Finally, possible implications of the outlined neuro-
scientiﬁc evidence for developmental science will be
discussed. Speciﬁcally, it is suggested that our ability to
reﬂect upon others and our ability to share their feelings
should display different ontogenetic trajectories reﬂecting
the differential development of the underlying brain
structures.
2. Mind reading
For two decades now, research in developmental
psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuro-sciencehas focused on the human ability to have a ‘‘ToM’’
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978) or to ‘‘mentalize’’ (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2000; Frith and Frith, 2003), that is, to make
attributions about the propositional attitudes (desires,
beliefs, intentions) of others. This ability is absent in
monkeys and only exists in a rudimentary form in apes
(Povinelli and Bering, 2002). Wimmer and Perner (1983)
developed a new paradigm to study the ability to mentalize
in children. In this so-called false-belief task a story is told
which goes like this: Maxi has some chocolate and puts it
into a blue cupboard. Maxi goes out. Now his mother
comes in and moves the chocolate to a green cupboard.
Maxi comes back to get his chocolate. Where will Maxi
look for the chocolate? The answer can be given simply by
pointing: Maxi will look in the blue cupboard because this
is where he falsely believes the chocolate to be. Control
questions checked that the child understood the sequence
of events: Where is the chocolate really? Do you remember
where Maxi put the chocolate in the beginning? A series of
subsequent studies established that children from around
age 4 but not before begin to understand this scenario and
can verbally explain it when asked. At age 5, over 90%,
and at age 6 all children could understand the task (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Perner et al., 1987). Other researchers
used variants of this task with essentially similar results.
Studies were also carried out in other cultures indicating
the universality of this clear developmental phenomenon
(Avis and Harris, 2005). Note, however, that Clements and
Perner (1994, 2001) were able to show that the false-belief
scenario with Maxi and the chocolate is already under-
stood by 3-year-old children when the task is transformed
into a little play and eye-gaze is measured instead of verbal
report.
Research in the domain of psycho-pathology demon-
strated that the explicit attribution of mental states such as
false beliefs is severely delayed in autism. The lack of a
ToM in most autistic children could explain their observed
failures in communication and social interaction (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985, 2000; Frith, 2003).
Recent imaging studies on normal healthy adults have
focused on the ability to ‘‘mentalize’’ and have used stories,
cartoons, picture sequences and animated geometric shapes
which differed in the degree to which they represented the
intentions, beliefs and desires of others (for a review, see
Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Other studies, for example,
involved the brain imaging of subjects while they played
strategic games (McCabe et al., 2001; Gallagher et al.,
2002; Rilling et al., 2004) with another partner or
alternatively with a computer outside the scanner room.
All these studies have repeatedly given evidence for the
involvement of three brain areas: the temporal poles, the
posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and most
consistently an area in the medial pre-frontal lobe (mPFC)
which is illustrated in Fig. 1. This area has not only been
found to be involved when mentalizing about the thoughts,
intentions or beliefs of others but also when people are
attending to their own mental states (Mitchell et al., 2005).
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Fig. 1. Region of maximum activity in the region of the medial pre-frontal cortex, the area found to be reliably activated during mentalizing tasks. This
activity was elicited when subjects adopted an ‘‘intentional stance’’ while they were playing a computerized version of the children’s game Rock Paper
Scissors with either the experimenter or a computer. The ﬁgure illustrates activity speciﬁc to when subjects believed that they were playing against the
experimenter compared to playing against a computer, and thus treated the other as an agent attributing to it beliefs and goals. The actual game sequence
was identical in both conditions (adapted from Gallagher and Frith, 2003).
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subserve the formation of decoupled representations of
beliefs about the world, ‘‘decoupled’’ in the sense that they
are decoupled from the actual state of the world and that
they may or may not correspond to reality.
A related line of research has focused on the investiga-
tion of the neural mechanism underlying our ability to
represent others’ goals and intentions by the mere
observation of their motor actions. This notion stems
from the ﬁnding that there are neurons in the pre-motor
cortex of the macaque brain that ﬁre both when the
monkey performs a hand action itself and when it merely
observes another monkey or a human performing the same
hand action (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). It has been suggested
that these ‘‘mirror neurons’’ represent the neural basis for
imitation. Thus, when we imitate someone, we ﬁrst observe
the action and then try to reproduce it. But how do we
transform what we see in terms of perceptual input into
knowledge of what we need to do in terms of motor
commands? The discovery of mirror neurons demonstrated
that a translation mechanism is present in the primate
brain and automatically elicited when viewing others’
actions. Moreover, Gallese and Goldman (1998) suggested
that this mirror system might underlie our ability to
understand other people’s intentions by providing us with
an automatic simulation of their actions, goals and
intentions.Since the discovery of these ‘‘mirror neurons’’ a similar
common coding of the production and perception of motor
action has been demonstrated in the human brain using
imaging techniques such as PET and fMRI (for a review,
see Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Grezes and Decety,
2001). Typically, people were scanned while they saw
movies depicting short motor actions. The observed
activation was then compared with the activation elicited
when the scanned subjects did the same motor action
themselves. In line with the observation in monkeys, these
studies revealed that the mere observation of another
person performing an action recruited partly the same
circuitry elicited by the execution of the same action. More
speciﬁcally, this circuitry involves supplementary motor
area (SMA), pre-SMA, pre-motor cortex, the supramar-
ginal gyrus, intraparietal sulcus and the superior parietal
lobe (Grezes and Decety, 2001).
3. Empathy
In addition to the ability to understand the mental states
(propositional attitudes) of others, humans can also
empathize with others, that is, share their feelings and
emotions in the absence of any direct emotional stimula-
tion to themselves. Humans can feel empathy for other
people in a wide variety of contexts: for basic emotions and
sensations such as anger, fear, sadness, joy, pain and lust,
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Fig. 2. Shared pain- and empathy-related networks observed when pain
was applied to self or partner. The female volunteers activated anterior
cingulated cortex (ACC) and bilateral anterior insula—the affective
component of their own pain experience—when they observed their loved
one receiving painful stimulation to his right hand. The ﬁgure illustrates
results of a conjunction analysis between the contrasts pain–no pain in the
context of self and other at Po0.001 (adapted from Singer et al., 2004b).
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embarrassment and love. It has been suggested that
empathy is the process that prevents us from doing harm
to others and motivates altruistic behavior. An absence of
empathy is what characterizes psychopaths who hurt
others without feeling guilt or remorse (Blair, 2003).
Empathy is crucial for the creation of affective bonds
between mother and child, and later between partners and
larger social groups. These examples exemplify that the lay
term ‘‘empathy’’ refers to a complex and multi-level
concept incorporating processes of affect sharing, mental
state attribution and action control and initiation. As
mentioned already in the introduction, we focus here on
our capacity to understand emotions of others by sharing
their affective states. At this point it is important to stress
that although empathizing is deﬁned as ‘‘affect sharing’’
the affective state in self and others is not simply shared but
has to be induced in the self by the perception or
imagination of an emotional state in another person and,
even if it feels similar, is nevertheless distinguishable from
the same feeling originated in ourselves.
Neuro-scientiﬁc research on empathy has been strongly
inﬂuenced by action–perception models outlined earlier.
Thus, the idea that there are neural mechanisms enabling
the sharing of other people’s states has been expanded to
include the ability to share their feelings and sensations as
well (Gallese, 2003; Gallese et al., 2004; Preston and de
Waal, 2002). How can we understand what someone else
feels when he or she experiences emotions such as sadness
or happiness, or bodily sensations such as pain, touch or
tickling, in the absence of any emotional or sensory
stimulation to our own body? Inﬂuenced by perception–ac-
tion models of motor behavior and imitation, Preston and
de Waal (2002) proposed a neuro-scientiﬁc model of
empathy, suggesting that observation or imagination of
another person in a particular emotional state automati-
cally activates a representation of that state in the observer
with its associated autonomic and somatic responses. The
term ‘‘automatic’’ in this case refers to a process that does
not require conscious and effortful processing, but which
can nevertheless be inhibited or controlled. Imaging studies
in the past two years have started to investigate brain
activity associated with different empathic responses in the
domains of touch, smell and pain. The results have
revealed common neural responses elicited by the observa-
tion of pictures showing disgusted faces and smelling
disgusting odors oneself (Wicker et al., 2003), likewise by
being touched and observing videos of someone else being
touched (Keysers et al., 2004). Whereas the former study
observed common activation in anterior insula (AI) cortex,
a cortex which has been found to be associated with the
processing and feeling of disgust, the latter study identiﬁed
common activation in secondary somato-sensory cortex
(SII), a part of the cortex involved in processing and feeling
the sensation of touch.
Another study was able to identify shared and unique
networks involved in empathy for pain (Singer et al.,2004a). In this study, couples were recruited allowing the
assessment of empathy ‘‘in vivo’’ by bringing both partners
into the same scanner environment. Brain activity was then
measured in the female partner while painful stimulation
was applied either to her own or to her partner’s right hand
via electrodes attached to the back of the hand. The male
partner was seated next to the MRI scanner and a mirror
allowed her to see both, her own and her partner’s, hands
lying on a tilted board in front of her. Flashes of different
colors on a big screen behind the board pointed either to
her hand or that of her partner, indicating which of them
would receive the stimulation and whether it would be
painful or non-painful.
This procedure enabled the measurement of pain-related
brain activation (the so-called ‘‘pain matrix’’) when pain
was applied to the scanned subject or to her partner
(empathy for pain). The results suggest that some parts,
but not the entire ‘‘pain matrix’’, were activated when
empathizing with the pain of others. Activity in the
primary and secondary somato-sensory cortex was only
observed when receiving pain. These areas are known to be
involved in the processing of the sensory-discriminatory
components of our pain experience, that is, they indicate
the location of the pain and its objective quality. In
contrast, bilateral AI, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), brainstem and cerebellum were activated when
subjects either received pain or a signal that a loved one
experienced pain (see Fig. 2). These areas are involved in
the processing of the affective component of pain, that is,
how unpleasant the subjectively felt pain is (Craig, 2002;
Peyron et al., 2000). Thus, both the experience of pain to
oneself and the knowledge that a loved partner is
experiencing pain activates the same affective pain circuits.
Further analyses also revealed that activity in these
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iation and that these differences covary with interindivi-
dual differences in standard empathy questionnaires—the
Empathic Concern Scale (IRI) by Davis (1980) and the
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) from Mehra-
bian and Epstein (1972) and Mehrabian (1997). The higher
the subjects scored on these questionnaires, the higher was
their activation in ACC and AI.
In sum, these ﬁndings suggest that we use representa-
tions reﬂecting our own emotional responses to pain to
understand how the pain of others feels. Moreover, our
ability to empathize may have evolved from a system which
represents our own internal feeling states and allows us to
predict the affective outcomes of an event for ourselves and
for other people. Consistently, activation in these regions
has been observed in a wide range of imaging studies
associated with emotional awareness of internal bodily
states (Critchley et al., 2004), subjective feelings expressed
by subjective ratings of trustworthiness in faces (Winston et
al., 2002), in response to unfair offers during monetary
exchange games (Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003) or
when confronted with the faces of fair players (Singer et al.,
2004b). Interestingly, a special cell type, the so-called von
Economo cell, has been observed exclusively in these two
brain regions and only in humans and our closest relatives
the great apes. John Allman has suggested that these large
cells may provide a possible neural mechanism for fast
social intuitions in uncertain situations of the like of ‘‘I feel
or don’t feel good about this’’ (Craig, 2003). In general,
these structures have been suggested to subserve a
subjective representation of internal bodily and subjective
feeling states (Gallese et al., 2004; Craig, 2002, 2003;
Critchley et al., 2004; Damasio, 1994).
Results of recent studies on empathy for pain indicate
that similar empathic responses can be observed even if the
‘‘object’’ of empathy is unknown or unfamiliar (Jackson et
al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2004). The magnitude of this
activity, however, is modulated by the affective link to the
‘‘object’’ of empathy (Singer et al., 2006). Thus, activity in
ACC and AI has also been observed when subjects watched
still pictures depicting body parts involved in possibly
painful situations (Jackson et al., 2005) or videos showing a
needle piercing in the back of a hand (Morrison et al.,
2004). The ﬁndings of a new study by Singer et al. (2006)
indicate that overall empathy-related activation for un-
familiar persons in pain is lower than when empathizing
with a loved one in pain. More importantly, however, this
study gives ﬁrst evidence for the modulation of activity in
ACC and AI as a function of whether the subjects liked or
disliked the other person in pain.
Finally, a number of studies have investigated the
perception and evaluation of facial emotional expressions
(for overviews, see also Blair, 2003; Adolphs, 2002; Haxby
et al., 2002), mostly by presenting static pictures of faces
with different emotional expressions ranging from fear,
anger, disgust to happiness and surprise. These studies
identiﬁed the involvement of a variety of brain regions,most prominently primary and higher-order visual areas,
orbito-frontal cortex, amygdala, insula and basal ganglia.
Although relevant, the focus of most of these studies was
not on the study of empathy but on the investigation of
threat detection, aversive conditioning, subliminal percep-
tion, inherent reward values or attentional modulation (for
an exception, see Carr et al., 2003; Decety and Chaminade,
2003).
4. Future research perspectives: distinguishing mentalizing
and empathizing
Clearly, neuro-scientiﬁc research on empathic under-
standing is in its infancy. In the experiments undertaken so
far (Wicker et al., 2003; Keysers et al., 2004; Singer et al.,
2004a, 2006; Morrison et al., 2004), subjects were neither
required to make any explicit judgment about the feelings
of the other person (for an exception see Avenanti et al.,
2005, commented on by Singer and Frith, 2005) nor to
engage in other-regarding behavior. As pointed out earlier
the focus was primarily on our capacity for affect sharing,
the capacity to automatically resonate with other people’s
feelings even when we are not aware of it. For example,
when seeing someone else crying, we automatically start
producing tears in our eyes, even in the absence of
awareness.
The literature refers to these effects as emotional
contagion, the human tendency to automatically mimic
and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures
and movements with those of another person (Hatﬁeld et
al., 1994). An example for such contagious effects can be
observed already in newborns who respond signiﬁcantly
more with crying when hearing another newborn crying
than when hearing the sound of white noise, their own cry,
the cry of an older baby or a synthetic cry (Martin and
Clark, 1987; Simner, 1971; Decety and Jackson, 2004).
However, affect sharing also occurs in the absence of any
emotional stimuli to the subject. Even when subjects only
see symbols which indicate by their color whether another
person is in pain or not, activation in parts of the pain
network involved in the processing of our own pain
experience is elicited. As with emotional contagion this
empathic response is still implicit in the sense that it was
elicited without the requirement of any explicit, effortful
perspective taking or judgment about the other people’s
emotional states.
The capacity for affect sharing—deﬁned in this article as
the capacity for empathy—is, however, only one aspect of
what is called empathy in our everyday understanding.
Thus, the term empathy usually refers to a complex and
multi-level construct including simple forms of emotional
contagion as well as complex forms of empathic perspec-
tive taking associated with other-regarding pro-social
behavior (see also Decety and Jackson, 2004; Batson et
al., 1997; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg, 2000;
Preston and de Waal, 2002). Different authors have
focused on different aspects of empathy, some focusing
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the conscious process of perspective taking allowing the
understanding of the others’ feelings, and again others on
the motivational aspect of empathy underlying the
engagement in pro-social other-regarding behavior. Ima-
gine, for example, being confronted with a close and
usually quite peaceful friend who is in a stage of extreme
rage because he is jealous that his girlfriend showed too
much affection towards you during vacations together.
Your capacity for affect sharing will help you to experience
how it feels to be in rage and this will allow you to make
more accurate predictions about possible actions your
friend might take. At the same time, however, you will not
confuse the rage and jealousy of your friend with your own
motivational state. Moreover, you will engage in cognitive
perspective taking (e.g., mentalizing) to understand the
meaning of the feeling as well as your friend’s thoughts and
beliefs regarding this speciﬁc situation. Further, you will
have to regulate and control your own feelings of distress
resulting from the threat of the situation and you will
probably try to engage in comforting helping behavior to
appease the psychological pain of your friend. All these
complex processes belong to what we commonly mean
when we speak of empathy.
Future research will have to investigate in further detail
these different levels of empathic responding and clarify
when the abilities of mentalizing (understanding the
propositional attitudes of others) and empathizing (sharing
the affects of others) play unique and when they play
common roles in the understanding of other people’s
states. An important component of this research will be to
identify the neuronal circuitries underlying these different
forms of empathic responses.
For purposes of illustration we will focus on the example
of empathy research in the domain of pain. A ﬁrst step for
future research would be to compare implicit and explicit
forms of empathy. For example, the comparison between
brain activities during the mere perception of pain in others
and that elicited when subjects are required to make
explicit judgments about the unpleasantness or intensity of
the painful stimulation as perceived by the other person
should elicit different neural activation patterns: implicit
forms of empathic responses should be associated with
activation of affective representation of the pain network
(AI and ACC) alone, whereas the explicit empathy
conditions should involve additional activation in STS
and mPFC, the areas which have been observed to be
involved in cognitive perspective taking.
An interesting additional variation would be to test
explicit empathic understanding in two conditions: (a) a
condition in which there is congruency between one’s own
and the other’s feeling and (b) a condition in which there is
incongruency between one’s own and the other’s feeling. In
the ﬁrst case, subjects assess the effect of painful stimula-
tion on another person who shares feelings with regard to
pain similar to themselves. In the case of incongruency,
subjects watch, for example, a masochist getting painfulstimulation, i.e., a person that experiences pain partly as
joyful and rewarding instead of solely aversive and
unpleasant. In the latter condition, no affect sharing may
take place because subjects lack the adequate affect
representations. Accordingly, a lack of activation in pain-
related networks and enhanced activation of STS and
mPFC reﬂecting cognitive perspective taking should be
observed. Finally, processes of inhibition and regulation of
empathic responses are assumed to be associated with
activity in brain areas known to be relevant for top-down
control and emotion regulation, particularly the dorso-
lateral aspects of the pre-frontal cortex (Anderson et al.,
2004; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Ochsner et al., 2002; Wager
et al., 2004).
5. Implications for developmental neuro-sciences
So far, I have summarized evidence for neuronal
correlates of mind reading and empathy, two abilities
which allow human beings to represent the states of other
people whether these are mental or emotional. These
abilities enable people to predict others’ behavior and,
therefore, successfully engage in social interactions. De-
spite these common features and the difﬁculty of separating
the two abilities in everyday situations, neuro-scientiﬁc
evidence suggests that these abilities nevertheless can be
distinguished and may rely on different neural circuitries.
Thus, sharing sensations and emotions with others is
associated with activation of circuitries involved in the
processing of similar states in ourselves, involving the
secondary somato-sensory cortices for touch, insular cortex
and ACC for pain and disgust and amygdala for fear.
Globally, these regions constitute the ‘‘emotional’’ (Dolan,
2002; Le Doux, 1998) or ‘‘social’’ brain (Adolphs, 1999)
and most of these structures are usually referred to as
limbic and para-limbic structures. They are crucial for
emotional processing and developed early in phylogeny. By
contrast, mentalizing abilities have been shown to be
associated with activation in pre-frontal and temporal
cortices, most importantly the mPFC and posterior STS,
structures which belong to the neo-cortex and developed
late in phylogeny.
Based on evidence from developmental brain science
suggesting different developmental trajectories for different
brain regions over the life span (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay
et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2003, 2004; Raz et al., 2005) it is
suggested that introducing a developmental approach to
the neuro-scientiﬁc study of mentalizing and empathizing
may help to dissociate the two abilities and to generate a
better understanding and prediction of the emergence of
the proposed different levels of empathic responding.
Note that there is a vast amount of existing behavioral
data on the development of both empathy and ToM.
This literature is summarized elsewhere and is not in
the scope of the present article (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2000; Mitchell et al., 2005; Decety and Jackson,
2004; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg, 2000). The
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mental states of others should evolve later in ontogeny
than the ability to share emotions because our ability
to share affective states with others relies on phylogeneti-
cally old structures which develop early in ontogeny,
whereas the capacity to understand mental states
(beliefs, thoughts) relies on structures which emerged late
in phylogeny and are also among those to mature latest
in ontogeny.
Based on modern brain imaging techniques develop-
mental neuro-sciences have indeed begun to give new
evidence for nonlinear changes in gray matter (GM)
density during childhood and adolescence. GM maturation
is reﬂected in a loss of density over time with a
simultaneous increase in synaptic pruning (Giedd et al.,
1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2003). Giedd et al.
(1999) have shown that brain development between the
ages of 4–21 years follows temporally distinct and
functionally meaningful maturational trajectories in which
higher-order association areas mature only after the lower-
order sensorimotor regions have matured. Additionally, it
appears that phylogenetically older cortical areas mature
earlier than the newer cortical regions. Thus, within the
frontal cortex, the primary sensorimotor cortices mature
ﬁrst whereas the pre-frontal cortex matures last; the dorso-
lateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC) loses GM only at the
end of adolescence. The occipital lobes including primary
visual cortex and the temporal poles involved in processing
smell and taste mature very early, whereas the lateral
temporal lobes mature very late. A small region of the
posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus matures last;
a ﬁnding which is interesting with respect to the crucial role
of the STS in mentalizing (Apperly et al., 2004). Finally,
phylogenetically, some of the oldest cortical regions,
among those the limbic and para-limbic structures men-
tioned earlier, lie on the inferior brain surface in the medial
aspects of the temporal lobe and develop earlier than the
structures of the neo-cortex.
In sum, these ﬁndings suggest that levels of empathic
responding that involve implicit affect sharing and are
based on limbic and para-limbic structures as well as on
somato-sensory cortices should develop earlier than our
ability for cognitive perspective taking because the former
rely on structures which develop early in brain develop-
ment, whereas the latter rely on structures of the neo-cortex
which are among the latest to mature, such as the pre-
frontal cortex and lateral parts of the temporal cortex. The
ﬁnding that the DLPFC has not fully matured up to an age
of 25 is interesting with respect to its possible role in the
modulation and control of affective responses and might
suggest that the full capacity for effective and adaptive
empathic responding is not developed until late adoles-
cence. It would be interesting to investigate whether the
maturation of the DLPFC parallels psychological matura-
tion in the capacity to control and modulate empathic
responses necessary to cope with contagious distress or
engage in pro-social behavior.6. Mentalizing and empathizing not only separate but also
intertwined
Even though we have argued for separate developmental
pathways for empathizing and mentalizing abilities with
the latter developing much later than the former, we
assume that (a) on both neuronal and psychological
grounds the two developmental pathways also interact
with each other and (b) both capacities undergo develop-
mental changes throughout childhood and adolescence.
Thus, as discussed earlier, empathy refers to a multi-
faceted construct ranging from simple forms of emotion
contagion to cognitive perspective-taking abilities. Con-
tagious crying seems to be already present in newborns,
before infants have developed self-awareness and the
distinction between self and others, a capacity which
develops only around 18–24 months of age, the period in
which children also display the ﬁrst manifestations of pro-
social behavior towards others (Decety and Jackson, 2004).
The ability to have empathic responses in the absence of
any emotional cue develops probably even later and should
parallel the maturation of memory systems and mental
imagery. Moreover, explicit forms of empathy should
coincide with the emergence of conscious representations
of one’s own feeling states allowing for statements such as
‘‘I feel sad or jealous’’. The capacity to understand other
people’s feelings when there is congruency between one’s
own and another person’s feeling states probably develops
earlier than the capacity to understand others’ feeling in the
absence of any representation of this feeling state in
oneself. Whereas the former probably relies on a simula-
tion based on one’s own representation of a given feeling
state in oneself (limbic structures), the latter probably relies
purely on mentalizing capacities (pre-frontal and temporal
structures). As outlined earlier, mentalizing abilities
develop by about age 4 and are probably based on the
development of mPFC and temporal structures. Thus, the
basic capacity for mentalizing seems to be clearly in place
long before the complete maturation of the neuro-circuitry
subserving it. This suggests that not only empathizing but
also mentalizing abilities may change in nature from early
childhood to adolescence. Similar to emotional contagion
preceding more complex forms of implicit and explicit
empathy, explicit forms of mentalizing abilities are
preceded by processes allowing implicit attribution of
intentions and other mental states. For example, the ability
of an infant to direct its attention/gaze towards the
attentional focus of the mother (joint attention) already
develops at around the age of 12–18 months or even earlier.
Furthermore, explicit forms of mentalizing may differenti-
ate and get more and more complex over the life span. The
distinction between ﬁrst-order (attributing a belief to
another person) and second-order beliefs (attributing a
belief about another person’s belief), the former developing
at about age 4, the latter developing later between the ages
6–10, points to a continuous development of mentalizing
abilities throughout the life span.
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focused only on the ﬁrst part of the life span and neglected
possible implications of adult age changes in neuronal
structures for emotional regulation and mind reading. The
phase of old and very old age would be of special interest
for testing the hypothesis of distinct neuronal networks
underlying our abilities for affect sharing and mind
reading. Similar to early childhood different brain areas
show differential decline in old age [71] suggesting higher
vulnerability to structures which develop later and are
phylogenetically younger (e.g., PFC). It may therefore be
that empathic responses are preserved up to very old age
whereas mentalizing abilities show earlier decline. A
challenge for future research will be to reﬁne the use of
functional imaging techniques in infants (Dehaene-Lam-
bertz et al., 2002) and old age (Jones et al., in press) and to
develop ‘‘interactive mind’’ paradigms suitable for infants,
children and the aged to enable the assessment of the brain
regions underlying our capacities for mind reading and
empathizing over the entire life span.References
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Abstract:
At  the  time  of  this  work  I  had  been  concentrating  on  how  the  family  gave  shape  to  adolescent  person-­
alities  and  how  adolescents  would,  as  a  consequence,  accept  themselves.
The purpose of this present study is to determine the differences in personality range and levels of 
self-­acceptance  among  groups  of  women  and  men  from  complete,  incomplete  and  reconstructed  fam-­
ilies.  The  study  included  a  group  of  314  adolescents,   from  the  administrative  region  of  Lódź.  The  
following  test  methods  were  used:  the  Survey  and  standardised  Inventory  of  Personality  NEO  -­  FFI  
by  P.T.  Costa  and  R.  McCrae  as  adapted  by  B.  Zawadzki,  J.  Strelau,  P.  Szczepaniak  and  M.  Śliwińska;;  
and  the  Scale  of  Interpersonal  Attitude  (SUI)  as  adapted  by  J.  M.  Stanik.
As a result of statistical analyses, it turned out that the dimension of personality the Openness to Ex-­
perience  had  indeed  diversiﬁed  the  examined  adolescent  groups.  Statistically  signiﬁcant  differences  
were  also  observed  at  the  self-­acceptance  level  between  the  study  groups.
Keywords:
family  structure,  adolescence,  personality,  self-­acceptance
Streszczenie:
W  niniejszej  pracy  skoncentrowałam  się  na  przedstawieniu  roli  struktury  rodziny  w  kształtowaniu  się  
osobowości  i  samooceny  adolescentów.  Celem  prezentowanych  badań  było  określenie  różnic  w  za-­
kresie  wymiarów  osobowości   i   poziomu   samooceny  między   grupami   kobiet   i  mężczyzn   z   rodzin  
pełnych,  monoparentalnych  oraz  zrekonstruowanych.  Badaniami  objęto  314  młodych  osób  z  woje-­
wództwa   łódzkiego.   Zastosowano   następujące  metody   badawcze:   ankietę,   Inwentarz   Osobowości  
NEO-­FFI  P.T.  Costy  and  R.  McCrae’a  w  adaptacji  B.  Zawadzkiego,  J.  Strelaua,  P.  Szczepaniaka  
i  M.  Śliwińskej  oraz  Skalę  Ustosunkowań  Interpersonalnych  (SUI)  w  adaptacji  J.  M.  Stanika.
W  rezultacie  przeprowadzonych  analiz  statystycznych  okazało  się,  że  wymiar  osobowości  różnicujący  
badane  grupy  stanowi  cecha  otwartości  na  doświadczenie.  Istotne  statystycznie  różnice  zaobserwo-­
wano  także  w  zakresie  samooceny  badanych  grup  młodzieży.
1 Katarzyna  Walęcka-­Matyja,   Institute   of   Psychology,   Faculty   of   Educational   Sciences,   University   of  
Łódź,  Smugowa  10/12,  91-­433,  Łódź;;  kwalecka@uni.lodz.pl.
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Introduction
Psychological  literature  widely  discusses  the  multilateral  inﬂuences  of  family  on  emo-­
tional  and  social  life  development  as  well  as  on  the  whole  man’s  personality  (Cartwright,  
2003;;  Plopa,  2005;;  Liberska,  2011;;  Rostowska,  Rostowski,  2011).
Researchers  assume  that  an  individual’s  correct  development  including  the  forma-­
tion  of  personality,  self  image,  self  acceptance  and  the  relation  to  oneself  as  well  as  to  
other  people  results  from  family  experience  (Reykowski,  1992).
Family experience can either help develop an individual or, in cases of adverse and 
very  strong  inﬂuences,  impede  the  process  of  psychical  and  social  development,  not  let-­
ting  an  individual  form  desirable  human  values.
The  above-­mentioned  experience  is  extremely  important  because  its  impact  con-­
centrates  mostly  in  the  childhood  period,  when  a  child’s  psyche  of  is  the  most  absorptive,  
vulnerable,  ﬂexible  and  hardly   inﬂuenced  by   the  external  environment  (Dunn,  Munn,  
1985).
Familiologists  point  out  the  importance  of  the  parents’  role  in  family  functioning  and  
the  children’s  development.  It  is  because  in  the  initial  life  period,  including  the  time  from  
infancy  to  pre-­school  age,  it  is  the  family  that  plays  the  main  role  in  the  child’s  personal-­
ity  and  self-­esteem  formation.  Its  ﬁrst  social  contacts  are  established  with  the  mother,  then  
with  the  father,  brothers  and  sisters  and  other  housemates  (Napora, Schneider,  2010).
Familial  inﬂuence  on  the  child’s  development  is  spontaneous  in  nature,  and  is  not  
the  effect  of  any  particular  educational  program.  Social  stances,  determined  to  a  large  
extent  by  the  socialization  process  in  the  ﬁrst  years  of  life,  depend  on  the  family  atmos-­
phere in the home, the educational methods applied by the parents, the family structure, 
and  on  the  social  behaviour  patterns  demonstrated  by  the  parents.
The  research  done  by  G.  Poraj  (1988)  shows  that  parents  affect  the  children’s  per-­
sonality  and  self-­acceptance  development  through  applying  particular  educational  meth-­
ods.  Negative  inﬂuences  can  be  exerted  by  excessive  severity,  exaggerated  rigorism,  and  
using  too  much  punishment  and  rules  as  well  as  by  permissive  education,  excessive  care,  
and  solicitude  linked  with  limited  independence.
A  number  of  researchers  (Tyszkowa,  2006;;  Harwas-­Napierała,  2006)  point  out  that  
the  relations  of  a  child  with  adults,  mainly  concerning  their  personal  qualities,  are  con-­
sidered  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  personal  development.
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There   is   also   some   empirical   evidence   that   there   is   a   close   connection   between  
personality  and  mature  parenthood.  Mature  parenthood  can  help   to  reduce   the  child’s  
self-­centeredness,  form  the  child’s  sense  of  responsibility  and  empathy,  and  trigger  its  
readiness  to  perform  social  roles  (Rostowska,  2003).
The  family  structure  plays  a  very   important   role   in  personal  development.   It   in-­
cludes the fact that the child has both biological parents, a stepfather or a stepmother, as 
well  as   their  age,   job  and  social   status.  A  different  educational   situation   is  created   in  
a  two-­generation  family  as  well  as  in  an  extended  one.  Furthermore,  when  a  child  has  
siblings,  their  age  and  number  appear  to  be  signiﬁcant  for  personality  and  self-­accept-­
ance  formation.  Different  personal  qualities  and  self-­acceptance  levels  will  be  formed  in  
the  eldest,  the  youngest  or  the  only  child,  or  the  only  boy  among  a  few  sisters  or  the  only  
girl  among  a  number  of  brothers  (Tenikue,  Bertrand,  2010).  Knowledge  of  emotional  
and  social  experiences  which  were  provided  to  a  child  in  its  family  is  often  the  key  to  
understanding  the  difﬁculties  the  child  has  in  social  functioning  (Kubik,  1999).
At the early school age and during adolescence a child comes into the secondary 
developmental  context,  whose  range  is  much  wider  than  the  family  environment.  In  this  
life  period  an  individual’s  personal  development  takes  place  mainly  through  inﬂuences  
of  non-­family  environments,  such  as  school,   friends  and  people  met   in  various  youth  
organizations,  and  later  in  work  (Tyszkowa,  2006).
Our  article  concentrates  on  the  family  role  in  personality  shaping  and  self-­accep-­
tance  of  adolescents  (average  age  21).  An  important  argument  for  doing  research  in  this  
ﬁeld  is  to  explore  the  changes  which  are  currently  taking  place  within  the  Polish  family.  
They  are  structural,  and  functional,  in  nature  and  are  connected  with  self-­consciousness,  
thus  creating  a  new  kind  of  educational  environment.
Modern  families  have  a  diversiﬁed  structure.  Increasingly,  incomplete  families  as  
well  as  reconstructed  ones  are  becoming  visible  in  Polish  society.  Both  cases  have  a  ten-­
dency  to   increase,   therefore   it   is  so   important   to  study  how  young  people  function  in  
incomplete families after a divorce and in reconstructed ones since the psychological 
knowledge  on  this  subject  is  still  insufﬁcient.
This  study  adopted   the  personality  concept  by  R.R.  McCrae  and  O.P.   John.  The  
authors  singled  out  ﬁve  main  personality  dimensions:  Neuroticism,  Extraversion,  Open-­
ness   to  Experience,  Agreeableness  and  Conscientiousness  (John,  1990).These  ﬁve  di-­
mensions  were  conﬁrmed  by  numerous  sample  groups,  kinds  of  data,  and  for  a  number  
of  languages  (Zimbardo,  2012).
Self-­acceptance  was  determined  based  on  the  deﬁnition  suggested  by  J.  M.  Stanik.  
The  author  deﬁnes  it  as  a  rather  stable  state  of  personality,  resulting  from  an  individual’s  
relatively  stable  self-­estimation,  especially  when  comparing  oneself  with  other  people.  
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High   scores   obtained   on   the   self-­complacency   scale   for   low   self-­estimation,   connect  
a  neurotic,  suspicious  and  hostile  personality  with  a  high  level  of  apprehension.  On  the  
contrary,  low  scores  point  to  the  lack  of  these  symptoms  in  the  surveyed  person’s  self-­
description  (Stanik,  1998).
It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  level  of  self-­acceptance  is  connected  with  how  an  
individual’s  personality  acts,  in  other  words,  with  its  structuralization  and  organization  
level.   Individuals  with   stable   self-­estimation   have   a   better   organized   personality   that  
individuals  with  unstable   self-­estimation.  Moreover,  worse   structuralization   results   in  
greater  susceptibility  of  the  personality  to  emotional  inﬂuences.
Research  problems  and  hypotheses
The  purpose  of  our  research  was  to  answer  the  following  questions:  Are  there  any  differ-­
ences  in  personality  qualities  between  young  people  from  full  families,  incomplete  fam-­
ilies  and  reconstructed  ones?  Are  there  any  differences  in  the  self-­acceptance  level  be-­
tween  young  people  from  full  families,  incomplete  families  and  reconstructed  ones?  Are  
there  any  relations  and  of  what  kind  between  young  persons’  self-­acceptance  levels  and  
personality  qualities  from  differently  structured  families?
According  to  our  designated  purpose  and  the  above-­mentioned  questions  and  based  
on  the  content-­related  literature,  a  number  of  research  hypotheses  have  been  formulated.
Hypothesis  no.  1:  There  is  a  difference  in  personality  qualities  between  groups  of  
women  from  full  families,  incomplete  families  and  reconstructed  ones.
Hypothesis  no.  2:  There  is  a  difference  in  personality  qualities  between  groups  of  
men  from  full  families,  incomplete  families  and  reconstructed  ones.
Hypothesis  no.  3:  There  is  a  difference  in  the  self-­acceptance  level  between  groups  
of  women  from  full  families,  incomplete  families  and  reconstructed  ones.
Hypothesis  no.  4:  There  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  differences  in  the  self-­accept-­
ance  level  between  groups  of  men  from  families  of  different  structure.
Hypothesis  no.  5: There are relations, different as far as strength and direction are 
concerned,  between  the  self-­acceptance  level  and  the  examined  personality  qualities.
Research  methods
The   following   test  methods  were  used   to   answer  our   research  questions:  Survey  and  
Standardised  Inventory  of  Personality  NEO  -­  FFI  by  P.T.  Costa  and  R.  McCrae  as  adapt-­
ed  by  B.  Zawadzki,  J.  Strelau,  P.  Szczepaniak  and  M.  Śliwińska  and  Interpersonal  Rela-­
tionships  Scale   (SUI)   in   J.  M.  Stanik’s   adaptation.  The   survey  method  allowed  us   to  
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gather  data  on  the  socio-­demographic  situation  of  young  persons  (age,  gender,  family  
structure,  domicile,  marital  status,  education).  NEO-­FFI  and  SUI  are  psychometrically  
acceptable  and  allow  for  scientiﬁc  research  (Stanik,  1998;;  Zawadzki,  Strelau,  Śliwińska,  
1998).
Participants
The  study  included  a  group  of  600  young  persons  (average  age  21;;  δ=1,181)  from  the  
administrative  region  of  Łódź.  The  tests  were  anonymous  and  done  in  groups.  Participa-­
tion  in  the  research  was  voluntary. To  create  an  appropriate  sample  group,  the  following  
exclusion  criteria  were  adopted:  young  person’s  attitude  toward  participation  in  the  sur-­
vey, demographic structure of the family of origin, and completion of the test sheets2.
Taking  into  account  the  demographic  structure  of  the  family  of  origin,  and  accord-­
ing to our designated purposes, the distinguished environments included: the full family, 
the  incomplete  family  as  a  result  of  parental  divorce,  and  the  reconstructed  family.  The  
above-­mentioned  familial  typology  was  adopted  due  to  methodological  considerations  
connected  with  facilitating  the  conduct  of  research  in  this  area.  The  appropriate  sample  
group  did  not  include  any  persons  originating  from  other  family  types  than  the  above-­
mentioned.
Ultimately,  the  test  group  comprised  314  people  (158  women  and  156  men).  With  
respect  to  the  family  of  origin  criterion  three  comparative  groups  were  identiﬁed.  Com-­
parative  group  I  was  made  up  of  105  people  from  incomplete  families  (53  men  and  52  
women).  Comparative  Group  II  consisted  of  104  people  from  stepfamilies  (51  men  and  
53  women).  In  contrast,  comparative  group  III  comprised  105  people  from  full  families  
(52  men  and  53  women).
The  empirical  material,  collected  through  surveys,  was  subject  to  qualitative  analy-­
sis.  For  elaborating  the  data,  the  test  of  independence  chi  -­  square  (χ2)  was  used.  A  number  
of  statistical  analyses  were  carried  out  using  the  computer  program  IBM  SPSS  Statistics  
20.  It  turned  out  that  the  persons  forming  the  appropriate  sample  group  were  character-­
ized  by  domiciled  uniformity  (large  cities,  with  a  population  of  more  than  100  thousand-­
χ2=4.166;;df=4;;p=.384),  marital  status  (single-­χ2=1.322;;df=2;;p=.516)  and  education  level  
(secondary  education-­χ2=1.031;;df=2;;p=.597).
2 In  order  to  determine  the  credibility  degree  of  the  received  results,  we  used  a  rate  which  consisted  of  the  
number  of  question  marks  in  the  Interpersonal  Relationships  Scale  by  M.  Stanik.  It  points  to  a  protective  
and  distrustful  attitude  towards  the  survey.  Considering  this  fact,  we  excluded  from  the  examination  all  
those   persons  who   had   received   high   and   extremely   high   scores   in   this   scope   (119   people)   (Stanik,  
1998).
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Results
The  results  presented  below  were  intended  to  answer  the  question:  Did  the  surveyed  groups  
of  women  and  men  from  families  of  diversiﬁed  structures  differ  in  their  personality  quali-­
ties?  For  statistical  results  the  F  test  and  Tukey’s  multiple  comparison  test  were  used.
Since  women  and  men  react  differently  to  the  same  stimuli  and  behave  differently  
in  social  situations,  is  the  difference  being  subject  to  both  genetic  factors  as  well  as  en-­
vironmental  ones  the  results  for  all  the  women  and  men  in  the  comparable  groups  from  
differently  structure  families  were  taken  into  account  (Mandal,  2006).
Variations  in  the  personality  dimensions  of  the  tested  young  women  from  com-­
plete  families,  incomplete  families  and  reconstructed  families.
Bi-­factor  variation  analysis  taking  gender  into  consideration  pointed  to  a  statisti-­
cally  signiﬁcant  difference  between  the  women  from  the  examined  types  of  families.  It  
concerned  the  quality  of  Openness  (F=14.487;;  p=.0005)  (Figure  1  and  Table  1).
In  the  Openness  dimension,  the  highest  average  results  (above  average)  were  ob-­
tained  by  women  from  full  families  in  comparison  with  those  from  incomplete  families  
and  reconstructed  ones.  The  results  appeared  statistically  signiﬁcant.  A  similar  degree  of  
Openness  also  characterized  women  from  incomplete  and  reconstructed  families,  who  
otherwise  obtained  average  results  or  results  below  average.
Figure  1.  Variations  in  the  personality  dimensions  of  the  tested  young  women  from  families  of  diverse  struc-­
ture.
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Table  1.  The  family  structure  and  the  dimensions  of  personality  of  women  in  the  light  of  Tukey’s  test.
Openness to Experience
Structure of family: reconstructed incomplete
complete .0005 .0005
incomplete .768
In  the  other  personality  dimensions  surveyed  by  the  NEO-­FFI  test,  namely  Neu-­
roticism,  Extraversion,  Agreeableness  and  Conscientiousness,  there  were  no  statistically  
signiﬁcant  differences  between  the  surveyed  groups  of  women.  The  results  were  on  the  
average  level.  In  this  way  Hypothesis  no.  1  was  supported.
Variations  in  the  personality  dimensions  of  the  tested  young  men  from  com-­
plete  families,  incomplete  families  and  reconstructed  families.
Comparative  analysis  pointed  out  that  the  personality  dimension  signiﬁcantly  differ-­
ent  among  the  men’s  groups  was  Openness  (F=23.677;;  p=.0005)  (Figure  2  and  Table  2).  
Survey   results   for  men   from  differently   structured   families  were   similar   to   those   re-­
ceived  by  the  women  in  this  sphere.
In  Openness,   the  highest  average   results   (above  average)  were  obtained  by  men  
from  full  families  in  comparison  with  men  from  either  incomplete  or  reconstructed  fam-­
ilies,  whose  results  were  below  average.  The  results  appeared  statistically  signiﬁcant.  
The  quality  of  Openness  characterized  the  men  from  incomplete  families  and  those  from  
reconstructed  ones  to  a  similar  degree.
Figure  2.  Variations  in  personalities  of  the  young  men  from  diverse  structured  families.
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Table  2.  The  family  structure  and  dimensions  of  the  men’s  personality  in  the  light  of  Tukey’s  test.
Openness to Experience
Structure of family: reconstructed incomplete
complete .0005 .0005
incomplete .423
In  the  other  personality  dimensions  surveyed  by  NEO-­FFI,  namely  Neuroticism,  
Extraversion,  Agreeableness  and  Conscientiousness,  there  were  no  statistically  signiﬁ-­
cant  differences  between  the  men’s  groups.  The  results  were  on  the  average  level  and  in  
this  way  they  supported  Hypothesis  no.  2.
Variations  in  self-­acceptance  of  the  young  women  from  diversely  structured  
families
The  research  results  presented  below  (Figure  3  and  Table  3)  concerning  variations  
in  the  self-­acceptance  for  the  female  groups  pointed  to  a  statistically  signiﬁcant  differ-­
ence  (F=32.664;;  p=.0005).
Figure  3.  Variations  of  the  average  results  as  regards  self-­acceptance  in  the  surveyed  female  groups.
Table  3.  The  family  structure  and  the  women’s  self-­acceptance  level  in  the  light  of  Tukey’s  test.
Self-­acceptance
Structure of family: reconstructed incomplete
complete .0005 .0005
incomplete .984
Considering  the  women’s  self-­acceptance  from  the  types  of  families,  it  was  noticed  
that  women  from  incomplete  families  were  characterized  by  the  highest  average  results  
on  the  self-­acceptance  scale,  which  means  that  they  have  a  low  level  of  self-­esteem  in  
comparison  with  women  from  full  families.
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The  group  from  reconstructed  families  did  not  differ  signiﬁcantly  as  regards  aver-­
age  results  in  self-­acceptance  from  those  growing  up  in  incomplete  families.  The  self-­
esteem  level  was  similar  in  these  two  groups.
The  optimum  level  of  self-­acceptance  characterized  the  group  from  full  families,  
which  differed  signiﬁcantly  in  this  scope  from  the  groups  of  the  women  coming  from  
other  family  types.
Variations  in  self-­acceptance  of  the  young  men  from  diversely  structured  fam-­
ilies.
Considering  the  inﬂuence  of  the  family  structure  on  the  self-­acceptance  level  in  the  
tested  men  groups,  a  statistically  signiﬁcant  difference  was  noticed  (F=45.723;;p=.0005).  
The  results  are  presented  by  Figure  4  and  Table  4.
Figure  4.  Variations  of  the  average  results  as  regards  self-­acceptance  in  the  male  groups.
Table  4.  The  family  structure  and  the  men’s  self-­acceptance  level  in  the  light  of  Tukey’s  test.
Self-­acceptance
Structure of family: reconstructed Incomplete
complete .044 .0005
incomplete .0005
The  statistical  analysis  shows  that,  as  far  as  self-­acceptance  is  concerned,  men  from  
incomplete  families  received  the  highest  average  results  in  comparison  with  men  from  
reconstructed  families  (above  average)  and  from  full  ones  (low  results).  It  means  that  
they  are  characterized  by  a  low  level  of  self-­esteem;;  they  are  tense  and  neurotic.  The  
results  appeared  statistically  signiﬁcant.
Between  the  male  groups  from  full  families  and  reconstructed  ones  there  was  seen  
a  tendency  (p=.044)  toward  showing  better  socially  adapted  men  from  full  families.  As  
it  appeared,  men  from  full  families  received  the  lowest  average  results  on  the  self-­ac-­
ceptance  scale,  which  means  the  their  self-­esteem  was  optimal.
 
7.54 
3.21 
6.39 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
The level of self-acceptance 
family complete family incomplete family reconstructed 
68
Polish Journal of Applied Psychology, 2014, vol. 12(1)
Correlation  of  self-­acceptance  with  the  personality  dimensions   in   the  young  
people  from  the  examined  families  types.
The   next   research   stage   analysed   the   relations   between   self-­acceptance   and   the  
young  persons’  personality  dimensions  from  differently  structured  families.  In  order  to  
do  that,  we  used  the  r-­Pearson  correlation  coefﬁcient.
Taking  into  consideration  that  the  correlation  coefﬁcients  are  not  additive,  we  car-­
ried  out  a  statistical  analysis  separately  for  each  compared  group.
In  the  situation  when  the  same  two  psychological  variations  correlated  with  each  
other  in  two  or/and  three  types  of  the  surveyed  families,  the  obtained  correlation  coefﬁ-­
cients  were  compared  with  respect  to  their  value  compatibility.
  Analysing  the  results  with  respect  to  correlations  between  self-­acceptance  and  se-­
lected  personality  dimensions,  we  used  a  breakdown  of  these  variations  and  received  the  
results  which  are  in  Table  5.
Table  5.  The  relation  between  self-­acceptance  and  some  personal  qualities  of  the  young  people  from  
differently  structure  families.
Dimensions
of personality 
Self-­acceptation
Structure of family
Family complete Family incomplete Family reconstructed
Neuroticism .200p=.041
.575
p=.0005
.339
p=.0005
Extraversion -­ -­.255p=.009 -­
Openness to Experience -­ -­ -­
Agreeableness -­.200p=.041 -­ -­
Conscientiousness -­ -­ -­.225p=.022
The  research  results  with  respect  to  correlation  between  self-­acceptance  and  some  
personal  qualities  showed  that  there  are  relations  between  the  variations  and  that  their  
strength  and  directions  are  different.  In  this  way,  Hypothesis  ﬁve  was  conﬁrmed.
Considering  the  relation  between  self-­acceptance  and  neuroticism,  we  discovered  
that it occurs in all the surveyed groups from full families, incomplete families and re-­
constructed  ones  (p=.200;;p=.575;;p=.339).  Correlation  coefﬁcient  values  were  not  sig-­
niﬁcantly  different  (p=.029).
High  levels  of  apprehension,  emotional  tension,  frequently  experienced  feelings  of  
hostility  and  anger,  shyness,  and  minimal  ability  to  cope  with  stress  result  in  receiving  
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high  scores  in  the  self-­acceptance  scale,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  pointing  to  low  self-­
esteem.
There  was  negative  correlation  between  the  extraversion  and  self-­acceptance  in  the  
persons  from  incomplete  families.  This  low  level  of  self-­acceptance  appears  to  be  related  
to  behaviours  aimed  at  seeking  stimulation,  willingness  to  dominate  in  company,  and  life  
activities.  The  mechanism  of  compensation  might  have  taken  place  here.  A  young  man  
from  an   incomplete   family,  having   low  self-­esteem,  wants  above  all   to  show  psychic  
strength  and  vigour  –  and  not  to  be  perceived  as  weak  and  hesitant.
Agreeableness,  or  one’s  attitude  about  other  people,  correlated  negatively  with  self-­
acceptance   in  persons  from  full   families.   It  appears   that  a  higher   level  of  self-­esteem  
characterizes  persons  who  are  less  agreeable,  more  egocentric,  and  in  relations  with  oth-­
ers  oriented  towards  competition  rather  than  cooperation.  The  last  relation  analysed  con-­
cerned   conscientiousness,  which   correlated  positively  with   self-­acceptance   for  young  
persons  from  reconstructed  families.  We  found  that  strong-­willed,  highly  motivated  and  
persistent  persons  are  characterized  by  an  optimum  level  of  self-­acceptance.
Conclusions
From  the  dawn  of  time,  humanistic  thought  has  been  interested  in  the  family  as  an  
institution,  its  problems  having  always  been  the  centre  of  attention  of  all  religious,  phil-­
osophical,  ethical  and  legal  systems,  since  the  family  constitutes  man’s  most  fundamen-­
tal  reality.  Although  the  family  still  occupies  a  high  position  in  the  hierarchy  of  values  
declared by man, it is affected by a host of undesirable changes and threats, such as: 
consumptionism,  unemployment,  poverty,  and  social  pathologies.  More  and  more  fami-­
lies are unable to perform all their roles correctly and because of this they cannot provide 
their  children  with  optimal  conditions  for  development.  Phenomena  of   the  kind  men-­
tioned  concern  both  full,  incomplete,  and  reconstructed  families,  which  can  also  be  af-­
fected  by  permanent  conﬂicts  or  commonly  existing  social  diseases  such  as  alcoholism.
Content   related   literature  concerning  diversiﬁed  family  structures,   shows  a  wide  
range  of  occurring  problems.  It  is  emphasized  that  they  affect  not  only  adults  but  also  the  
younger  generation,  who  are  doomed  to  existence  in  atypical  environments  not  always  
satisfying   their  needs.  There   is  no  doubt   that  any  abnormalities   in  a   family   inﬂuence  
a  young  individual’s  personal  development  and  self-­acceptance.
Our  research  has  shown  that  the  functioning  speciﬁcity  of  full  families,  incomplete  
families and reconstructed ones strongly determine young persons personalities and their 
self-­acceptance  levels.
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  Comparisons  between  the  groups  of  women  and  men  from  differently  structured  
families  pointed  to  one  differentiating  personality  dimension.  It  appeared  that  the  women  
and  the  men  from  full  families  most  frequently  displayed  cognitive  curiosity,  a  tendency  
toward  positive  valuations  of  life  experiences.  Young  people  from  incomplete  and  recon-­
structed  families  received  Openness  scores  below  average,  which  can  point  to  conven-­
tionalism  and  conservatism  demonstrated  both  in  views  and  behaviour.
Openness characterizing the young people from full families could have resulted 
from the attitudes presented by the parents, expressing acceptance, respect and the right 
to  gain  experience.  Being  able  to  act  independently  and  at  the  same  time  feeling  secure,  
the  young  generation  could  fully  concentrate  on  their  cognitive  activity  development.
Openness is very important for young, contemporary men since the environment 
where  people  live  is  characterized  by  an  unheard  of  confrontation  of  cultures,  a  variety  
of  which  can  be  deﬁned  both  globally  and  in  micro-­sociological  terms.  It  is  the  conse-­
quence  of   such  phenomena   as:   availability  of  modern   transport,   communication,   and  
information  transmission  as  well  as  social  mobility  and  environmental  openness.  People  
meeting  each  other,  almost  at  every  step,  reveal  their  distinctness  to  each  other.  In  such  
circumstances,  even  peaceful  co-­existence,  not  to  mention  agreement  or  cooperation,  is  
impossible  without  openness  or  tolerance  toward  others.
It   should   be   emphasized   that   nowadays   a   preferable   personality   structure   is   an  
“open”  one  as  it  is  open  to  innovativeness  and  a  high  level  of  life  aspirations.  The  occur-­
ring  cultural  changes  intertwine  with  social  culture  differentiation,  its  mobility,  tendency  
to  be  open  to  act  according  to  new  social  rules,  with  its  emergence  of  new  social  groups,  
institutions,  jobs,  development,  and  deepening  individual  autonomy  (Doniec,  2005).
Therefore,  people  characterized  by  openness  have  more  opportunities  to  ﬁnd  their  
place  and  succeed  in  the  contemporary  world  than  those  people  who  do  not  have  this  
quality.
There  is  no  doubt  that  besides  personal  qualities,  self-­awareness  and  self-­accept-­
ance  are  crucial  for  social  behaviours  displayed  by  an  individual.
Self-­acceptance  is  an  important  element  of  self-­awareness  as  it  enables  self-­deter-­
mination  as  well   as   enabling   individuals   to  distinguish   themselves   from   the   environ-­
ment.  It  allows  a  person  to  assume  a  critical  attitude  towards  their  abilities  as  well  as  
towards  new  requirements  set  by  the  environment.  It  plays  an  important  role  not  only  in  
getting  to  know  oneself  but  also  in  steering  one’s  behaviour  and  realizing  his/her   life  
plans.
If  a  person  knows  what  place  they  occupy  in  society  and  what  they  can  achieve,  that  
means  that  their  self-­awareness  functions  correctly  and  there  are  no  intrapersonal  con-­
ﬂicts.
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If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  big  discrepancy  between  a  person’s  view  of  their  
abilities   and   their   real   achievements,  we   speak   about   a   self-­awareness   disorder.  This  
disorder,  according  to  psychoanalysis,  can  result  from  a  conﬂict  between  aspirations  for  
signiﬁcance  and  feelings  of  low  self-­esteem.
The  results  of  our  research  with  respect  to  self-­acceptance  in  young  people  from  
differently  structured  families  showed  statistically  signiﬁcant  differences  between  wom-­
en’s  and  men’s  groups.
Both  women  and  men  from  full  families  received  scores  pointing  to  a  high  level  of  
self-­esteem.  On   the   other   hand,  women   and  men   from   incomplete   and   reconstructed  
families  received  scores  reﬂecting  low  levels  of  self-­esteem,  which  were  connected  with  
neurotic  and  hostile  attitudes.
Our  results  strongly  indicate  that  the  family  which  satisﬁes  the  needs  of  its  mem-­
bers   and   provides   them  with   support   and   unconditional   love,   constitutes   the   optimal  
educational  environment  for  stimulating  one’s  positive  self-­image.
Our  results  can  be  conﬁrmed  by  the  research  results  done  by  H.  Szczęsna  (2005).  
The   author  demonstrated   empirically   that   young  people   from  divorced   families  were  
characterized  by  an  average  self-­acceptance  level  in  comparison  with  young  people  from  
full,  well-­functioning  families,  who  had  a  high  level  of  self-­acceptance.
Also,  J.  Conway  (1997)  in  his  research,  demonstrated  empirically  that  young  peo-­
ple  from  incomplete  families  were  more  often  characterized  by  low  levels  of  self-­accept-­
ance  and  self-­esteem.
Furthermore,  research  by  K.  Pospiszyl  showed  that  the  more  the  father  is  involved  
in  the  educational  process  and  the  stronger  his  emotional  bonds  with  the  child  are,  the  
higher  the  child’s  self-­acceptance  and  self-­conﬁdence  are  in  relations  with  other  people  
(Pospiszyl,  1980).
As  a  result  of  our  research,  a  few  important  observations  were  made,  which  are  not  
only   consistent  with   contemporary   thought  but   also  bring   in   some  valuable   elements  
modifying   the   general   knowledge  on   the   subject.  The   research   results   are   signiﬁcant  
psychologically  because   they  show  that   the  family  structure  and  parental   relationship  
inﬂuence,  to  a  large  extent,  the  personal  development  and  the  self-­acceptance  level  of  
young  people.
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Abstract 
 
The present study examined the differences in the relationship between emotional intelligence 
(EI) and self-acceptance as a function of gender and ibasho (ibasyo), a Japanese concept of 'home' 
or 'refuge'. Here, the ibasho represents the person who eases one's mind. The participants were 244 
Japanese undergraduates who were asked to complete the Japanese version of the Emotional 
Intelligence Skills and Competence Questionnaire (J-ESCQ; Toyota, Morita, & Takšić, 2007), a 
question related to ibasho (Who is the person that eases the mind) and self-acceptance scales 
(Itatsu, 1989). Positive correlations between all sub-abilities in EI: (perceiving and understanding 
emotion (PU), expressing and labeling emotion (EL), managing and regulating emotion (MR), and 
self-acceptance) were found in females whereas in males, the only positive correlation was found 
between MR and self-acceptance. For participants who report that 'lover' is a person who eases 
their mind, PU has a negative correlation with self-acceptance. Both EL and MR have a strong 
correlation with self-acceptance in all types of groups. These results indicate that the effect of each 
sub-ability in EI on self-acceptance is determined by gender and the presence of the person who 
provides a sense of ibasho and also suggest that these determinants should be considered to clarify 
individual differences in adaptation.  
 
Keywords: emotional intelligence, J-ESCQ, ibasho, self-acceptance 
 
 
 
Emotional intelligence (EI) has been an interesting topic in psychology and a 
great deal of research has been conducted (Law, Wong, & Song, 2004; Toyota, 
2009). In particular, since Goleman (1995) suggested that EI was a strong predictor 
of performance, a number of research projects have examined the relationship 
between EI and any kind of performance. Recently, Joseph and Newman (2010) 
specified a cascading model of the relationship between EI and job performance, in 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 20 (2011), 3, 449-459   
 
450 
which the following sequence is described. Namely, emotion perception casually 
precedes emotion understanding, which in turn precedes emotion regulation and job 
performance. This model was confirmed to be valid via meta-analysis of several 
pieces of research. 
According to Salovey and Mayer (1990), EI is "the subset of social intelligence 
that involves the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to 
discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide one's thinking and 
actions" (p. 189). This definition of EI was followed by many other proposals (e.g. 
Davies, Stankov, & Robert, 1998; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) which, 
although not identical, contained only minor differences (Toyota, 2009). The 
common elements of all of the definitions were as follows: an ability to understand 
one's own or others' emotion or feeling; the ability to express one's own emotion or 
feeling, and the ability to regulate or control one's own emotion or feeling (Toyota, 
2009). Takšić (1998) followed the definitions of Salovey and Mayer (1990) and 
developed the Emotional Skills & Competence Questionnaire (ESCQ). The ESCQ 
thus has three subscales corresponding to the following three sub-abilities: the 
ability to perceive and understand emotion (PU), the ability to express and label 
emotion (EL), and the ability to manage and regulate emotion (MR). On the basis 
of the ESCQ developed by Takšić (1998), Toyota et al. (2007) have developed the 
Japanese version of ESCQ. The present study used J-ESCQ as the measure for 
assessing EI.  
Although the relationship between EI and job performance as mentioned above 
has been clarified, the relationship between EI and adaptation has not been 
examined so much. Especially in Japan, few studies have examined the relation. 
For example, Toyota et al. (2007) examined the relationship between EI and self-
esteem as one of the positive aspects of adaptation. They showed a positive 
correlation between EI and self-esteem. Toyota (2009), using the scale of loneliness 
as an index of negative aspect of adaptation, indicated that EI, especially MR, 
determined the level of loneliness.  
Both the positive aspect, e.g. self-esteem, and the negative aspects of 
adaptation, e.g. loneliness, seem to be determined by self-acceptance. Itatsu (1994) 
found a close relation between self-acceptance and interpersonal relations. Namely, 
the participants who accepted their own self had friendly attitudes toward others. 
As attitude to others is a critical aspect of adaptation, the more a participant 
accepted their own self, the higher level of adaptation he or she has. Therefore, self-
acceptance is worth being examined to clarify the critical aspects of adaptation. As 
Toyota et al. (2007) showed, there is a positive relation between EI and self-esteem. 
This relation may be mediated by self-acceptance. Because the participants with 
higher EI could control their emotion in a situation of strong stress, they could 
accept their own self. As for the participants with lower EI, they could not control 
their emotion in such a situation and they often had difficulty in accepting their 
own self. So the positive relation between EI and self-acceptance could be 
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predicted. Some recent research (Toyota, 2005; Toyota & Kishida, 2006) found 
gender differences in interpersonal adaptation. Toyota et al. (2007) also observed 
gender differences in the correlations between total EI score and neuroticism (-.35 
for male and -.17 for female) and between MR score and conscientiousness (.16 for 
male and .35 for female). Considering these gender differences, the effect size of EI 
on self-acceptance would depend on gender. The first purpose of the present study 
is to examine the differences in the effect of EI on self-acceptance between male 
and female undergraduates.  
Previous studies (Epstein & Feist, 1988; Fey, 1957; Phillips, 1951) examined 
the relation between self-acceptance and other-acceptance (acceptance of others), 
and showed a close relation between the two types of acceptance. Although no 
research directly examined the other-acceptance in Japan, Toyota (2009) 
investigated the effect of Iiasho similar to the concept of other-acceptance, on 
loneliness. According to Toyota (2008), ibasho is an idiosyncratic word in the 
Japanese culture, and is defined as the person who eases your mind (PEM), or the 
person one feels comfortable with, such as "myself", "mother", "father", "brother", 
"sister", "friend" and so on. Toyota (2008) showed that participants who selected 
"myself" as PEM had a higher level of loneliness than those who selected "mother" 
or "friend". Since the earliest research by Kato (1977), research on PEM stressed 
the contrast between "myself" and "others". Namely, it is critical whether someone 
depends on others or not. Recent studies (Okamura & Toyota, 2002; Toyota & 
Okamura, 2001, 2002) have indicated that the participants who selected "myself" as 
PEM ("myself" groups) were inferior in two interpersonal emotions (the level of 
confidence in others and subjective distance between myself and others) than those 
who selected "mother" or "friend". These studies suggested the importance of PEM 
for the adaptation and the possibility that PEM had an effect on self-acceptance in 
Japanese students. The present study compares self-acceptance among PEM 
groups. Since self-acceptance, as mentioned before, was correlated with other-
acceptance (e.g., Epstein & Feist, 1988), it is predicted that participants in 
"mother", "friend" and "lover" groups would have higher scores of self-acceptance 
than those in "myself" group. The second purpose of the present study was to 
examine this prediction.  
Toyota (2008) showed that the effects of EI on the level of loneliness were 
varied among the three groups. Namely, the loneliness in "myself" group was 
strongly influenced by EI, in contrast to the "mother" or "friend" groups. Toyota 
(2009) also showed the differences in the effect of sub-abilities (PU, EL, MR) in EI 
on loneliness across each ibasho (PEM) group. Considering these differences 
among PEM groups, the effect size of EI on self-acceptance would be varied 
among PEM groups ("myself", "mother", "friend" and "lover"). MR is the most 
critical for self-acceptance among sub-abilities in EI, because one has to control or 
regulate some unpleasant, stressful, or sad events that caused the feeling of not-
accepting their own self. If so, it is predicted that MR has a significant effect on 
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self-acceptance in all PEM groups. However, it is also predicted that the effects of 
EL and PU would depend on type of PEM groups. The third purpose of the present 
study is to examine these predictions.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
The participants were 244 Japanese undergraduates, 96 of whom were males, 
148 were females. The mean age was 18.7 (SD=0.64), ranging from 18.0 to 21.8 
years old, and belonging to 2 different universities located in Kansai area of Japan. 
 
Instruments  
 
The present study used the following three instruments.  
 
Japanese version of the Emotional Skills and Competence Questionnaire (J-
ESCQ) - the original version of this scale was developed by Takšić (1998) using 
Croatian participants and is based on the framework of the emotional intelligence 
model (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). The original version includes 45 items divided 
into three subscales mentioned above (1) PU (e.g., I notice when somebody feels 
down.), (2) EL (e.g., I am able to express my emotions well.), and (3) MR (e.g., I try 
to keep up a good mood.). The original version of the ESCQ indicated that the 
coefficient alphas of the subscales were satisfactory to enable the confirmation of 
the reliability of the ESCQ (Takšić, 2002). Toyota et al. (2007) developed the J-
ESCQ, consisting of 8 items per subscale (24 items). The alphas for the three 
subscales (PU, EL and MR) were .91, .88, and .65, respectively. The present study 
used J-ESCQ as a tool for measuring the level of EI. Participants rated each item on 
a 5-point rating scale (never, seldom, occasionally, usually, and always), indicating 
how often they feel or think about the statement expressed in each item. 
 
Ibasho Choice Index (ICI) - Ibasho (the person who eases one's mind) of each 
participant was assessed by the ICI. This index was developed by Toyota and 
Okamura (2002) and used in previous studies (Toyota, 2008, 2009). ICI includes 
the question, "Who is the person that eases your mind?" and 8 alternatives of 
choice, namely myself, mother, father, grandfather or grandmother, brother or 
sister, friend, lover and others. Participants were asked to choose one of the 8 
alternatives as the answer to the previous question. 
 
Self-Acceptance Scale Short Version (SASSV) - this scale was developed by 
Itatsu (1989), and then adapted to undergraduates (Itatsu, 1994). This scale 
consisted of 25 items with a 7-point rating scale, (ranging from 1 = disagree to 7 = 
agree), indicating how participants feel or think about the statement expressed in 
each item (e.g. I like myself, I am sensitive). Itatsu (1994) evidenced significant 
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correlations of self-acceptance with interpersonal attitude (Kato & Takagi, 1980). 
This correlation was regarded as an indicator of the concurrent validity of the scale. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants in two different classes completed the previously mentioned scales 
in the author's classes. Participants were distributed the sheets of paper containing 
ICI, J-ESCQ and SASSV separately. They were asked to answer each scale 
following the author's instructions. Two orders of answering the three scales (ICI, 
J-ESCQ and SASSV; ICI, SASSV and J-ESCQ) were assigned to each of the 2 
classes. 
 
 
Results 
 
Effects of EI on Self-Acceptance in Males and Females 
 
Descriptive data for males and females are shown in Table 1.  
A multiple regression analysis was performed to determine the effects of EI on 
self-acceptance in male and female participants, respectively. Table 2 shows the 
result in males indicating that only MR has a significant effect on self-acceptance 
and explains 15% of self-acceptance variance. Whereas for females PU, EL and 
MR have significant effects on self-acceptance, and these three sub-abilities in EI 
explains 35% of self-acceptance variance. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Data for Males and Females on Measures  
of Self-acceptance of EI 
 
   Male Female 
Self-
Acceptance 
M 
SD 
81.26 
8.46 
80.73 
8.88 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
PU M SD 
25.34 
5.22 
25.89 
4.62 
EL M SD 
26.02 
4.94 
25.19 
5.60 
MR M SD 
28.12 
4.70 
28.07 
4.03 
 
Note. PU – Perceiving and Understanding Emotion;  
EL – Expressing and Labeling Emotion;  
MR – Managing and Regulating Emotion 
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Table 2. Multiple Regression Analysis on Self-Acceptance by EI sub-scales  
(PU, EL, and MR) as a Function of Gender 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 Self-Acceptance 
Male Female 
 r β r β 
PU  .10  .13 -.23** 
EL  .25  .41 .29*** 
MR  .39 .39** .53 .49*** 
 R2 
F 
.15 
17.22*** 
.35 
25.76*** 
Note. PU – Perceiving and Understanding Emotion; EL – Expressing and 
Labeling Emotion; MR – Managing and Regulating Emotion. 
**p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
The Relationship between PEM, EI and Self-Acceptance 
 
As Toyota (2008, 2009) indicated, the participants' choices of each of 8 
alternatives in ICI were counted. Table 3 indicates the number of each choice. As 
participants frequently chose "myself", "mother", "friend" and "lover" options, the 
following analyses were conducted to these four groups. Table 4 shows the means 
and standard deviations for J-ESCQ (PU, EL and MR) and self-acceptance scores 
for each group. 2 (Gender; male and female) X 4 (PEM; "myself", "mother", 
"friend" and "lover") analyses of variances were conducted for each index (PU, EL, 
MR and self-acceptance). For all of the three sub-abilities in EI (PU, EL and MR), 
the main effect of gender, that of PEM and the interaction of gender and PEM were 
not significant. However, only for self-acceptance, the main effect of PEM was 
significant (F(3, 200)=3.95, p<.01). Multiple comparisons using Scheffe's method 
were performed to this main effect, indicating that the self-acceptance score in 
"mother" group was higher than those in "myself" and "lover" groups (p<.05). But, 
the difference in this score between the latter two groups was not significant and 
the differences in the score between "friend" group and the other three groups were 
not significant. 
 
Table 3. The Number of Choice for Each Alternatives to Ibasho Question  
("Who is the Person that Eases your Mind?") 
 
 Myself Mother Father 
Grand-
father or 
-mother 
Brother 
or sister Friend Lover Others Total 
Male 28 10 4 1 6 20 23 4 96 
% 29.17 10.42 4.17 1.04 6.25 20.83 23.96 4.17 100 
Female 25 61 6 1 14 26 15 0 148 
% 16.89 41.22 4.05 0.68 9.46 17.57 10.14 0.00 100 
Total 53 71 10 2 20 46 38 4 244 
% 21.72 29.10 4.10 0.82 8.20 18.85 15.57 1.64 100 
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Table 4. Mean Scores and their SDs of Self-Acceptance and EI  
as a Function of Group 
 
  Type of Group 
  Myself Mother Friend Lover 
  Male N=28 
Female 
N=25 
Male 
N=10 
Female 
N=61 
Male 
N=20 
Female 
N=26 
Male 
N=23 
Female 
N=15 
Self-
Acceptance 
M 
SD 
79.00 
8.66 
79.04 
7.83 
84.30 
10.02 
83.30 
7.59 
84.15 
7.92 
80.46 
8.93 
79.96 
7.65 
76.20 
11.73 
EI 
PU M SD 
24.75 
6.20 
25.32 
3.84 
24.60 
6.60 
25.44 
3.83 
25.60 
4.76 
26.62 
6.33 
26.91 
4.55 
26.73 
5.91 
EL M SD 
24.89 
5.52 
25.52 
6.09 
24.20 
6.99 
25.34 
5.40 
26.05 
4.63 
25.46 
5.65 
28.13 
3.99 
23.67 
6.07 
MR M SD 
26.18 
4.32 
27.48 
4.46 
29.70 
5.06 
28.34 
3.60 
28.55 
5.08 
28.85 
4.34 
29.30 
5.16 
26.67 
3.46 
Total M SD 
75.54 
13.65 
78.44 
11.99 
79.10 
13.31 
78.95 
10.35 
80.25 
10.43 
80.69 
15.03 
84.48 
8.97 
76.60 
12.74 
Note. PU – Perceiving and Understanding Emotion; EL – Expressing and Labeling Emotion;  
MR – Managing and Regulating Emotion. 
 
The Relationship between EI and Self-Acceptance as a Function of PEM Group 
 
Table 5 shows the correlations between each subscale of EI and self-acceptance 
in each group. Although .21 for female in "lover" group is a little low, the other 
correlations between MR and self-acceptance are high (range from .32 to .70). EL 
also has strong correlations with self-acceptance, except for males in "mother" 
group. For the correlation between PU and self-acceptance, the clear differences 
among PEM groups were observed. Namely, positive correlations were observed in 
"myself" and "friend" groups, but negative correlation was found in "lover" group.  
 
Table 5. Correlations EI (PU, EL and MR) in Each PEM Group 
 
 
 
Type of Group 
 Myself Mother Friend Lover 
 Male 
N=28 
Female 
N=25 
Male 
N=10 
Female 
N=61 
Male 
N=20 
Female 
N=26 
Male 
N=23 
Female 
N=15 
EI 
PU .35 .24 -.19 .18 .29 .62* -.36 -.21 
EL .28 .34 -.17 .43* .31 .59* .50* .44 
MR .32 .68* .46 .42* .36 .70* .45* .21 
Total .38 .50* -.01 .45* .46 .68* .45* .27 
Note. PU – Perceiving and Understanding Emotion; EL – Expressing and Labeling Emotion; 
MR – Managing and Regulating Emotion. 
*p<.05. 
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Discussion 
 
The first purpose of the present study was to examine gender differences in the 
effect of EI on self-acceptance. For males, only MR predicted the level of self-
acceptance, whereas for females, all of the three sub-abilities (PU, EL and MR) 
predicted it. As previous studies (Toyota, 2005; Toyota et al., 2007; Toyota & 
Kishida, 2006) showed the gender differences in interpersonal adaptation, the 
present study also indicated the gender difference in the effect of EI on self-
acceptance. As Toyota et al. (2007) suggested, further research in interpersonal 
adaptation should take gender into consideration.  
The second purpose of the present study was to examine the differences of self-
acceptance among PEM groups. As predicted, participants in "mother" and "friend" 
groups had higher scores of self-acceptance than those in "myself" group. 
However, the score in "lover" group was as low as in "myself" group. It is 
inconsistent with the prediction. Previous studies (Kato, 1977; Toyota, Oga, & 
Okamura, 2007; Toyota & Okamura, 2001, 2002) stressed the contrast between 
"myself" and "others". But "others" includes many types of groups, such as 
"mother", "friend", "lover" and so on. Although Toyota (2009) showed the 
difference in the effect of EI on loneliness between "mother" and "friend" groups, 
the present study found the difference between "lover" and the other two groups 
("mother" and "friend"). Since lover may be the most intimate and ego-involved 
person during later adolescence (Toyota & Kishida, 2006), it is reasonable to detect 
the difference between "lover" and the others.  
The third purpose of the present study was to compare the effect of sub-
abilities of EI on self-acceptance among PEM groups. Consistent with the 
prediction, MR have strong effects on self-acceptance in all of PEM groups. Toyota 
(2009) showed the importance of MR on loneliness, and indicated that the ability to 
regulate or control emotion about some events had a function to restrain the level of 
loneliness. Also, Toyota, Morita & Takšić (2007) showed the positive relations 
between MR and self-esteem. Considering these studies, the present result indicates 
the possibility that efficacy of regulating or controlling emotion leads to 
improvement of self-acceptance. Namely, the participants with higher MR have a 
higher level of self-esteem, which in turn may lead to a higher level of self-
acceptance. Not only MR but also EL has significant effects on self-acceptance in 
all of PEM groups. This result is consistent with Toyota (2009) showing the effects 
of EL on loneliness and self-esteem, and suggests that the ability to express and 
label emotions has also an important function to improve the level of self-
acceptance. As expression of emotion leads to a reduction of loneliness (Toyota, 
2009) improvement of self-acceptance may be partially caused by the reduction of 
loneliness. 
Interestingly, the effect of PU on self-acceptance varies with PEM groups. 
Namely, the strong relations between PU and self-acceptance were observed in 
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"myself" and "friend" groups. However, a weak or negative correlation was found 
in "mother" and "lover" groups. Especially for "lover" group, PU has a negative 
effect on self-acceptance. Although the participants in "lover" group depend on 
others as those in "mother" and "friend" groups, there may be differences in the 
level or degree of dependence. Comparing with the level of dependence to which 
participants in "mother" or "friend" groups depend on the "mother" or a particular 
"friend", each participant in "lover" group may depend on a particular "lover" more 
deeply. So, perceiving and understanding emotion of a particular "lover" often 
elicits a negative emotion, which leads to a decline of self-acceptance.  
The present study leads to the suggestion that it is critical to enhance the level 
of MR and EL for improving self-acceptance. A precise educational system should 
be provided to enhance the level of MR and EL. Toyota and Shimazu (2006) 
showed the positive relationships between the perceived experiences of 
contingency and MR (r=.34), or EL (r=.24), and indicated that the perceived 
experiences of contingency enhanced the level of MR and EL, which in turn led to 
the improvement of self-acceptance. According to Toyota (2009), contingent 
experience is one of the most successful predictors. Considering Toyota and 
Shimazu (2006), to enhance the level of MR and EL we should provide the 
opportunity to feel the contingency in the activity to the participants in educational 
program. During the program, participants should express their own emotion to 
others and control their own emotion to communicate with others. These activities 
related to EL and MR would facilitate their own self-acceptance. Considering the 
gender difference found in the present study, in further investigation it is necessary 
to establish a flexible utilization of such an educational program depending on the 
individual differences. 
Finally, the present study used self-acceptance as an index of adaptation. 
Toyota (2008, 2009) used loneliness as an index of the negative aspect of 
adaptation. Toyota (2009) also used self-esteem as an index of the positive aspect 
of adaptation. The present study used the self-acceptance as the core index related 
to both type of aspects, negative and positive aspects of adaptation. In further 
research a new index of adaptation should be considered.  
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Abstract
Although it is one of the central concepts of Rational Emotive Behavioral The-
rapy (REBT), unconditional self-acceptance has not been sufficiently empirically exa-
mined, especially not experimentally. Therefore, the aim of this study was to examine 
the effects of unconditional self-acceptance on mental health indicators in an ego-
provoking experimental situation. For a sample of 182 students, we simulated the 
situation of public speaking. After the simulation, participants were given previously 
prepared and randomly assigned positive, neutral and negative feedback. We used the 
Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ: Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001), 
Serbian Inventory of Affect based on PANAS-X (SIAB-PANAS: Novović & Mihić, 
2008), Anxiety subscale (DASS-42: Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), State Depression 
Scale (SD: Novović, Biro & Nedimović, 2009) and Situational Attributional Style con-
structed for the purpose of this study (according to Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Data 
were collected during the winter semester 2013/2014 at the University of Novi Sad. 
In the case of anxiety and depression as outcome variables (posttest measures), the 
analysis of covariance revealed a significant three-way interaction between the level of 
unconditional self-acceptance, the type of feedback and the satisfaction with feedback. 
On the other hand, the same predictors did not influence the measures of positive and 
negative affect. Various expectations from the feedback, as well as the feedback, pro-
voke a certain self-assessment. Different pattern of effects in case of different outcome 
variables is in accordance with REBT theory.
Key words: unconditional self-acceptance, feedback, anxiety, depression
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In the focus of this study is the evaluative component of the Self, which is, al-
most always, associated with psychological problems - an excessively low or high 
evaluation of some aspects of the self is associated with different psychological dis-
turbances (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001; David & Szentagotai, 2008). The most in-
vestigated construct is self-esteem which represents general subjective, positive or 
negative, evaluation of the self (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Self-esteem correlates 
with positive mental health indicators, psychological well-being and happiness (Di-
ener & Diener, 1995; DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). Individuals with high self-esteem 
have lower levels of emotional distress (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & 
Rusbult, 2004) and they are more likely to use adaptive stress coping strategies 
(Greenberg et al., 1992). On the other hand, people with low self-esteem have higher 
levels of psychological distress, depression and anxiety (Bernet, Ingram, & John-
son, 1993; Tennen & Affleck, 1993). Bearing in mind previous results, self-esteem 
could be seen as a “social vaccine” for preventing different personal problems in 
connection with social functioning. Many western countries implemented system-
atic programs for boosting self-esteem in education, health and business sectors 
(Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). However, there is little evidence 
for the efficacy of these programs (Baumeister et al., 2003). Also, there are several 
problems with current operationalization of self-esteem. Some studies suggest that 
self-esteem can’t be reduced to high vs. low dichotomy (Sava, Maricutoiu, Rusu, 
Macsinga, & Virga, 2011), and it is not an unidimensional construct (Kernis, 2005). 
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) argues that self-evaluation of per-
sonality (positive or negative) and a general assessment of one’s worth or value 
based on achieved performance, is irrational and leads to psychological problems. 
Most of the psychological disturbances associated with an excessive focus on self-
esteem are mild, such as sensitivity to criticism, aggression, maladaptive perfec-
tionism, etc. (as cited in Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001), but there are those that are 
severely pathological (e.g. bipolar disorder) (O’Brien, Bartoletti, & Leitzel, 2006). 
Therefore, the concept of self-esteem is detrimental to mental health, according 
to REBT. As a “healthier” substitute for self-esteem, REBT offers the concept of 
unconditional self-acceptance (Szentagotai & David, 2013). Unconditional self-
acceptance is defined as fully and unconditionally accepting yourself, regardless 
of whether you behave correctly, intelligently or competently, and regardless of 
whether people respect, accept or love you (Ellis, 1977). REBT sees unconditional 
self-acceptance as a continuum or as an intellectual and emotional habit which is 
expressed to a greater or lesser extent in different individuals. People with high un-
conditional self-acceptance are more resistant in ego-provoking situations such as 
failure or rejection (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001; Davies, 2006, 2007, 2008; Mac-
innes, 2006; Popov & Popov, 2011). 
We aimed at investigating the effects of the level of unconditional self-accept-
ance on several mental health variables (positive and negative affect, state anxi-
ety and state depression) in the situation of a realistic stressor in the ego-threat 
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domain. We used an experimental design which has rarely been used in the field 
and predicted that participants with lower levels of unconditional self-acceptance, 
dissatisfied with their feedback, would score higher for ego-disturbance symptoms 
(anxiety and depression) and negative affect compared to those with higher levels of 
unconditional self-acceptance. We also assumed that participants with higher levels 
of unconditional self-acceptance, satisfied with their feedback would score higher 
on positive affect.
METHOD
Participants
The sample consisted of 188 students (81% females) at the University of Novi 
Sad. We selected those study groups for which communication and presentation 
skills are an important part of their future profession. Psychology students were de-
liberately excluded because they are familiar with these kinds of experiments. After 
the elimination of multivariate outliers (according to the Mahalanobis distances; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) 182 participants remained in the final sample. The mean 
age of the participants was 20.14 years (SD = 3.17).
Instruments and variables
The instruments used are described below.
Serbian Inventory of Affect based on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-X 
(SIAB-PANAS: Novović & Mihić, 2008) is a Serbian translation and adaptation of 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-X (PANAS-X: Watson & Clark, 1994). A 
short version of the questionnaire, consisting of 20 items, was used to assess states 
of positive and negative affect (Positive Affect (PA) pre-test α = .91, PA post-test α 
=.93, Negative Affect (NA) pre-test α =.85, NA post-test α =.83)
Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ: Chamberlain & Haaga, 
2001) is a Serbian translation of the original instrument (Chamberlain & Haaga, 
2001). USAQ consists of 20 statements with a 7- point Likert scale, that reflect vari-
ous aspects of USA philosophy, as used in REBT (post-test α =.70).
Anxiety Scale from Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale (DASS-42: Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) assesses autonomic arousal, skeletal muscle effects, situational 
anxiety, and subjective experience of anxious affect. The scale contains 14 items 
with a 4-point Likert-type response format (pre-test α =.86, post-test α =.85)
A State Depression Scale (SD: Novović, Biro, & Nedimović, 2009) assesses the 
presence of depressive affect and its cognitive content, as well as other behavioral 
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and motivational interferences in relation to a depressive state. The scale contains 
20 items with 5-point Likert scale (pre-test α =.91, post-test α =.91).
The Situational Attributional Style Questionnaire (SASQ: Popov, 2014) was 
constructed for the purpose of this study. Beside attributional style, SASQ measures 
several variables including satisfaction with feedback, which is only relevant to this 
study. The respondents’ task was to indicate to what extent they felt satisfaction with 
feedback on a 7-point Likert scale.
Data collection procedure
Considering the nature of the study, the experiment had to be blind, i.e. the in-
formation about the experiment was kept from the participants until after the experi-
ment. Data were collected at the University of Novi Sad, during the winter semester 
2012/2013 in several stages: 
1. Students were informed that the University was introducing a new course: 
Public speaking skills. They were invited to voluntarily participate in establishing 
the criteria for the distribution of students at different levels of the course. Students 
participated in the study in exchange for course credits. The three-member “jury” 
was introduced to participants, whose alleged role was to judge participants’ public 
speaking skills. 
2. After the sample selection, we conducted the first testing session (pretest 
phase) in order to measure dependent (depression, anxiety, positive and negative 
affect) and moderator variables (unconditional self-acceptance, feedback and satis-
faction with feedback) and to collect demographic data. These testing sessions, as 
well as other parts of the experiment, were conducted in groups of 15 participants 
on average. 
3. Further, participants were given a short text about public speaking. Their 
task was to prepare themselves for an oral presentation in front of other colleagues 
and the “jury”. They had 5 minutes to prepare the presentation. 
4 Time allowed for the presentation was 1 minute and participants were inter-
rupted after the time ran out. Participants were informed about limited time for the 
oral presentation in the previous phase.
5. After the presentations, participants were asked to leave the room for a few 
minutes until the “jury” created individual feedback information. Instead of that, the 
“jury” simply placed the feedback information in the envelope with the name and 
surname of the participants. There were an equal number of positive, negative and 
neutral feedbacks and they were randomly assigned to participants. Along with the 
envelopes, participants received a battery of instruments for posttest measuring of 
dependent variables.
6. At the end, the participants were debriefed and they received oral and writ-
ten explanation of the whole procedure. 
SUVREMENA PSIHOLOGIJA 19 (2016), 1, 71-80
75© “Naklada Slap”, 2016. Sva prava pridržana.
RESULTS 
The data were analyzed using the analysis of covariance. The effects of a set of 
factors (level of unconditional self-acceptance, type of feedback and satisfaction 
with the feedback) on different dependent variables were tested in separate analy-
ses. Posttest measures of mental health indicators that served as dependent variables 
were: depression, anxiety, positive and negative affect while pretest measures of the 
same variables served as covariates. Unconditional self-acceptance scores and sat-
isfaction with feedback were dichotomized by a median split prior to the analysis – 
scores above the median represented high scores on reported measures while scores 
below the median were treated as low scores. The used factors were predictive for 
posttest measures of mental health indicators only for depression and anxiety; posi-
tive and negative affect remained unchanged by manipulating feedback. The effects 
from depression and anxiety ANCOVAs that reached statistical significance are 
presented in Table 1.
As can be seen in Figure 1, left graph, participants with lower scores on un-
conditional self-acceptance, who were less satisfied with positive feedback they 
Table 1. The effects of unconditional self-acceptance, type of feedback and satisfaction 
with feedback on depression and anxiety
Anxiety Depression
F p F p
SA_pre 41.428 .000 SD_pre 304.239 .000
USA×FS×FB 3.270 .041 USA×FS×FB 5.584 .005
Note: USA-unconditional self-acceptance; SA_pre-state anxiety pretest; SD_pre-state depression 
pretest; FS-feedback satisfaction; FB-feedback
Figure 1. Effects of level of unconditional self-acceptance, type of feedback and satisfac-
tion with feedback on posttest anxiety. 
SUVREMENA PSIHOLOGIJA 19 (2016), 1, 71-80
76 DOI: 10.21465/2016-SP-191-06
received, were more anxious in comparison with other participants. On the other 
hand, participants with lower unconditional self-acceptance but more satisfied with 
the feedback, were more anxious in case of a negative feedback than other partici-
pants (Figure 1, right graph).
With regards to depression, participants with lower unconditional self-accept-
ance dissatisfied with feedback were more depressive in comparison to those with 
higher unconditional self-acceptance both in case of neutral as well as positive 
feedback. At the same time, participants with lower unconditional self-acceptance 
who were satisfied with received feedback were more depressive in response to 
negative feedback in comparison to participants with higher unconditional self-
acceptance.
DISCUSSION
Results presented here support predictions of REBT theory about the protective 
role of unconditional self-acceptance in depressive and anxious emotional reac-
tions on stressful situations. Stressors were operationalized as feedback on public 
speaking, but we also examined the role of stressor evaluation ‒ satisfaction with 
feedback. We hypothesised that unconditional self-acceptance would have different 
effects on mental health indicators for participants with different satisfaction with 
feedback, which is exactly what we obtained. 
The participants with low unconditional self-acceptance who were not satisfied 
with feedback were more anxious and more depressive than the participants with 
higher unconditional self-acceptance, both after positive and neutral feedback. Par-
ticipants with lower unconditional self-acceptance, but satisfied with negative feed-
Figure 2. Effects of level of unconditional self-acceptance, type of a feedback and satis-
faction with a feedback on posttest depression.  
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back, are more anxious than participants with higher unconditional self-acceptance. 
On the other hand, participants with lower unconditional self-acceptance who are 
not satisfied with feedback are the most anxious in case of positive feedback. The 
lowest score on the depression scale was after negative feedback. It seems like these 
participants do not accept negative feedback, so it does not influence their depres-
sive symptoms. On the other hand, when someone is satisfied with the feedback, 
lower unconditional self-acceptance means higher scores on a depression scale. 
This pattern of results might mean that these participants expected negative feed-
back and since they are prone to self-deprecation they had a higher score on the 
depression scale. Similar unconditional self-acceptance moderation of the relation-
ship between type of feedback and satisfaction with it, on the one hand, and mental 
health variable on the other hand, is obtained in the case of anxiety. The reason could 
be pessimistic attribution where negative events are interpreted with the internal, 
stable and pervasive cause (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). However, this is a hypoth-
esis wich should be examined. 
Overall, these results indicate that personal interpretation of events, more than 
the events themself, is more important for quality of emotional response. It is con-
firmation for one of the fundamental ideas underlying REBT: “People are not dis-
turbed by things, but by the view they take of them” (Epictetus as cited in Ellis, 
1977) and it is crucial for the therapeutic process. 
Although the trend of the results are is as expected, the tested predictors did not 
reach statistical significance in the case of affectivity variables. We assume that this 
might happen because the emotional response in the present experimental situation 
is not necessarily dysfunctional. Namely, REBT makes differences between healthy 
and unhealthy negative emotions which differ qualitatively more than quantitatively 
(Dryden, 2002). According to REBT, healthy positive and negative emotions should 
be less influenced by interaction of self-evaluation, feedback and satisfaction with 
it. It is unclear how much the variance of affect, measured in this study, is saturated 
with (un)healthy emotional responses because the instrument that we used is not de-
signed to distinguish healthy and unhealthy emotional response. For future research 
in the context of REBT it would be useful to construct an instrument that would 
discriminate between healthy (functional) and unhealthy (dysfunctional) emotions.
Although the complex joint effect of the level of unconditional self-accept-
ance, type of feedback and satisfaction with it on clinically relevant variables 
presented here cannot be taken as sufficient evidence for therapeutical usefullness 
of unconditional self-acceptance, it certainly does qualify unconditional self-ac-
ceptance for the “race” with other self-evaluative constructs in predicting mental 
health variables. Therefore, the work on the “psychological reality” of uncondi-
tional self-acceptance should be continued in the same direction – investigating 
the effects of unconditional self-acceptance in other controlled but ecologically 
valid settings.
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BEZUVJETNO SAMOPRIHVAĆANJE I MENTALNO ZDRAVLJE U 
EKSPERIMENTALNOM EGO -PROVOCIRAJUĆEM KONTEKSTU
Sažetak
Iako je jedan od središnjih koncepata Racionalno Emotivno Bihevioralne Tera-
pije (REBT), koncept bezuvjetnog samoprihvaćanja nije dovoljno empirijski istraži-
van, naročito ne eksperimentalno.  Zato je cilj ovog istraživanja je ispitivanje utjecaja 
bezuvjetnog samoprihvaćanja na pokazatelje mentalnog zdravlja u eksperimentalnoj 
ego- provocirajućoj situaciji. Na uzorku od 182 studenta, simulirali smo situaciju jav-
nog nastupa za koji su ispitanici dobili unaprijed pripremljeni, slučajno raspoređeni 
pozitivni, neutralni i negativni feedback te smo ispitivali efekte interakcije bezuvjet-
nog samoprihvaćanja, feedbacka i zadovoljstva dobivenim feedbackom na pokazatelje 
mentalnog zdravlja. Korišteni mjerni instrumenti su: Skala bezuvjetnog samoprihva-
ćanja (USAQ; Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001), Srpski inventar afekata baziran na PA-
NAS-X (SIAB- PANAS; Novović & Mihić, 2008), Subskala anksioznosti (DASS-42; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), Skala stanja depresivnosti (SD; Novović, Biro & Ne-
dimović, 2009) i Skala situacionog atribucijskog stila konstruirana za ovo istraživanje 
(prema Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Podaci su prikupljeni tijekom zimskog seme-
stra 2013/2014 godine na Sveučilištu u Novom Sadu. Rezultati analize kovarijanse 
ukazuju na to da razina samoprihvaćanja ima veću ulogu u predikciji anksioznosti i 
depresivnosti u interakciji sa zadovoljstvom dobivenim feedbackom od same prirode 
feedbacka. S druge strane, isti prediktori nisu utjecali na mere pozitivnog i negativnog 
afekta. Različita očekivanja od dobivenog feedbacka, kao i sam feedback, provociraju 
određenu samoprocjenu, te se različite kombinacije ovih faktora na drugačiji način 
reflektiraju na pokazatelje mentalnog zdravlja, sukladno sa REBT teorijom.
Ključne riječi: bezuvjetno samoprihvaćanje, feedback, anksioznost, depresivnost
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